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Empathy and emotion regulation are both processes that are vital for 
effective social functioning and emotional wellbeing. Broadly speaking, 
empathy refers to understanding and/or sharing another’s emotion, and 
emotion regulation refers to the processes by which one manages 
emotions. Despite increasing awareness that empathy and emotion 
regulation may be closely related, there has been little empirical study of 
this topic and the nature of the inter-relationships between their different 
component processes are not well characterised.  
 
This thesis addresses current gaps in the literature by utilising a range of 
approaches, including self-report, behavioural, eye-tracking, and 
psychophysiology measures, to examine the relationship between different 
trait and task measures of empathy and emotion regulation. It was 
predicted that the cognitive (i.e. understanding others’ emotions) and 
affective (i.e. sharing others’ emotions) dimensions of empathy would show 
different relationships with emotion regulation. Broadly speaking, it was 
expected that emotion regulation abilities would be positively associated 
with cognitive empathy but negatively associated with affective empathy.  
 
There was strong support for the hypothesis that empathy and emotion 
regulation are related. Furthermore, in most studies there was evidence to 
suggest that cognitive and affective empathy are related to emotion 
regulation abilities and behaviours in different ways. Divergent 
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relationships between trait and task metrics of cognitive and affective 
empathy were observed for various emotion regulation measures, including 
habitual strategy use, implicit emotion regulation ability, and reappraisal 
ability. While there was some support for the hypothesis that emotion 
regulation abilities are positively associated with cognitive empathy but 
negatively associated with affective empathy, conflicting findings were 
observed.  
 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to current knowledge and 
represents an important step towards elucidating the nature of the 
relationship between empathy and emotion regulation. The findings also 
highlight some important considerations regarding the relationship 
between different methods used to assess empathy and emotion regulation, 
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1.1. General introduction 
Empathy and emotion regulation are both processes that are vital for 
effective social functioning and emotional wellbeing (Decety and Lamm, 
2006; Gross, 2002, 2015). Broadly speaking, empathy refers to 
understanding and/or sharing another’s emotion (Chakrabarti and Baron-
Cohen, 2006; Decety and Jackson 2004; Preston and de Waal 2002), and 
emotion regulation refers to the processes by which one manages emotions 
(Gross, 1998, 2015). While empathy and emotion regulation largely have 
been considered separately, there is growing awareness that these 
processes may be closely related. Consider a situation in which somebody 
has upset or angered you. Trying to see things from that person’s 
perspective and understand the motivations behind their actions can often 
help to regulate any negative emotions you felt as a result of their 
behaviours. Or think of a parent whose child is in pain. Empathic processes 
can allow the parent to understand and share their child’s distress. 
However, if they are unable to sufficiently regulate the emotional state 
elicited via empathic processes, it could impede the parent’s ability to 
support their child appropriately. These everyday examples illustrate just 
some of the ways in which empathic and regulatory processes may interact.  
 
While the extant literature discussed in this chapter provides some 
evidence to suggest that these constructs may be related, there has been 
little systematic study of this topic. As such, the nature of the inter-
relationships between different component processes related to empathy 
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and emotion regulation are not well characterised. The research presented 
in this thesis addresses current gaps in the literature by utilising a range of 
approaches, including self-report, behavioural, eye-tracking, and 
psychophysiology measures, to examine the relationship between the 
various component processes that comprise empathy and emotion 
regulation. This introductory chapter discusses key background literature 
relevant to the studies described within. I begin with an overview of the key 
components of empathy and emotion regulation, before discussing existing 
theoretical and empirical work suggestive of a relationship between these 
two constructs.  
 
1.2. Empathy 
Empathy refers to the capacity to understand and/or share the emotions of 
others. These abilities serve vital social functions, such as enabling one to 
understand and respond appropriately to others, thereby supporting the 
development and maintenance of interpersonal relationships (Bailey et al., 
2008). Levels of empathy have been shown to vary within the general 
population, and it is considered to be a measurable and relatively stable 
trait (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Leiberg and Anders, 2006). 
Various approaches have been used to assess variability in empathy; 
subsequent chapters describe in greater detail some commonly used self-
report (chapter 2) and task-based (chapter 3) measures of empathy. The 
focus of this section is upon providing a broad overview of the construct, 
highlighting the different component processes that support the human 
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capacity to understand and resonate with the emotional experiences of 
others.  
 
1.2.1. Component processes of empathy 
Most theories of empathy distinguish between two core dimensions: 
affective empathy (the propensity/ability to share others’ emotions), and 
cognitive empathy (the ability to understand others’ emotional experiences) 
(Decety and Jackson, 2004; Singer and Lamm, 2009). There is considerable 
support for this distinction between the cognitive and affective dimensions 
of empathy, which are each mediated by largely non-overlapping neural 
substrates (see review by Yu and Chou, 2018). For example, individuals with 
autism spectrum conditions (ASC) exhibit deficits in understanding others’ 
emotional states, but their ability to resonate with others’ emotions remains 
relatively intact (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Lockwood et al., 
2013; see Frith and Happé, 2005, for review). Conversely, individuals with 
psychopathic traits and conduct disorder display deficits in the affective 
dimension of empathy, but do not show similar difficulties with cognitive 
empathic abilities (Jones et al., 2010; Lockwood et al., 2013; Sebastian et al., 
2012).  
 
While many theoretical accounts use the term empathy to refer to the end-
state(s) associated with understanding and/or sharing another’s emotion, I 
propose that empathy is best conceptualized not as end-states, but as the 
processes themselves that mediate these states. As such, empathy is not a 
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distinct emotional state per se (e.g. sadness, happiness), but rather a set of 
processes through which these emotion-states can be cognitively 
represented and/or generated in response to observing another 
conspecific. The rationale for a departure from the conventional framing of 
the term empathy as an emotional state is that such use of the term can 
conflate it with other experiences, such as sympathy, which represents just 
one possible outcome of observing another individual's emotional state 
(Batson et al., 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1989).  
 
In this thesis, I use the following heuristic for empathy, with three core 
components: 1) perception (perceptual mechanisms that facilitate the 
detection of relevant emotion cues), 2) mimicry/embodiment (mechanisms 
that can elicit spontaneous resonance with another’s emotions), and 3) 
cognitive processes (mechanisms that enable the observer to make 
inferences about another’s experience and manage the co-active self and 
other related representations) (fig. 1.1). 
 
These empathic components reflect separable mechanisms mediated by 
distinct neural networks, each of which contributes to the understanding 
or sharing of another individual’s emotional response as it unfolds. An 
affective reaction to another’s emotional state has the potential to be 
elicited in response to whatever cues are available to the perception of the 
observer. Importantly, different emotion cues may act upon the observer in 
different ways. When “concrete” cues such as facial, bodily, or vocal 
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expressions can be perceived, the empathic process can be mediated by 
mimicry/embodiment mechanisms, which may result in sharing of 
emotion. In the absence of any concrete emotion cues, “abstract” cues, 
such as contextual information or verbal mediation through language, can 
enable an understanding of another’s emotion via inferential cognitive 
processing (Goldman, 2011). As many situations offer a mixture of both 
types of cues, many empathy-induced reactions arise from a dynamic 
interplay between cognitive and mimicry-related processes. In the 
remainder of this subsection I discuss evidence in support of the 
delineation between the components of empathy described in this heuristic 
and draw upon relevant empirical findings to demonstrate the role these 
processes play in the ability to understand and/or share another’s emotion.
 
Fig. 1.1. Component processes of empathy: Perceptual processes facilitate the 
detection of relevant emotion cues; mimicry/embodiment mechanisms can elicit 
spontaneous resonance with another’s emotions; cognitive processes enable the 
observer to make inferences about the other’s emotional state and distinguish self 
from other. The colour grading on each component reflects the temporal gradient 
of these processes: for example, perceptual processes are active very early in 
response to a stimulus, whereas cognitive processes come online at a later stage. 
While the three component processes reflect separable mechanisms that operate 




Crucial to understanding and responding to another’s emotion is the ability 
to attend to relevant cues pertaining to their state. Thus, attention to 
socio-emotional stimuli reflects a fundamental precursor to empathic 
processes. One of the primary means by which human emotion is 
communicated is through facial expressions (Adolphs, 2002). A human face 
expressing an emotion represents a highly salient cue that is often 
processed in a prioritized manner.  
 
Efficient detection of facial expressions of emotion has been demonstrated 
using various paradigms (e.g. Fox et al., 2000; Sweeny et al., 2012). In 
attentional blink tasks, the inability to detect a second target face when it is 
preceded by another target with a short stimulus onset asynchrony (within 
200-400ms; Fox et al., 2005) is reduced when the second face is emotional 
(Yerys et al., 2013). Event related potential (ERP) studies have demonstrated 
that relative to neutral faces, emotional faces are associated with enhanced 
positivity of fronto-central components, with differences observed as early 
as 180 ms after stimulus onset (Eimer and Holmes, 2007). Such findings 
suggest that salient emotional information may be processed at an early 
stage of perception on a relatively implicit level. 
 
The importance of perceptual processes for empathy is evident in studies 
of trait empathy. Studies using the aforementioned attentional blink 
paradigms have shown that improved detection of sad facial expressions 
 21 
during the ‘attentional blink period’ is positively related to trait empathy 
(Kang et al., 2017). Further, two recent eye-tracking studies have shown that 
trait empathy is positively associated with gaze bias towards social versus 
non-social stimuli (Chakrabarti et al., 2017; Hedger et al., 2018).  
 
Higher trait empathy is also associated with more fixations on the eye-
region during face perception (Cowan et al., 2014) and a greater ability to 
infer complex mental/emotional states from images of just the eye-region 
(Vellante et al., 2013). The eyes appear to hold a special status in human 
social perception (Darwin, 1872) and attention to the eye-region of the face 
plays an important role in the perception component of empathy (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997). This view is supported by findings that individuals with 
ASC, a group of disorders characterized by deficits in social functioning and 
understanding others’ mental/emotional states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Frith and Happe, 2005), fixate less on the eye-region when viewing social 
stimuli than typical controls (Klin et al., 2002).  
 
As the research discussed above highlights, the perception of facial cues 
pertaining to another’s emotion is a core component process of empathy. 
While I have focused specifically upon facial expression of emotion, 
another’s emotions can be communicated in a variety of ways, such as 
through bodily posture, prosody, or verbal mediation through language 
(Coulson, 2004; Scherer, 2003; Wallbott, 1998). All emotion cues are not 
necessarily as concrete as facial and bodily expressions: we routinely have 
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to respond to abstract emotion-relevant cues from our environment. As I 
will go on to discuss, while concrete emotion cues can spontaneously elicit 
a response in the observer through mimicry/embodiment mechanisms, 
abstract cues may require more elaborate cognitive processing (Bird and 
Viding, 2014; Goldman, 2011). 
 
1.2.1.2. Mimicry/embodiment 
Humans display an inherent predisposition to spontaneously mimic the 
behaviours of others, including their facial expressions, body language, and 
vocalisations (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Chartrand and Dalton, 2008; 
Dimberg et al., 2000; Hess and Blairy, 2001; Niedenthal et al., 2001). 
Spontaneous facial mimicry (SFM) has been extensively studied using facial 
electromyography (fEMG). Perception of emotional facial expressions elicits 
activity in congruent muscle groups in the observer; e.g. Corrugator 
supercilii in response to angry faces and the Zygomaticus major in response 
to happy faces (Dimberg and Petterson, 2000; Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998; 
Rymarczyk et al., 2018; Sims et al., 2012). Crucially, SFM can be triggered 
rapidly and automatically (Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998), even when the 
observer is not consciously aware of the presence of the face (Bornemann 
et al., 2012; Dimberg et al., 2000). Evidence of such spontaneous mimicry in 
young children who have not yet developed efficient cognitive control 
mechanisms (Nadel, 2002), suggests that these processes are recruited 
early in the hierarchy of empathy-related responses. 
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Spontaneous mimicry is consistent with the common neural coding 
between perception and action (Prinz, 1997), whereby the perception of a 
behaviour automatically activates the motor representations that 
participate in the first-hand enactment of that behaviour (Dijksterhuis and 
Bargh, 2001; Preston and de Waal, 2002). This principle has been associated 
with the putative mirror neuron system (MNS), a network of brain regions 
activated by both the observation and execution of a given action. The MNS 
includes the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior parietal lobule (IPL), 
superior/middle temporal sulcus/gyrus (STS/MTG), and the anterior 
insula (AI) (Casile et al., 2011; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 
2006; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). It is thought that the MNS maps the 
perceived behaviour onto the observer's own motor and affective systems 
(Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Stevens et al., 2000).  
 
In the context of others’ emotional displays, the shared neural substrates 
between self and other can evoke in the observer an affective state 
isomorphic to that of the perceived other (de Waal and Preston, 2017; 
Hatfield et al., 1993). This set of processes thus potentially enable a quick 
route to sharing another individual’s emotion. This rudimentary 
embodiment of another’s emotion may also facilitate 
recognition/understanding of the other’s state by enabling the observer to 
draw upon the experience of the other mirrored in his or her own brain and 
body (Adolphs, 2002; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Carr et al., 2003; Chartrand 
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and Bargh, 1999; Dimberg et al., 2000; Hatfield et al., 1993; Niedenthal et al., 
2001; Preston and de Waal, 2002). 
 
In support of the role of mimicry/embodiment in empathy, the magnitude 
of SFM has been found to be positively related to the extent of self-
reported emotion shared between the observer and observed other (Sato et 
al., 2013, though see Hess and Blairy, 2001), and also to trait measures of 
empathy (Dimberg et al., 2011; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002). Similarly, 
activation of structures in the MNS has been noted consistently across a 
range of paradigms measuring empathic processes (Carr et al., 2003; 
Chakrabarti et al., 2006; Kaplan and Iacoboni, 2006; Lamm et al., 2011). 
Individual differences in MNS activation have also been related to trait 
empathy. For instance, IFG activity during the perception of emotional 
faces and bodily movements is positively correlated with trait empathy 
(Kaplan and Iacoboni, 2006; Pfeifer et al., 2008). Meanwhile, lesions in MNS 
regions are associated with deficits in emotion recognition and a reduced 
capacity to share others’ emotions (Adolphs et al., 2000; Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2009). 
 
In sum, mimicry/embodiment represent component processes within 
empathy that enable a direct mapping of another individual’s emotion on to 
the motor and affective systems of the observer, without an explicit need 
for complex cognition. These processes occur at an early stage of stimulus 
decoding and are largely automatic in nature. Further, 
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mimicry/embodiment processes may often, although not always, interact 
with the cognitive processes of empathy described in the following 
subsection. 
 
1.2.1.3. Cognitive processes 
The cognitive processes within empathy have been given various labels, 
such as perspective-taking and mentalizing, and are often considered 
synonymous with the construct of theory of mind (ToM) (Batson, 2009; 
Frith and Frith, 2003; Premack and Woodruff, 1978). This cognitive 
component encompasses various processes that enable the observer to 
take the perspective of another individual and make inferences about their 
mental/emotional state, based on knowledge of the context and 
estimations of the other’s beliefs/intentions (Frith and Frith, 2003). When 
concrete emotion cues are available, cognitive processes often interact 
with mimicry/embodiment processes. In the absence of concrete emotion 
cues, this cognitive-inferential route may in itself be sufficient to enable an 
understanding of, and affective response to, another’s emotion (Goldman, 
2011; Singer and Lamm, 2009; Walter, 2012). 
 
Emotional responses to a given stimulus/situation depend on how it is 
appraised in relation to one’s goals (Buhle et al., 2014; Moors, 2013). Thus, in 
order to accurately represent and respond to another’s emotions, the 
observer must make inferences about the knowledge, goals, and appraisals 
of the other in a given situation (Frith and Frith, 2003, 2006). At the most 
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basic level, such inferences can be drawn from situational cues using simple 
social scripts. For example, knowing that a student has missed the school 
bus may enable an observer to infer that he or she is likely feeling anxious 
about being late to school. Critically, the accuracy of these inferential 
processes is dependent upon the knowledge of the observer (Bird and 
Viding, 2014; Goldman, 2011). One who is not familiar with school buses and 
the education system might find it difficult to make the inference relative to 
another who is more embedded within this socio-cultural milieu. 
 
Empathic processes can often lead to co-active representations of self and 
other (Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Osborn and Derbyshire, 2010; 
Santiesteban et al., 2012). In attempting to represent another’s state via 
inferential processes, failures in self other-control can result in egocentric 
interference, whereby the observer’s own knowledge, beliefs, and states 
can affect how accurately he or she is able to infer another’s state (Camerer 
et al., 1989; Derbyshire et al., 2013; Epley et al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 2015; 
Silani et al., 2013; Todd et al., 2015). Similarly, where spontaneous 
mimicry/embodiment of another’s emotion is elicited by concrete emotion 
cues, self-other control processes are necessary for the observer to 
subsequently represent the other’s emotion as distinct from his or her own 
(Decety and Chaminade, 2003; Preckel et al., 2018). Thus, maintaining self-
other distinction is an important cognitive process within empathy, that 
enables an understanding of another’s emotion state (Jackson et al., 2005; 
Lamm et al., 2007). 
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In contrast to the relatively automatic nature of mimicry/embodiment 
processes, this cognitive component reflects more effortful processing. It 
relies upon various facets of cognitive control (Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis 
et al., 2009; Gokcen et al., 2016; Hansen, 2011) which enable the observer to 
simultaneously represent their own and the other’s state, inhibit their 
default egocentric perspective in order to take the perspective of the other, 
and draw upon relevant knowledge from stored memory (Bird and Viding, 
2014; Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen, 2006; Goldman, 2011; O’Connell et al., 
2015).  
 
The cognitive component of empathy is associated with a largely cortical 
network including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the superior temporal sulcus (STS), and the 
anterior temporal pole (TP) (Frith and Frith, 2006; Ruby and Decety, 2004; 
Saxe et al., 2004; van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009), with activations in 
these regions reported across a range of tasks that involve inferring 
another’s mental/emotional state (Atique et al., 2011; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et 
al., 2014; Goel et al., 1995; Lamm et al., 2011; Morelli et al., 2014; van 
Overwalle, 2009).  
 
In sum, cognitive processes represent the most elaborate and complex set 
of empathic processes. They involve switching between the representations 
of self and other in service of inferences based on concrete and/or abstract 
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cues that requires the integration of perceptual information with stored 
knowledge. Understandably, these cognitive processes necessitate more 
cortical resources and time, and as such, occur later and evolve over a 
longer timescale than the other empathic processes described above. 
 
1.3. Emotion regulation 
Emotion regulation comprises diverse processes that transform a goal to 
experience a different state into distinct strategies that attempt to bias the 
unfolding of emotion in the desired direction (Gross, 1998, 2015). Emotions 
are typically defined as psychological and somatic responses to 
motivationally significant events (Frijda, 1986; Levenson, 1999). While 
emotions can serve a vital and adaptive function, such as facilitating 
appropriate behavioural adjustments to one’s environment (Lazarus, 1991; 
Levenson, 1999; Oatley and Jenkins, 1992; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990), 
sometimes the emotions one experiences can be decidedly unhelpful. For 
instance, in preparing for an upcoming public talk, a moderate level of 
anxiety may facilitate the motivation necessary to work hard in order to 
deliver a successful presentation. However, if one’s level of anxiety is 
excessive and/or improperly managed, it can impede the ability to function 
effectively in pursuit of this goal (Gross, 2015; Tamir and Millgram, 2017).  
 
Emotion regulation enables control of the type, intensity, and duration of 
emotional experiences (Gross and Thompson, 2007), facilitating the ability 
to respond flexibly to situational demands and manage one’s emotions in 
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such a way that they do not impede successful goal pursuit (Gyurak et al., 
2011). The capacity to regulate emotions in an adaptive manner has 
important implications for social functioning, emotional wellbeing, and 
physical health (Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Boden et al., 2013; 
D’Avanzato et al., 2013; Dvorak et al. 2014; Gross, 2002; Gross and John, 
2003). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that emotion 
dysregulation plays a significant role in various psychopathologies, such as 
depression and anxiety (Crowell, et al., 2014; Folk et al. 2014). 
 
1.3.1. Emotion regulation strategies 
A fundamental aim of prior research has been to develop a taxonomic 
system that explains the myriad ways in which emotions can be regulated 
(Gross, 1998; Koole, 2009; Larsen, 2000; Naragon-Gainey et al., 2017; Webb 
et al., 2012a). Various models of emotion regulation have been proposed: 
Some distinguish between implicit and explicit regulatory processes (e.g. 
Gyurak et al., 2011), others provide a distinction based on the motivational-
functional dimensions of different emotional processes (e.g. Koole, et al., 
2006). In order to highlight the various regulatory strategies by which one 
can manage their emotions, here I refer to the extended process model of 
emotion regulation (EPM; Gross, 2015). 
 
The EPM suggests that in order to understand how emotions can be 
regulated, it is useful to consider how emotions are generated in the first 
place. According to the EPM, emotion generation is a cybernetic process in 
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which a situation in the world, once perceived, is evaluated during appraisal 
processes, leading to various changes in emotional response systems such 
as facial expressions, autonomic activity, and subjective feelings (fig. 1.2). 
Emotion regulation begins when a goal to experience a different emotion is 
activated by a discrepancy between a generated emotion and some desired 
emotion state. While regulation goals are often hedonic in a proximate 
sense (e.g. increase immediate pleasure/reduce immediate pain), they can 
also be considered hedonic in a more ultimate sense (e.g. facilitate 
relationships with others) (Tamir, 2016; Tamir et al., 2019). 
 
A regulation goal often leads to the selection and implementation of a 
regulation strategy to attain the desired state. Emotion regulation 
strategies can broadly be categorized based on which stage of emotion 
generation they primarily intervene: world, perception, valuation, or 
response (Gross, 2015). For instance, consider a situation in which one is 
feeling anxious about an upcoming presentation. To regulate this emotion 
by intervening in emotion generation at the world stage, one could cancel 
the upcoming talk (situation selection) or engage in thorough preparation 
to reduce feelings of anxiety (situation modification). Alternatively, one 
could intervene at the perception stage by taking one’s mind off the 
situation (attentional deployment). Another option would be to intervene at 
the valuation stage and change one’s appraisals of the situation, for instance 
by telling oneself that everything will most likely go according to plan, and 
even in the worst-case scenario, delivering a bad talk would not be the end 
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of the world (cognitive change). Finally, one could attempt to alter one’s 
actual responses, for example, by attempting to suppress the associated 
experience/expression of emotion or engaging in deep-breathing to 
attenuate one’s physiological arousal (response modulation). 
 
Fig. 1.2. Schematic of the Extended Process Model of emotion regulation (Gross, 
2015). The emotion generation process comprises a situation (world), which once 
perceived (perception) is subject to evaluative processes (valuation) which 
determine the emotional response (action). Each stage in this cycle can be 
targeted by different regulation strategies, thereby altering the emotional 
response the situation elicits. 
 
While there is some variability in the precise network of brain regions 
associated with different regulatory strategies, emotion regulation has 
broadly been shown to involve the recruitment of prefrontal and parietal 
control regions, which attenuate activity in subcortical structures 
associated with emotion generation (Banks et al., 2007; Ferri et al., 2013; 
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Goldin et al., 2008; Kalisch, 2009; Urry et al., 2009; Wager et al., 2008). I 
now discuss in greater detail each strategy described by the EPM, 
highlighting evidence regarding the underlying processes and neural 
substrates by which they are mediated, and the typical outcomes they 
entail. As situation selection/modification strategies are difficult to 
examine using lab-based approaches, these strategies are not discussed 
further.  
 
Attentional deployment refers to controlling the way in which attention is 
allocated to different features of a stimulus/situation in order to alter its 
emotional impact. This could entail distraction, which involves directing 
attention away from the emotion-eliciting stimulus in an external (e.g. 
looking away) or internal (e.g. thinking about something incongruent with 
the emotional stimulus) manner. In addition to entirely distracting oneself, 
one may also attend to less emotionally relevant aspects of the situation 
(Gross and Thompson, 2007; Gross, 1998, 2015). Evidence suggests that 
people often try to shift their attention away from distressing stimuli 
(Langens and Morth, 2003), and show different patterns of gaze fixation 
during regulation relative to control conditions in laboratory tasks (van 
Reekum et al., 2007). Critically, there is evidence that diverting attention 
toward non-emotional features is effective in downregulating emotional 
intensity (Ferri et al., 2013; Nix et al., 1995). Conversely, one’s emotional 
response may be heightened when more emotional features are attended 
(Ochsner et al., 2004a).  
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Cognitive change strategies involve modifying the way in which one thinks 
about the emotion-eliciting stimulus, such that the emotional response it 
elicits is altered in the desired manner (Gross, 1998, 2002, 2015). The most 
commonly studied cognitive change strategy is reappraisal, which is often 
operationalized either as semantic reappraisal or reappraisal via 
perspective taking (Webb et al., 2012a). Semantic reappraisal refers to a 
cognitive-linguistic strategy in which the meaning adhered to an emotional 
stimulus is altered (Goldin et al., 2008; Hajcak and Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Phan 
et al., 2005). Reappraisal via perspective taking involves adopting the 
perspective of a detached observer in order to cognitively distance oneself 
from an emotional stimulus/state, without necessarily changing its 
meaning (Erk et al., 2010; Koenigsberg et al., 2010; Messina et al., 2015; 
Webb et al., 2012a).  
 
When participants are instructed to use these forms of reappraisal in 
laboratory studies, they experience significant reductions in negative 
emotional experience based on self-report, psychophysiological, and neural 
measures (Harrison and Chassey, 2019; Jackson et al., 2000; Ray et al., 2010; 
Shiota and Levenson, 2012; Wallace-Hadrill and Kamboj, 2016; Webb et al., 
2012a). Furthermore, the habitual use of reappraisal is associated with 
various favourable outcomes, such as increased trait positive affect, more 
effective interpersonal functioning, and increased emotional well-being 
(Gross, 2002; Gross and John, 2003). 
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Response modulation strategies act directly upon the emotional response 
itself. The most commonly studied form of response modulation is 
expressive suppression (henceforth suppression), which involves efforts to 
inhibit behaviours associated with the expression of emotion (e.g., facial 
expressions) (Gross, 1998, 2015). Suppression is broadly considered to be a 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategy, with evidence that it is associated 
with increased sympathetic/cardiovascular activity (Gross and Levenson, 
1997), increased acoustic startle response (Hagemann et al., 2006), and 
sustained activations in the amygdala and insula (Goldin et al., 2008). While 
some studies have found evidence of reduced self-reported negative 
emotion during suppression, this could be due to the redirection of 
attention necessary to control one’s facial muscles, which may inherently 
reduce attentional resources allocated to the emotional 
stimulus/experience (Goldin et al., 2008). 
 
In sum, emotion regulation comprises various strategies that enable the 
individual to manage their emotional responses by targeting different 
stages of the emotion generation process. As highlighted above, different 
regulation strategies vary in their short-term efficacy in modulating 
emotion; importantly, they may also differ in terms of their longer-term 
consequences (Gross, 1998, 2002, 2015; Koole, 2009; Tamir, 2009, 2011). 
Consider again the example of feeling anxious about an upcoming 
presentation. Efforts to distract oneself from the situation (i.e. attentional 
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deployment) may reduce feelings of anxiety in the short-term, but at the 
expense of long-term emotional adaptation (Kross and Ayduk, 2008; Paul et 
al., 2016; Uusberg et al., 2016). While trying to think differently about the 
situation (i.e. reappraisal) may be somewhat less effective than distraction 
in its short-term influence on the emotion state, this strategy may facilitate 
long-term adaptation, enabling the individual to more effectively deal with 
the affective impact of similar situations in the future (MacNamara et al., 
2011). 
 
While the primary focus of the EPM is upon the different regulatory 
strategies by which one can control their emotions, the model also 
highlights a broader repertoire of abilities necessary for effective emotion 
regulation. In addition to one’s capacity to implement a given regulatory 
strategy, effective emotion regulation is reliant upon the ability to be aware 
of one’s emotions and to select a regulatory strategy appropriate to a given 
emotional experience and context (Gross, 2015; Sheppes et al., 2015). This 
assertion is broadly aligned with other models of emotion regulation, which 
suggest that to adequately capture the complexity of the construct, one 
should take into account a range of abilities, such as: 1) awareness/clarity 
regarding one’s emotional experiences, 2) the capacity to select and 
implement appropriate regulation strategies to manage emotions across 
diverse contexts, and 3) the ability to monitor the extent to which 
regulatory efforts are successful in generating the desired modulation of 
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emotion (Bonanno and Burton, 2013; Gratz and Roemer, 2004; Koole et al., 
2015).  
 
1.3.2. Explicit and implicit emotion regulation 
A further distinction between different regulatory processes is the extent 
to which they are reliant upon conscious effortful implementation. Dual 
process models are common within human psychology and typically 
distinguish between implicit and explicit processes (Bargh and Gollwitzer, 
1994). With regards to emotion regulation, explicit refers to the modulation 
of emotion by processes reliant upon conscious effortful implementation 
and monitoring; implicit refers to processes that are enacted in a relatively 
automatic manner and can exert their modulatory effect on emotion 
without the need for effortful cognition or conscious awareness (DeWall et 
al., 2011; Gyurak et al., 2011; Mauss et al., 2007). 
 
As most definitions of emotion regulation emphasise “control” over one’s 
emotional experience, it is relatively unsurprising that the term is most 
commonly used to refer to more deliberate effortful processes. Indeed, 
many processes associated with emotion regulation are closely aligned with 
this definition and involve conscious and deliberate efforts to control the 
frequency, intensity, and type of emotion (Gross, 1998, 2015). However, 
given the frequent need for emotion regulation in day-to-day life, the 
effortful nature of more explicit regulatory processes can place significant 
demands on vital and limited cognitive resources; thus, their 
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implementation may not always be possible. Other work highlights the 
crucial role of implicit processes, which may mediate to a large extent 
emotion regulation in day-to-day-life (Conner and Barrett, 2005; 
Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Gyurak et al., 2011; Hetts et al., 1999; Mauss et 
al., 2007). Some have referred to implicit emotion regulation abilities as 
reflecting an “invisible shield”, which can provide a buffer against the 
potential negative effects of emotions and facilitate improved mental health 
and emotional wellbeing (Bargh and Williams, 2006; DeWall et al., 2011; 
Gilbert et al., 1998; Koole et al., 2015; Mauss et al., 2007). 
 
While a categorical “all or nothing” approach to distinguishing between 
implicit and explicit regulatory processes has a certain intuitive appeal, 
recent theoretical work suggests a more nuanced conceptualisation. Such 
work asserts that adaptive emotion regulation involves the dynamic 
interplay between implicit and explicit regulatory processes (Koole et al., 
2015). As an example of the “porous” boundaries between implicit and 
explicit regulatory processes, the extent to which initially demanding 
regulation strategies are reliant upon effortful control can diminish over 
time and habitual use (Drabant et al., 2009; Gyurak et al., 2011; Yuan et al., 
2015). In addition to the automatic implementation of regulatory strategies, 
implicit emotion regulation also encompasses other processes that may 
occur at the earliest stages of response to an emotional stimulus. For 
example, the capacity to maintain goal-directed behaviours and inhibit the 
distraction that irrelevant emotional stimuli/experiences can entail 
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(Tottenham et al., 2011), and the ability to implicitly monitor one’s emotional 
experience and adopt appropriate goals that motivate regulatory 
intervention (Koole et al., 2015).  
 
1.3.3. Distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation 
While research on emotion regulation has seen a dramatic increase over 
the past few decades, an ongoing debate persists regarding the extent to 
which emotion regulation can be meaningfully distinguished from emotion 
generation (Gross and Feldman-Barrett, 2011). A simple distinction between 
these constructs asserts that emotion generation comprises the processes 
through which an emotion is elicited, and emotion regulation refers to the 
processes that serve to modify these emotion-generative processes (Gross 
et al., 2011). However, this distinction may not be so clear-cut as evidence 
suggests overlap in the processes and neural substrates of emotion 
generation and regulation (Ochsner et al., 2009), leading some to assert 
that a clear distinction between these constructs is not possible (Kappas, 
2011).  
 
In the context of this thesis, I argue that distinguishing emotion regulation 
from emotion generation at a conceptual level serves a useful function so 
long as certain caveats are taken into account. A primary concern 
associated with distinguishing these sets of processes relates to the 
temporal sequence that such a distinction can imply (Gross et al., 2011). 
Given the aforementioned definition of emotion generation and regulation, 
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it may be intuitive to infer that emotion generation processes unfold prior 
to the regulatory processes that can act upon them. While this may indeed 
be the case in many situations, there may also be instances in which 
regulatory processes occur alongside, or even precede, emotion generative 
processes (see reviews by Gross and Feldman-Barret, 2011; Gross et al., 
2011).  
 
In sum, this thesis adopts a definition of emotion regulation similar to that 
asserted by Gross and colleagues (e.g. Gross, 2015; Gross et al., 2011), 
referring to processes that can act upon and alter the processes that 
constitute emotion generation. Critically, I assert that regulatory processes 
need not necessarily occur after emotion generation, and that the two sets 
of processes can at times occur in parallel. While I do refer to emotion 
regulation as a distinct construct, I acknowledge the close relationship 
between these processes and those associated with emotion generation 
and recognise that it can often be difficult to disambiguate the unique 
influence that each may have on the trajectory of one’s emotional response 
in a given situation. Given that regulatory processes may exert an influence 
at the earliest stages, and often without awareness or intent (Gyurak et al., 
2011; Mauss et al., 2007), it is likely that an individual's emotional reactivity 
(i.e. the intensity with which they are prone to experience emotions) can be 




1.4. Relationship between empathy and emotion regulation 
In this section I discuss relevant literature regarding the relationship 
between empathy and emotion regulation and highlight current gaps in our 
knowledge that this thesis seeks to address. A close relationship between 
empathy and emotion regulation has been proposed by previous theoretical 
accounts (e.g. Decety, 2010; Zaki, 2014), and there is strong overlap in the 
neural implementation and component processes associated with these 
constructs. For instance, the processes and neural substrates of reappraisal 
show significant overlap with those involved in the cognitive component of 
empathy (Kalisch, 2009; Mcrae et al., 2010; Ozonoff and McEvoy, 1994; 
Ozonoff et al., 1991; Sabbagh et al., 2006; Urry et al., 2009). Such work is 
suggestive of a relationship between empathy and emotion regulation.  
 
In their discussion of the association between empathy and emotion 
regulation, Schipper and Petermann (2013) suggest that the relationship 
between these two abilities is bi-directional. They posit that not only can 
regulatory processes influence one’s capacity to understand and share 
others’ emotions, but that empathic processes can influence one’s capacity 
for adaptive emotion regulation. Consistent with such theoretical work, this 
thesis asserts that the processes that underlie empathy and emotion 
regulation are closely related and seeks to test empirically the association 
between the various component processes that these complex 
multidimensional constructs comprise.  
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Of the handful of previous studies that have explored the relationship 
between empathy and emotion regulation, most have focused upon the 
moderating effect of emotion regulation on the association between 
affective empathy and different empathic outcomes (e.g. sympathy and 
personal distress; Okun et al., 2000), and prosocial behaviours (Lockwood 
et al., 2014). The key assertion of such work is that an optimal level of 
emotion regulation enables the observer to resonate with the negative 
emotions of others while maintaining arousal at a level where the observer 
does not become overly distressed by the other’s state. The focus of this 
thesis is not upon how emotion regulation relates to different outcomes of 
empathy per se, but rather how the different cognitive and affective 
component processes associated with empathy are related to different 
emotion regulation abilities.  
 
While not their primary focus, the aforementioned research examining the 
impact of emotion regulation on different empathic outcomes provides 
some evidence suggestive of a direct relationship between empathy and 
emotion regulation. For example, self-report measures of one’s capacity to 
understand others’ emotional states are positively related to the habitual 
use of reappraisal (Lockwood et al., 2014; Powell, 2018; Tully et al., 2016). 
Similarly, the self-reported capacity to take the perspective of others is 
negatively related to dispositional measures of emotion dysregulation 
(Contardi et al., 2016; Eisenberg and Okun, 1996; Okun et al., 2000). While 
relatively little work has directly examined the relationship between 
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cognitive/affective empathy and emotion regulation, some clues as to the 
nature of their potential relationship can be found through examination of 
prior work that has studied these two constructs in isolation.  
 
1.4.1. Evidence from atypical populations 
Findings from studies of atypical populations provide evidence of shared 
deficits in emotion regulation and empathy in certain psychopathologies. 
Relative to typical controls, individuals with autism spectrum conditions 
(ASC) exhibit poor performance on measures of ToM/cognitive empathy, 
and also report higher levels of emotion dysregulation (Konstantareas and 
Stewart, 2006). ASC individuals also report greater use of maladaptive 
regulation strategies, such as suppression, and less frequent use of adaptive 
strategies, such as reappraisal (Samson et al., 2012). Borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) is a condition characterised by difficulties regulating 
emotions and is often associated with atypically high levels of affective 
empathy (Fertuck et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2012). Such findings suggest that 
the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy may share different 
relationships with emotion regulation. 
 
1.4.2. Social appraisals and emotion generation/regulation 
Our emotions are often influenced by those around us; regulating the 
emotional state elicited by another’s actions can at times necessitate being 
able to take their perspective in order to understand the motivations and 
intentions underlying their behaviours. Think for instance of an occasion in 
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which someone’s behaviour has angered you. Component processes related 
to cognitive empathy may facilitate being able to put yourself in their 
perspective and infer that their behaviour was justified and that the 
negative response they evoked in you was not the other’s intention. As this 
example highlights, empathic processes could facilitate emotion regulation 
in situations where one’s emotional response was triggered by another 
individual. Empathic processes might also influence emotion generative and 
regulatory processes in instances where another individual was not the 
trigger for one’s emotion. 
 
Building upon prior work on appraisal theory, Manstead and Fischer (2001) 
proposed that in a given situation the object of one’s appraisals are not 
simply the “event” itself, but that the behaviours and emotional responses 
of other individuals present in that situation may also be appraised, and 
thus, influence the individual's emotional response. To illustrate this point, 
consider an example of a nervous flyer who becomes anxious during a bout 
of turbulence. While their appraisal of the event itself may induce strong 
anxiety and fear, this experience may be attenuated by evidence that other 
passengers and the flight crew are clearly not concerned by the situation. 
The authors refer to these appraisals of others’ emotional responses to an 
event as social appraisals (Manstead and Fischer, 2001).  
 
Social appraisals are likely dependent upon one’s ability to attend and 
accurately interpret relevant cues pertaining to others’ emotions, which are 
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mediated by various empathic processes. Thus, it stands to reason that an 
individual's propensity and ability to engage empathic processes may play 
an important role in determining their emotional responses. Critically, 
given the close relationship between appraisal and reappraisal processes 
(which are typically differentiated only by the point in time at which they 
occur; Uusberg et al., 2019), the work discussed above suggests that one’s 
ability to understand others’ emotional experiences may influence their 
own regulatory, as well as emotion generative processes.  
 
1.4.3. Overlap in cognitive control processes and neural substrates 
Further evidence of a close association between empathy and emotion 
regulation comes from research that has highlighted partial overlap in the 
neural networks and cognitive control processes that underlie key 
component processes associated with these constructs. The term cognitive 
control (often executive function) refers to a range of processes that govern 
high-level control of action and facilitate abilities such as planning and 
attentional flexibility. While the different sub-components of cognitive 
control have been defined in various ways, key processes commonly 
referred to are: working memory, inhibition, and set-shifting (Miyake et al., 
2000).  
 
There is evidence to suggest that similar cognitive control processes play a 
critical role in both empathy and emotion regulation. Firstly, cognitive 
empathic abilities and emotion/self-regulation show similar developmental 
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trajectories and are related to the development of general cognitive control 
functions (Carlson et al., 2004; Joseph and Tager-Flusberg, 2004; McRae et 
al., 2012; Wade et al., 2018). Further, there is evidence that different 
processes related to cognitive empathy and emotion regulation rely to 
varying degrees upon set-shifting, working memory, and inhibitory control 
(Austin et al., 2014; Gokcen et al., 2016; Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; 
Mcrae et al., 2013), and are associated with overlapping activation in regions 
of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Happé et al., 1996;  Kalisch, 2009;  Leopold et 
al., 2012; Mcrae et al., 2010; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Ozonoff et al., 1991; 
Ozonoff and McEvoy, 1994; Sabbagh et al., 2006).  
 
The ability to attribute an emotional/mental state to another individual 
requires various cognitive control processes, which facilitate the necessary 
coordination of self and other representations (Carlson et al., 2004; Carlson 
and Moses, 2001; Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Flynn, 2007; Hansen, 2011; 
Hughes and Ensor, 2007; Perner and Lang, 1999). Prior work provides 
evidence suggestive of a close relationship between cognitive control 
abilities and cognitive empathy/ToM (Austin et al., 2014; Gokcen et al., 2016; 
Hughes and Ensor, 2007; Marcovitch et al., 2015; Mutter et al., 2006). 
Further support for the role of cognitive control processes in 
understanding others’ emotional/mental states comes from studies 
demonstrating that increased cognitive load can result in decreased 
performance on ToM/cognitive empathy tasks (Bull et al., 2008; McKinnon 
and Moscovitch, 2007).  
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Similar cognitive control processes to those associated with the cognitive 
component of empathy have also been implicated in emotion regulation, 
where they underlie the ability to regulate affect and exert control over 
one’s behaviours (Rothbart and Rueda, 2005). While there are conflicting 
findings regarding the precise sub-components of cognitive control with 
which they are related, there is evidence to suggest that emotion regulation 
processes are dependent upon various cognitive control abilities 
(Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; Salas et al., 2014; Schmeichel and Demaree, 
2010; Schmeichel et al., 2008).  
 
Neuroimaging studies broadly suggest that emotion regulation is associated 
with a dynamic interaction between cognitive control regions of the 
PFC/parietal cortex and subcortical regions associated with emotion 
generation. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that activity in these 
control regions of the PFC inhibits activations in emotion generation 
regions, such as the amygdala and insula (Banks et al., 2007; Drabant et al., 
2009; Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2012; Urry et al., 2009; Wager et al., 
2008).  
 
In addition to being associated with the recruitment of similar domain-
general cognitive control processes, there is considerable overlap in the 
way in which certain empathic and regulatory processes are 
conceptualised. For example, reappraisal via perspective-taking or 
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cognitive-distancing (henceforth, distancing) (Messina et al., 2015; Webb et 
al., 2012a) involves taking a detached perspective from one’s immediate 
egocentric experience (Cocking and Renninger, 1993; Ochsner, et al. 2004; 
Trope and Liberman, 2010). Distancing is conceptually similar to 
perspective-taking in that both involve a shift in perspective.  
 
Consequently, one could argue that a greater ability to switch between self 
and other perspectives (a component process of cognitive empathy) might 
support the ability to regulate one’s emotions using cognitive-distancing 
strategies. The capacity to adopt a more distanced perspective may also 
enable greater self-reflection, thereby facilitating other regulatory 
processes, such as the selection of appropriate strategies and the ability to 
generate alternative appraisals of a situation that might serve to modify 
one’s emotional experience (Davis et al., 2011; Gruber et al., 2009; Katzir and 
Eyal, 2013; Kross and Ayduk, 2011; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Wallace-Hadrill 
and Kamboj, 2016; Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). 
 
In light of the findings discussed above, it is reasonable to infer that higher 
levels of cognitive empathy would be associated with improved emotion 
regulation abilities; this may be particularly true for more cognitively 
demanding regulatory processes. While cognitive empathic abilities may 
support emotion regulation, as I now discuss, the opposite could be true of 
affective empathy.  
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Individuals with greater affective empathy exhibit increased facial mimicry 
responses to others’ emotions (Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002), which in turn 
have been shown to relate to increased self-reported resonance with the 
mimicked emotion (Hatfield et al., 1993; Laird et al. 1994; Wild et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that greater affective 
empathy may be associated with increased emotional reactivity in a more 
general sense (Rueckert et al., 2011). Given that emotional 
stimuli/experiences can have a deleterious effect on the efficiency of 
cognitive control processes (Tottenham et al., 2011), the increased 
emotional reactivity associated with higher levels of affective empathy 
could interfere with one’s ability to engage the often demanding processes 
necessary for emotion regulation. Therefore, in contrast to cognitive 
empathy, it is possible that greater affective empathy would be associated 
with a diminished ability to utilise more cognitively demanding regulatory 
strategies.  
 
1.4.4. Emotional awareness and understanding 
In addition to the overlap in the processes and neural substrates by which 
they are mediated, there is reason to infer that empathy and emotion 
regulation may be related in other ways. For instance, empathy not only 
enables one to understand the emotional states of others but may also 
support the capacity to be aware of and understand one’s own emotional 
experiences. Many authors posit that self-understanding is a critical 
component of socio-cognitive abilities such as cognitive empathy/ToM 
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(Hobson, 2010; Frith and Frith, 2003). Indeed, a recent study found evidence 
to suggest that individuals who are better at differentiating their own 
negative emotional states, were also more accurate in recognising the 
emotional expressions of others (Israelashvili et al., 2019). 
 
An awareness and understanding of one’s own emotions is a fundamental 
prerequisite for adaptive emotion regulation: In order to effectively 
influence our emotional experiences, we must first of all recognise what we 
are feeling and why (van Rijn et al., 2011; Subic-Wrana et al., 2014). Indeed, it 
has been shown that greater clarity with regards to one’s own emotions is 
associated with the use of more adaptive emotion regulation strategies 
(Gohm and Clore, 2002) and a greater ability to implement reappraisal 
(Fustos et al., 2013). Furthermore, the capacity to detect and understand the 
somatic experiences associated with emotion (i.e. interoceptive awareness) 
may support regulatory processes in various ways. For example, improved 
interoceptive awareness can enable the detection of emotional responses 
at an early stage, which may support the generation of appropriate 
regulatory goals and facilitate the selection and implementation of 
regulatory processes prior to the emergence of a full blown emotional 
response (Craig, 2008; Fustos et al., 2013; Gross, 2015).  
 
In sum, it is possible that the improved awareness and understanding of 
one’s own emotions, associated with higher levels of empathy, could 
facilitate the ability to regulate one’s emotions effectively. By the same 
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logic, low levels of empathy could entail difficulties with emotional 
awareness/clarity, which might serve as a trigger for maladaptive emotion 
regulation (Schipper and Petermann, 2013).  
 
1.5. Summary, aims, and hypotheses 
In this chapter, I have discussed background literature relevant to the 
studies reported in this thesis. In the first section, I described the different 
component processes of empathy, with a focus upon the distinction 
between the cognitive and affective components that support the capacity 
to understand and/or resonate with another individual’s emotions. I then 
provided a broad overview of emotion regulation, focusing upon models 
that distinguish between different regulatory processes based upon 1) the 
point within the emotion generation process at which they intervene, and 
2) the extent to which they are reliant upon conscious, effortful 
implementation and monitoring. In the final section, I discussed extant 
theoretical and empirical work that provides some insight into the potential 
nature of the relationship between these constructs.  
 
In sum, there is evidence suggestive of a close bidirectional relationship 
between empathy and emotion regulation; however, to date there has been 
little systematic study of how the distinct cognitive and affective 
components of empathy relate to different emotion regulation processes. 
Additionally, of the handful of studies that have explored this relationship, 
most have relied solely upon self-report measures of both constructs. 
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While self-report questionnaires represent a useful source of information, 
empathy and emotion regulation are complex multidimensional constructs 
and a sole focus upon respondents’ self-perceptions of these abilities may 
be insufficient to fully capture their true complexity.  
 
Various studies provide evidence of divergence between trait and task 
measures of empathy (e.g. Devlin et al., 2014; Melchers et al., 2015; 
Michalska et al., 2013), which suggests that these different approaches may 
not assess the same underlying constructs. A fundamental distinction 
between trait and task measures is their focus upon respondents’ self-
perceived abilities (trait) versus their actual abilities (task), which may not 
necessarily show strong convergence. While task measures can provide a 
more objective index of one’s ability, trait measures may be more 
susceptible to response biases, such as overestimation of one’s abilities 
and/or socially desirable responding (Gerdes et al., 2010; Moskowitz, 1986; 
Paulhus, 1991). Furthermore, trait measures reflect respondents’ 
dispositional behaviours and experiences, which are likely to be relatively 
stable over time. In contrast, task measures typically assess more short-
term “state-level” responses, which may be more susceptible to contextual 
variability (Gross and John, 2003; Nezlek et al., 2007).  
  
A further important distinction between trait and task measures of 
empathy and emotion regulation is the extent to which they index one’s 
ability or propensity to engage these processes. Empathizing with another’s 
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emotion can come with certain emotional and cognitive costs, and one may 
often be motivated to avoid engaging empathic processes (Cameron et al., 
2019; see Cameron et al., 2018 and Zaki, 2014 for reviews). Thus, it is not 
only one’s ability to attend to another’s emotion cues, mimic/resonate with 
their experience, and/or place oneself in their perspective that is 
important, but also one’s motivation to engage these processes (Gehlbach, 
2004; Keysers and Gazzola 2014).  
 
In light of the above considerations, this thesis utilised a combination of 
trait and task measures of empathy and emotion regulation. This approach 
enables a more holistic examination of the relationship between empathy 
and emotion regulation, capturing aspects related to participants’ self-
perceived and actual ability to implement these processes, as well as their 
dispositional propensity to do so (Kagan, 2007; Russell-Smith et al., 2013; 
Moskowitz, 1986).     
 
This thesis addresses current gaps in the literature by testing the 
hypothesis that individual differences in empathy are associated with 
variability in emotion regulation abilities. Across five empirical chapters, the 
relationship between empathy and emotion regulation is examined using a 
range of questionnaires and tasks, incorporating self-report, behavioural, 
eye-tracking, and psychophysiology measures. Based on the evidence 
discussed in this chapter, it was predicted that different component 
processes associated with empathy would be differentially related to 
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different components of emotion regulation. Broadly speaking, I predicted 
that emotion regulation abilities would be positively related to cognitive 
empathy but negatively related to affective empathy.  
 
Each chapter begins with a brief review of the relevant literature, on which 
the specific hypotheses for the reported studies were based. I begin by 
exploring the relationship between empathy and emotion regulation using 
self-report (trait) measures of both constructs (chapter 2). I then build upon 
these findings by testing these same relationships using more objective task 
measures of component processes of cognitive and affective empathy 
(chapter 3). In subsequent chapters, I test the relationship between trait 
empathy and task measures of different emotion regulation abilities 
(chapters 4, 5, 6). An overview of the key focus of each empirical chapter is 

















Table 1.1. Summary overview of empirical chapters in this thesis 
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trait and task measures 
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spontaneous emotional 
recovery and instructed 
emotion regulation 
 
QCAE: questionnaire of cognitive and affective empathy 
ERQ: emotion regulation questionnaire 
DERS: difficulties in emotion regulation scale 
SFM: spontaneous facial mimicry (associated with affective empathy) 
DT: director task (associated with cognitive empathy) 





























It is thought that the individual in possession of the traits under 
investigation should be best placed to provide the most accurate 
information regarding their own thoughts, experiences, and behaviours 
(Kagan, 2007; McCrae and Costa, 1999; Paulhus and Vazire, 2007). 
Accordingly, self-report questionnaires are one of the predominant 
methods used to assess variability in personality constructs such as 
empathy (Robins et al., 2007). While performance-based tasks can provide 
more objective measures, the link between a given trait and a specific 
behaviour may not always be direct and some aspects of a construct may be 
most amenable to measurement via self-report (Furr and Funder, 2007).  
 
This chapter reports two studies that tested the relationship between 
empathy and emotion regulation using trait measures of both constructs. 
Study (1), examines how trait cognitive and affective empathy are associated 
with the habitual use of an adaptive and maladaptive regulation strategy; 
study (2) examines the relationship between trait empathy and difficulties 
with various aspects of emotion regulation.  
 
2.1.1. Trait measures of empathy 
With reference to the conceptualisation of empathy discussed in the 
introductory chapter, trait empathy can be viewed as reflecting an 
individual’s perceived ability and motivation to engage different empathic 
processes (Gehlbach, 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2014). Various 
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questionnaire measures have been developed to assess different 
components of empathy; as their development was often based upon 
slightly different conceptualisations of empathy there is some variability in 
the precise facets they assess (Reniers et al., 2011). Some trait measures, 
such as the Hogan Empathy Scales (HES; Hogan, 1969) and Empathy 
Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) give greater 
prominence to the cognitive dimension of empathy, whereas others, such 
as the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE; Mehrabian 
and Epstein, 1972), focus upon the affective dimension. Given the 
multidimensional nature of empathy, trait measures that enable the 
assessment of the affective and cognitive dimensions as related but 
dissociable constructs may provide the most useful insight into how 
different components of empathy relate to emotion regulation.  
 
The Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers et 
al., 2011) is a more recent multidimensional trait measure of empathy. The 
QCAE measures the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy with 
improved precision over previous multidimensional measures (e.g. the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Davis, 1983), which often conflated these 
facets of empathy with more general abilities and/or constructs that 
should be considered distinct from empathy, such as sympathy and 
personal distress (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Jolliffe and 
Farrington, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2004; Reniers et al., 2011).   
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2.1.2. Trait measures of emotion regulation 
While task-based measures of emotion regulation are useful for 
understanding the short-term effects of different regulatory strategies, 
their focus upon the relatively immediate consequences make them less 
helpful for understanding how individuals regulate their emotions in daily 
life (Gross and John, 2003). Task measures of emotion regulation are 
discussed further in later chapters (chapters 4, 5, and 6); the focus of this 
chapter is upon self-report measures that assess respondents’ dispositional 
regulatory behaviours and experiences.  
 
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John, 2003) 
measures the extent to which respondents habitually use reappraisal and 
suppression strategies day-to-day. A key benefit of the ERQ is that it 
captures the use of both an adaptive antecedent-focused strategy and a 
maladaptive response-focused regulation strategy (reappraisal and 
suppression, respectively). Prior work has demonstrated significant 
individual differences in the propensity to use these two strategies, which 
are associated with dramatically different consequences in terms of both 
their short-term efficacy and relationship with social functioning and 
emotional wellbeing (Cutuli, 2014; Gross and John, 2003; John and Gross, 
2004).  
 
Useful insight can be obtained through understanding the strategies 
individuals typically use to regulate their emotions; however, a sole focus 
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upon habitual strategy use may overlook other abilities crucial for effective 
emotion regulation (Greenberg et al., 2017; Gross, 2015; Kaufman et al., 
2016). The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz and 
Roemer, 2004) adopts a broader perspective, measuring respondents’ 
experiences of difficulties with various aspects of emotion regulation. While 
initially developed to examine emotion dysregulation in clinical 
populations, the DERS has proven effective for use in typical adult 
populations (Kaufman et al., 2016).   
 
2.1.3. The current studies 
This chapter examines how trait cognitive and affective empathy are 
related to the self-reported use of reappraisal and suppression (study 1), 
and self-reported experiences of emotion dysregulation (study 2). Prior to 
presenting the hypotheses of these studies, I provide a brief discussion of 
evidence regarding the potential relationships that trait cognitive and 
affective empathy may share with these measures of emotion regulation.  
 
The tendency to automatically mimic the emotional facial expressions of 
those around us reflects a fundamental mechanism through which 
resonance with others’ emotions is elicited (Chartrand and Dalton, 2008; de 
Waal and Preston, 2017; Hatfield et al., 1993; Preston and de Waal 2002). 
Given that suppression involves attempts to manage one’s emotions by 
inhibiting their expression (Gross, 2015), a tendency to use this strategy 
could interfere with mimicry/embodiment processes, thereby diminishing 
 61 
the extent to which the individual resonates with others’ emotional 
experiences. Mimicry/embodiment of another’s emotions can also support 
the capacity to understand their emotional experiences as the somatic 
state they evoke may provide useful information that one can draw upon in 
order to make inferences about what the other is feeling (Chartrand and 
Bargh, 1999; Hatfield et al., 1993; Preston and de Waal, 2002). Additionally, 
given evidence to suggest that suppression may diminish the availability of 
cognitive resources (Wang et al., 2014) it is possible that individuals who 
regularly use this strategy will be less able to engage the cognitive control 
processes necessary for representing and understanding others’ emotions. 
In light of the above evidence, it was predicted that both dimensions of 
empathy would show a negative relationship with the habitual use of 
suppression.  
 
Reappraisal reflects an effortful regulatory strategy, reliant upon various 
facets of cognitive control mediated by the PFC (Buhle et al., 2014; Messina 
et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2012a). Similar brain regions and cognitive control 
processes are associated with the cognitive component of empathy, where 
they mediate the ability to coordinate the coactive self and other 
representations in service of perspective taking and mental state 
attribution (Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis et al., 2009; Goel et al., 1995; 
Gokcen et al., 2017; Hansen, 2011; Saxe et al., 2004). Given this overlap, it is 
possible that higher cognitive empathy is associated with greater efficiency 
of the processes that support reappraisal.  
 62 
 
Moreover, our emotions are often influenced by those around us; regulating 
how we feel in response to another’s actions can at times necessitate being 
able to take their perspective in order to understand the motivations and 
intentions that underlie their behaviours. Given that reappraisal may often 
directly rely upon cognitive empathic processes it is possible that those 
with higher trait cognitive empathy will show an increased ability, and thus, 
propensity to use reappraisal in day-to-day life. Indeed, one prior study has 
reported a positive relationship between trait cognitive empathy and 
reappraisal use (Lockwood et al., 2014). 
 
Given the potentially deleterious effect of emotional arousal on the 
cognitive control processes (Hare et al., 2005, 2008; Tottenham et al., 2011), 
the increased emotional reactivity associated with higher levels of affective 
empathy (Rueckert et al., 2011; Sato et al., 2013) could impede one’s ability to 
utilise more cognitively demanding strategies such as reappraisal. 
Consequently, it was predicted that higher trait affective empathy would be 
associated with a reduced propensity to use reappraisal. While Lockwood 
et al. (2014) found no evidence of a relationship between affective empathy 
and reappraisal, the sample size in this study may have lacked the power to 
detect effects of a smaller magnitude. 
 
A divergence between the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy 
might also be expected for other components of emotion regulation, 
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particularly those that are reliant upon cognitive control processes, such as 
the ability to control emotional impulses and maintain a focus upon goal-
oriented behaviours in emotional situations. Based on the evidence 
previously discussed, it was predicted that trait emotion dysregulation 
would show a negative relationship with cognitive empathy but would be 
positively related to affective empathy. A summary of the hypotheses for 
the two studies reported in this chapter is presented below.  
 
1) Higher cognitive empathy will be associated with greater use of 
reappraisal, lower use of suppression, and lower levels of emotion 
dysregulation. 
 
2) Higher affective empathy will be associated with lower use of 
reappraisal and suppression, and higher levels of emotion 
dysregulation. 
 
2.2. Trait empathy and the use of reappraisal and suppression 
2.2.1. Methods 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
An a priori sample size estimation was conducted using G*Power 3.1. (Faul 
et al., 2007). Based on a small to moderate correlation between reappraisal 
use and trait cognitive empathy reported by Lockwood et al. (2014), a 
minimum sample size of 67 was required to obtain power of .80 at an alpha 
level of p = .05. For reasons of convenience, data were collected from both 
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the UK and Denmark, with the goal of collecting two subsamples of 
approximately 100 participants. While no specific differences across these 
two subsamples were predicted, the data from each sample was analysed to 
examine the consistency of the observed results.  
 
In total, 220 participants (161 female) were recruited from in and around the 
campuses of the University of Reading, UK (N = 94) and Aarhus University, 
Denmark (N = 126), using the online research panel and campus-based 
advertisements. All questionnaires were completed online in English and 
participants were reimbursed in the form of course credits or enrolment in 
a lottery to win free cinema tickets. The mean age of the overall sample was 
21.96 (SD = 5.67). Ethical approval was obtained from the research ethics 
committees of the Universities of Reading and Aarhus, and informed 
consent was provided by all participants. 
 
2.2.1.2. Materials  
Empathy. Trait empathy was measured using the Questionnaire of 
Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers et al., 2011). The QCAE is a 
31-item self-report questionnaire assessing respondents’ capacity to 
understand and resonate with the emotions of others. It comprises five 
subscales which track onto the two core dimensions of empathy (cognitive 
and affective). The cognitive empathy dimension assesses one’s propensity 
to take another’s perspective and accurately infer their state (e.g. “When I 
am upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself in his shoes’ for a while”, “I 
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can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person does not tell me”). The 
affective empathy dimension comprises items assessing respondents’ 
tendency to resonate with others’ emotions (e.g. “I am happy when I am 
with a cheerful group and sad when the others are glum”, “It affects me 
very much when one of my friends seems upset”).  
 
Participants rated their response to each item using a 4-point scale, 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”; higher values reflect 
greater levels of trait empathy. Cronbach’s alpha within the total (N = 220) 
sample was high for both QCAE dimensions (𝛼Cognitive empathy = .90; 𝛼Affective 
empathy = .84). Cronbach’s alpha was consistently high within the UK (N = 94, 
𝛼Cognitive empathy = .90; 𝛼Affective empathy = .84) and Denmark (N = 126, 𝛼Cognitive 
empathy = .90; 𝛼Affective empathy = .84) subsamples. Details of each QCAE item and 
scale coding are provided in appendix A. 
 
Reappraisal & suppression use. Reappraisal and suppression use were 
measured using the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and 
John, 2003). The ERQ is a 10-item questionnaire measuring respondents’ 
habitual propensity to use reappraisal and suppression. Each item is rated 
using a 7-point scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”; 
higher values reflect greater habitual use of each strategy. Cronbach’s alpha 
for the reappraisal and suppression subscales were acceptable within the 
total (N = 220) sample, 𝛼Reappraisal = .85; 𝛼Suppression = .77); similar alpha levels 
were observed within each sub sample: UK (N = 94,  𝛼Reappraisal = .80;  
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𝛼Suppression = .76), Denmark (N = 126, 𝛼Reappraisal = .86; 𝛼Suppression = .78). Details 
of each ERQ item and scale coding are provided in appendix B. 
 
2.2.1.3. Data Reduction & Analyses 
The relationship between trait empathy and regulation strategy use was 
examined using bivariate correlations. Normality of each variable was 
assessed using Kolmogorov Smirnov tests. Accordingly, Spearman’s rho is 
reported for correlations where any variable distribution showed significant 
deviation from normality. All correlations are reported as two-tailed, with a 
significance threshold of p < .05. To ensure that the observed results were 
not unduly influenced by a small number of outlier cases, the same analyses 
reported in this results section were also conducted following the removal 
of univariate and bivariate outlier cases (see appendix D).  
 
2.2.2. Results  
Trait empathy and reappraisal use 
Cognitive empathy was significantly positively correlated with the use of 
reappraisal, rho(218) = .25, p < .001. There was no relationship between 
affective empathy and reappraisal use, rho(218) = .05, p = .42. These two 
correlations were significantly different, Steiger’s Z = 2.42, p = .02 (see fig. 
2.1). A consistent pattern of results was observed within both subsamples: 
UK (CE-reappraisal, rho(92) = .29, p = .004, AE-reappraisal, rho(92) = .02, p = 
.88); Denmark (CE-reappraisal, rho(124) = .21, p = .02; AE-reappraisal, 
rho(124) = .09, p = .34).  
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Fig. 2.1. Scatterplot showing the relationship between reappraisal use (ERQ) and Z-
transformed cognitive/affective empathy (QCAE). Cognitive empathy (blue) 
showed a positive correlation with reappraisal use; affective empathy (red) showed 
no relationship with reappraisal use. 
 
Trait empathy and suppression use 
Trait cognitive and affective empathy both showed significant negative 
correlations with the habitual use of suppression (rho(218) = -.16, p = .02; 
rho(218) = -.26, p < .001, respectively). These correlations were not 
significantly different, Steiger’s Z = 1.27, p = .20 (fig. 2.2). While the 
correlation between cognitive empathy and suppression did not reach 
significance in the UK sample, the pattern of results across both 
subsamples were broadly consistent: UK (CE-suppression, rho(92) = -.11, p = 
.30; AE-suppression rho(92) = -.29, p = .005); Denmark (CE-suppression 
rho(124) = -.21, p = .02, AE-suppression rho(124) = -.23, p = .008). 
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Fig. 2.2. Scatterplot showing the relationship between suppression use (ERQ) and 
Z-transformed trait cognitive/affective empathy (QCAE). Cognitive empathy (blue) 
and affective empathy (red) were both negatively correlated with suppression use.  
 
2.3. Trait empathy and emotion dysregulation 
2.3.1. Methods 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
A sample of 137 participants (101 female) was recruited from the University 
of Reading campus. The mean age of the sample was 20.26 years (SD = 3.01). 
Recruitment was via the university online research panel and all 
participants were awarded course credit for participation. Questionnaires 
were completed online. Ethical approval was obtained from the University 
of Reading research ethics committee.   
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2.3.1.2. Materials  
Empathy. Trait empathy was measured using the QCAE (Reniers et al., 2011) 
(see section 2.1.3. for details). Cronbach’s alpha was high for both empathy 
dimensions (𝛼Cognitive Empathy = .88; 𝛼Affective Empathy = .82).  
 
Emotion dysregulation. Trait emotion dysregulation was measured using 
the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation-short form (DERS-SF; Kaufman et al., 
2016). The DERS-SF (henceforth, DERS) is an 18-item questionnaire 
assessing difficulties in six aspects of emotion regulation: 1) awareness of 
emotions (awareness), 2) clarity/understanding of emotions (clarity), 3) 
acceptance of emotions (non-acceptance), 4) capacity to maintain goal-
directed behaviours in emotional situations (goals), 5) control over 
emotional impulses (impulse), and 6) ability to effectively manage one’s 
emotional responses (strategies). Participants reported the extent to which 
they experience difficulties in these aspects of emotion regulation using a 
5-point Likert scale, where 1 = almost never (0-10% of the time) and 5 = 
almost always (91-100% of the time); higher ratings reflect increased 
emotion dysregulation. The ratings of the six subscales are summed to 
provide a total score reflecting overall levels of emotion dysregulation 
(DERS-Total). Within this sample, the DERS-Total score, and each subscale 
demonstrated acceptable to high Cronbach’s alpha: 𝛼DERS-Total = .91; 𝛼Awareness 
= .79; 𝛼Clarity = .86; 𝛼Acceptance = .82; 𝛼Goals = .89; 𝛼Impulse = .89; 𝛼Strategies = .83. 
Details of each DERS item and scale coding are provided in appendix C. 
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2.3.1.3. Data Reduction & Analyses 
The relationship between empathy and emotion dysregulation was 
examined using bivariate correlations. Normality of each variable was 
assessed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Accordingly, Spearman’s rho is 
reported for correlations where any variable distribution showed significant 
deviation from normality. All correlations are reported as two-tailed, with a 
significance threshold of p < .05. For reference, the results following the 
removal of univariate and bivariate outliers are reported in appendix D.  
 
2.3.2. Results 
Cognitive empathy showed a significant negative correlation with DERS-
Total scores, rho(135) = -.18, p = .04. Affective empathy was not significantly 
correlated with DERS-Total, rho(135) = .13 , p = .14. These two correlations 




Fig. 2.3. Scatterplot showing the relationship between Z-transformed trait 
cognitive/affective empathy (QCAE) and overall levels of emotion dysregulation 
(DERS-Total). Cognitive empathy (blue) was negatively correlated with DERS-
Total; affective empathy (red) was not significantly correlated with DERS-Total. 
 
To better understand the relationship between cognitive/affective 
empathy and trait emotion dysregulation, exploratory analyses were 
conducted to examine the relationship between these two dimensions of 
empathy and each subscale of the DERS. Cognitive empathy was 
significantly negatively related to the awareness and impulse subscales and 
showed a trend-level negative relationship with clarity, non-acceptance, 
and strategies. There was no relationship between cognitive empathy and 
the goals subscale of the DERS.  
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Affective empathy was significantly positively related to the DERS goals and 
strategies subscales and showed a trend-level positive relationship with 
non-acceptance. Affective empathy was negatively related to awareness but 
showed no relationship with clarity or impulse control. Steiger’s tests 
demonstrated that with the exception of the clarity subscale, the cognitive 
and affective dimensions of empathy showed different relationships with 
each subscale of the DERS (all correlation coefficients and associated 
Steiger’s test Z statistics are reported in table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1. 
Correlation coefficients for cognitive/affective empathy and DERS  
 
Variable Awareness Clarity Non-
Acceptance 
Goals Impulse Strategies 
Cog Empathy -.40*** -.16 -.15 .11 -.17* -.10 
Aff Empathy -.22** -.01 .16 .29** .04 .23** 
Steiger’s (CE-AE) -2.38** -1.58 -3.42*** -4.36*** -2.31* -3.6*** 
*< .05, ** < .01, *** < .001 
 
2.4. Discussion 
2.4.1. Summary of findings 
Across two studies the relationship between trait measures of empathy and 
emotion regulation was examined. It was predicted that the two dimensions 
of empathy would both be negatively related to the use of suppression but 
share different relationships with the habitual use of reappraisal (ERQ; 
Gross and John, 2033) and self-reported emotion dysregulation (DERS; 
Kaufman et al., 2016). The observed results broadly support these 
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hypotheses and highlight significant patterns of divergence in the 
relationships that trait cognitive and affective empathy share with habitual 
regulation strategy use and emotion dysregulation. The results suggest that 
while higher cognitive empathy is broadly associated with more adaptive 
emotion regulation, higher affective empathy is associated with increased 
difficulties with certain aspects of emotion regulation.   
 
Trait cognitive and affective empathy were both negatively related to the 
habitual use of suppression. While higher cognitive empathy was associated 
with more frequent use of reappraisal, affective empathy showed no 
relationship with reappraisal use. The two dimensions of empathy also 
showed divergent patterns in their relationships with trait emotion 
dysregulation. Cognitive empathy was negatively related to overall levels of 
emotion dysregulation, suggesting that those with greater cognitive 
empathy experience fewer difficulties with emotion regulation. In contrast, 
affective empathy did not show a significant relationship with overall levels 
of emotion dysregulation. Significant divergence between cognitive and 
affective empathy were also observed for various subscales of the DERS.  
 
During the writeup of these studies a paper was published that reported 
the same relationships between reappraisal use and trait cognitive and 
affective empathy in a large UK sample (Powell, 2018). Additionally, a study 
by Contardi et al. (2016) was published after the present studies were 
conducted, and reported similar relationships between trait empathy and 
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emotion dysregulation in a sample of Italian students. The findings of the 
current studies provide further support for this recent work by replicating 
the findings in a large sample from two countries. 
 
Aside from the negative relationship between cognitive empathy and 
suppression, which was not found in the Lockwood et al. (2014) study, the 
current results show a consistent pattern with prior work (Contardi et al., 
2016; Powell, 2018; Tully et al., 2016). Furthermore, by examining how trait 
empathy is associated with the different subscales of the DERS, the current 
study provides greater specificity regarding the relationship that cognitive 
and affective empathy share with different aspects of emotion 
dysregulation. While the correlational design of these studies precludes the 
ability to make direct attributions of cause and effect, some potential 
interpretations of these results are now discussed in relation to extant 
theoretical and empirical work.  
 
2.4.2. Cognitive empathy & emotion regulation 
Trait cognitive empathy was broadly associated with more adaptive 
emotion regulation in both studies, demonstrated by more frequent use of 
adaptive reappraisal strategies, less frequent use of maladaptive 
suppression strategies, and lower trait emotion dysregulation. The negative 
relationship between cognitive empathy and emotion dysregulation was 
driven primarily by relationships with DERS subscales assessing difficulties 
with emotional awareness and impulse control. The cognitive component of 
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empathy is reliant upon various cognitive control processes, which support 
the ability to take another’s perspective and make accurate inferences 
about their mental/emotional state (Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis et al., 
2009; Goel et al., 1995; Gokcen et al., 2017; Hansen, 2011; Saxe et al., 2004). 
Given that many forms of adaptive emotion regulation are reliant upon 
similar processes (Buhle et al., 2014; Goldin et al., 2008; Hendricks and 
Buchanan, 2016; Kalisch, 2009; McRae et al., 2012), it could be that higher 
cognitive empathy is associated with improved efficiency of the cognitive 
control processes that also underlie the ability to regulate one’s emotions 
effectively. Conversely, lower levels of cognitive empathy may impede the 
ability to implement adaptive but cognitively demanding regulation 
strategies such as reappraisal.  
 
Cognitive empathy was negatively associated with difficulties with 
emotional awareness, suggesting that individuals with greater cognitive 
empathy show a heightened awareness of their own emotional experiences. 
This finding is consistent with prior work, which asserts that cognitive 
empathic abilities may support the capacity to reflect upon and understand 
one’s own emotions (Frith and Frith, 2003; Happé et al., 1996; Hobson, 
2010). Given that the capacity to be aware of and understand one’s own 
emotions may facilitate the ability to select and implement a regulation 
strategy suitable to a given context (Fustos et al., 2013; Gross, 2015), this 
heightened emotional awareness could in part explain why cognitive 
empathy was associated with more adaptive patterns of strategy use.  
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The negative correlation between trait cognitive empathy and suppression 
use suggests that individuals with higher cognitive empathy are less likely 
to use this strategy in their daily lives. As individuals with cognitive 
empathy experience fewer difficulties with emotion regulation and show a 
heightened propensity to use reappraisal, they may simply be less reliant 
upon maladaptive strategies such as suppression. This result could also be 
interpreted by considering the inverse relationship between these two 
constructs. Given that suppression can have a negative impact upon 
cognitive control processes (Wang et al., 2014), the frequent use of this 
strategy could interfere with the processes that mediate the ability to take 
another’s perspective and make inferences about their state. Furthermore, 
the frequent use of suppression could inhibit mimicry/embodiment 
mechanisms (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Hatfield et al., 1993; Preston and 
de Waal, 2002), which might impede one’s ability to understand others’ 
emotions through embodied simulation.  
 
2.4.3. Affective empathy & emotion regulation 
Affective empathy was not significantly associated with overall trait 
emotion dysregulation but was significantly positively correlated with 
subscales assessing difficulties with managing one’s emotions and 
maintaining goal-focused behaviours in emotional situations. In contrast, 
affective empathy was negatively related to difficulties with emotional 
awareness, suggesting that similar to cognitive empathy, greater affective 
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empathy may facilitate the capacity to be aware of one’s own emotions. The 
divergent relationships that affective empathy shared with these sub-scales 
of the DERS could explain why it did not show a significant positive 
relationship with the overall emotion dysregulation (i.e. DERS-Total) metric.  
 
Higher levels of affective empathy are associated with increased arousal in 
response to others’ emotions (Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002), and may relate to 
heightened emotional reactivity in a more general sense (Rueckert et al., 
2011). Given that emotions can interfere with the cognitive control 
processes upon which many aspects of adaptive emotion regulation are 
reliant (Hare et al., 2005; Tottenham et al., 2011), the increased emotional 
reactivity associated with higher affective empathy may diminish the 
capacity to regulate one’s emotions effectively. While the heightened 
emotional awareness that greater affective empathy entails could facilitate 
certain aspects of emotion regulation, such as the selection of adaptive 
regulation strategies, the concurrent difficulties in maintaining goal-
focused behaviours may negatively impact the implementation of more 
demanding regulatory strategies. This could explain why affective empathy 
showed no relationship with reappraisal use, despite being associated with 
improved emotional awareness, which ought to facilitate the selection of 
adaptive strategies such as reappraisal (Gross, 2015). 
 
The negative relationship between affective empathy and the habitual use 
of suppression suggests that more frequent use of this strategy is 
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associated with a reduced capacity to share others’ emotions. The 
emotional resonance by which affective empathy is defined is largely driven 
by spontaneous mimicry mechanisms, which can automatically elicit in the 
observer an emotional state isomorphic to that of the perceived other 
(Hatfield et al., 1993; Laird et al. 1994; Wild et al., 2001). Consequently, it is 
unsurprising that individuals who frequently attempt to suppress any 
outward indicators of their emotions (e.g. facial expressions) report a 
diminished capacity/propensity to resonate with the emotions of others.  
 
2.4.4. Summary, conclusions, and limitations 
The findings of these studies support the hypothesis that empathy and 
emotion regulation are related. Critically, they suggest that the cognitive 
and affective dimensions of empathy share different relationships with the 
habitual use of reappraisal and various aspects of emotion dysregulation. 
While these findings represent an important first step in further elucidating 
the relationship between different components of empathy and emotion 
regulation, it is important to highlight certain limitations of these studies.  
 
These studies utilised only self-report measures of empathy and emotion 
regulation, which, while helpful in understanding respondents’ self-
perceptions of their empathic and emotion regulation abilities (Dziobek et 
al., 2008) are not without their inherent limitations. Firstly, given that many 
of the processes associated with both empathy and emotion regulation can 
occur on an implicit level (Decety and Jackson, 2004; Gyurak et al., 2011; 
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Mauss et al., 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009), one could 
argue that certain features of these constructs may be difficult to assess 
accurately via introspection (Kagan, 1988). However, I would assert that 
while respondents may be unable to directly reflect upon the underlying 
processes associated with these constructs, the subsequent consequences 
of their empathic/regulatory abilities are likely available to perception.  
 
A further limitation of trait measures is their reliance on retrospective self-
reporting, which may leave them susceptible to inaccuracies and response 
biases (Moskowitz, 1986) such as socially desirable responding (Gerdes et 
al., 2010; Paulhus, 1991). In the present studies, all questionnaires were 
completed online and participants were explicitly informed that their 
responses would remain entirely confidential. This anonymity should have 
helped reduce the potential that any socially desirable responding was 
present in the data, and there is no reason to infer that participants would 
have been motivated toward impression management to any extent that 
might have impacted the results in a demonstrable way.  
 
Finally, a fundamental limitation of using only trait measures is that they 
are unable to accurately capture more ability-based components of 
empathy, which may be more amenable to measurement using 
performance-based task approaches. Indeed, prior work highlights a lack of 
convergence between trait and task measures of empathy (e.g. Melchers et 
al., 2015), which could suggest that these approaches are assessing slightly 
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different latent constructs. One key distinction between trait and task 
measures is the extent to which they capture one’s propensity or ability to 
engage empathic processes or use different regulatory strategies. More 
specifically, trait measures reflect a combination of respondents’ self-
perceived abilities and motivation to engage different empathic and 
regulatory processes, which may not necessarily be directly related to one’s 
objective ability to implement these processes effectively.  
 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis seek to build upon the findings of these 
studies in various ways. To address the limitations of using only trait 
measures of empathy, the next chapter examines the same relationships 
tested here using more objective task-based measures of different 
component processes of empathy. Later chapters utilise a range of tasks 
that directly assess some of the key aspects of emotion regulation found to 
be related to empathy in the present studies. For example, in chapter 4, the 
relationship between cognitive/affective empathy and performance-based 
measures of the ability to inhibit impulsive responses and maintain goal-
focused behaviours in the presence of salient emotional distractors is 
examined. Finally, to build upon the findings suggestive of divergent 
relationships between cognitive/affective empathy and reappraisal, 
chapter 5 reports two studies that examined how these components of 
empathy are associated with task metrics assessing the ability to 
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The results of the trait analysis reported in the previous chapter suggest 
that the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy share different 
relationships with emotion regulation. While trait measures provide an 
indication of respondents’ self-perceived levels of cognitive/affective 
empathy (Dziobek et al., 2008), they are less effective in capturing key 
ability-based components of these constructs (Russell-Smith et al., 2013). 
More objective indicators of these abilities can be obtained using task-
based approaches. This chapter builds upon the findings of chapter 2 by 
examining the relationship between empathy and trait emotion regulation 
using established task paradigms that assess abilities related to distinct 
component processes of empathy.  
 
Cognitive empathy was measured using two tasks that assess participants’: 
(1) ability to take another individual’s perspective, and (2) ability to 
accurately infer complex emotional/mental states based on subtle facial 
cues. A fundamental process associated with affective empathy was 
assessed using electromyographic (EMG) measures of spontaneous facial 
mimicry (SFM), which provide a proxy index of participants’ propensity to 
resonate with others’ emotions. I begin with a brief overview of these task 
measures of empathy before moving on to discuss evidence regarding their 




3.1.1. Task measures of cognitive empathy 
The cognitive component of empathy comprises various abilities that 
enable the observer to take the perspective of another individual and make 
inferences about their emotional/mental state (Blair, 2005; Davis, 1983; 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Broadly speaking, this cognitive component 
encompasses two partially dissociable categories of processes: (1) self-other 
control processes, which enable the observer to suppress their own 
egocentric perspective in order to take the perspective of another; (2) 
inferential processes, which facilitate the recognition and interpretation of 
various cues from which another’s mental/emotional state can be 
understood (Bird and Viding, 2014; Decety, 2010).  
 
The capacity to inhibit one’s default egocentric perspective in order to take 
the perspective of another individual is a critical component process 
supporting the ability to understand others’ emotions (Decety and 
Chaminade, 2003; Frith and Frith, 2003; Shanton and Goldman, 2010). 
Humans typically interpret incoming information based on their own 
perspective (Coburn et al., 2015; Wimmer and Perner, 1983), and in order to 
accurately represent another individual’s experience, which may be 
different from one’s own, this egocentric bias must be inhibited.  
 
Failure to adequately inhibit one’s default self-perspective can result in 
egocentric interference, whereby one’s own knowledge, beliefs, and visual 
perspective can impact the accuracy with which one is able to infer 
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another’s experience (Camerer et al., 1989; Derbyshire et al., 2013; Epley et 
al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 2015; Schmid and Schmid-Mast, 2010; Silani et al., 
2013; Todd et al., 2015). Suppressing one’s egocentric bias is cognitively 
demanding and has been shown to be associated with cognitive control 
processes mediated in part by the PFC (Bailey and Henry, 2008; Healey and 
Grossman, 2018; Lamm et al., 2011; Saxe et al., 2004).  
 
The director task (henceforth DT) is a visual perspective-taking paradigm 
commonly used to examine perspective-taking abilities in typical adult 
populations (Keysar et al., 2003). Participants are required to move objects 
positioned on a shelving unit in response to instructions delivered by a 
“director” who is facing them from the opposite side of the shelves. A 
subset of the objects visible to the participant are occluded from the 
director’s view, meaning that on critical trials there is a conflict between 
the perspective of the participant and the director. For example, an 
instruction to move “the big cup”, referring to the largest cup visible to 
both director and participant, might lead the participant to initially 
consider as a target the largest cup visible to them, which cannot be seen 
by the director (foil object). To respond correctly, participants must inhibit 
their prepotent egocentric perspective in order to correctly interpret the 
director’s instruction and select the mutually visible cup to which they were 
actually referring (target object).  
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Behavioural measures, such as response time (RT) difference between 
conflict (experimental) and no-conflict (control) trials are sometimes used 
to assess DT performance. However, more recent studies utilise eye-
tracking metrics as more objective and informative indicators of 
perspective-taking ability (e.g. Rubio-Fernández, 2017). Gaze fixations are 
widely accepted as reflecting one’s focus of attention and information 
processing (Altmann and Kamide, 1999; Just and Carpenter, 1980; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995). Tracking an individual’s eye gaze patterns during 
the DT enables the direct measurement of the extent to which they exhibit 
an egocentric bias (by considering the foil object as a possible target) and 
how efficiently they were able to suppress this initial bias (Rubio-
Fernández, 2017; Symeonidou et al., 2016).  
 
While perspective-taking processes play an important role in the cognitive 
component of empathy, the capacity to understand others’ emotional 
experiences is also mediated by other abilities, such as those that enable 
the observer to make accurate inferences about what another individual 
may be thinking/feeling (Adolphs, 2009; Gallese et al., 2004; Vellante et al., 
2013). These inferential processes are reliant upon the observer’s ability to 
interpret the often subtle cues that may indicate another’s emotion, such as 
facial expressions, body language, and prosody (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith 
and Frith, 2006). A task commonly used to measure this ability is the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (henceforth RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997, 2001).  
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The RMET assesses participants’ ability to correctly identify complex 
mental/emotional states based solely upon images of the eye region and is 
typically considered a measure of advanced theory of mind (ToM), a 
construct synonymous with cognitive empathy. Performance on the RMET 
is thought to rely upon the relatively automatic process of matching the 
perceived expressions to relevant expression archetypes and terminology 
stored in memory (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Vellante et al., 2013). In 
contrast to the original version (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), the revised RMET 
includes only complex emotional/mental states (e.g. embarrassed, jealous), 
which necessitates the process of attributing a belief to the target and is 
less prone to ceiling effects in typical adult populations (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001; Vellante et al., 2013). While contrasting findings have been reported 
(e.g. Olderbak et al., 2015; Pinkham et al., 2018), studies have demonstrated 
that the RMET has sufficient sensitivity to assess variability in cognitive 
empathy/ToM in typical (Ahmed and Miller, 2011; Peterson and Miller, 2012) 
and atypical populations (e.g. ASC; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001).  
 
3.1.2. Task measures of affective empathy 
The human predisposition to spontaneously mimic the emotional facial 
expressions of others can induce in the mimicker a state isomorphic to the 
perceived emotion and reflects a fundamental component process 
associated with affective empathy (de Waal and Preston, 2017; Hatfield et 
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al., 1993; Preston and de Waal 2002). Spontaneous facial mimicry (SFM) has 
been studied empirically using facial electromyography (fEMG), which 
provides a sensitive measure of rapid and automatic emotional responses 
that may be difficult to detect using other methods (Tassinary and 
Cacioppo, 1992).  
 
There is considerable evidence that the perception of emotional facial 
expressions evokes activity in congruent muscle groups (e.g. the 
Zygomaticus major in response to happy faces, and Corrugator supercilii in 
response to angry faces) (Cacioppo et al., 1986; Dimberg and Petterson, 
2000; Hess et al., 1998; Rymarczyk et al., 2018; Sims et al., 2012). SFM can 
occur rapidly and automatically (Dimberg, 1990; Dimberg and Thunberg, 
1998), even when the individual is not aware of the presence of a face 
(Bornemann et al., 2012; Dimberg et al., 2000).  
 
Facial muscle activity is believed to have a direct influence upon one’s 
affective state (Ekman et al., 1983; Hennenlotter et al. 2009; Levenson et al., 
1990), which suggests that mimicking another’s emotional displays could 
trigger a corresponding state in the observer. Indeed, prior work has 
demonstrated that SFM magnitude is positively correlated with self-report 
indices of congruent emotional experiences (Gump and Kulik, 1997; Sato et 
al., 2013; Wild et al., 2001). Furthermore, blocking facial mimicry can 
attenuate activations in subcortical regions associated with emotional 
(Hennenlotter et al. 2009) and reward-related processing (Hsu et al., 2018). 
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Critically, the magnitude of SFM is positively related to trait measures of 
affective empathy (Dimberg et al., 2011; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002), 
suggesting that it can provide a reliable proxy measure of one’s propensity 
to resonate with others’ emotions. 
 
3.1.3. The current study 
This study examined the relationship between empathy and trait measures 
of emotion dysregulation (DERS; Kaufman et al., 2016) and the habitual use 
of reappraisal/suppression (ERQ; Gross and John, 2003) using objective 
task measures of different component processes associated with cognitive 
and affective empathy. An eye-tracking version of the DT was used to 
assess perspective-taking ability, with the relative gaze time on target 
versus foil objects indexing participants’ efficiency in suppressing their 
egocentric bias. An additional component of cognitive empathy was 
measured using the RMET, which provides an index of participants’ ability 
to infer complex mental/emotional states based on images of the eye 
region. Finally, affective empathy was assessed using an emotional face 
perception task, wherein the fEMG-measured magnitude of Zygomaticus 
major (ZM) and Corrugator supercilii (CS) activation in response to happy 
and angry faces was used to index participants’ propensity to resonate with 
others’ emotions. Broadly speaking, it was predicted that the cognitive and 
affective components of empathy would show different relationships with 




Given its reliance upon cognitive control processes also necessary for 
adaptive emotion regulation (Buhle et al., 2014; Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis 
et al., 2009; Goldin et al., 2008; Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; Saxe et al., 
2004), it was predicted that greater perspective-taking ability would be 
associated with lower levels of emotion dysregulation and more adaptive 
strategy selection (i.e. greater use of reappraisal and lower use of 
suppression). The specificity of this relationship was tested by examining 
the relationship between trait emotion regulation and an additional ability 
relevant to the cognitive component of empathy, as assessed by the RMET. 
Successful performance on the RMET is thought to rely upon more 
automatic processing of emotional information (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
Vellante et al., 2013), and is therefore likely to be less reliant than the DT 
upon cognitive control processes associated with emotion regulation. 
Consequently, it was predicted that RMET performance would show no 
relationship with trait measures of emotion regulation.  
 
Given the potentially deleterious effect that emotional arousal can have on 
the cognitive control processes necessary for effective emotion regulation 
(e.g. Tottenham et al., 2011), it was predicted that a heightened propensity 
to resonate with others’ emotions, as indexed by greater SFM, would be 
associated with increased trait emotion dysregulation and a reduced 
propensity to use reappraisal. While the studies reported in chapter 2 found 
no evidence of a relationship between trait affective empathy and 
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reappraisal use, and a positive relationship with only certain aspects of 
emotion dysregulation, this could be due to issues with trait measures 
conflating different components of empathy. For example, in order to 
report the extent to which one tends to resonate with others’ emotions, 
one must first of all have the capacity to recognise these states in others 
(an ability associated with the cognitive component of empathy). As SFM 
reflects a more objective and “pure” measure of one’s propensity to 
resonate with others’ emotions (i.e. affective empathy), I expected it to 
show a different relationship with trait emotion regulation than the trait 
empathy measures used in chapter 2.  
 
Finally, the negative relationship between suppression use and trait 
affective empathy reported in chapter 2, suggests that the habitual use of 
this strategy might interfere with the mimicry/embodiment processes that 
mediate the capacity to resonate with others’ emotions. Thus, it was 
predicted that SFM magnitude would be negatively related to the use of 
suppression. A summary of the study hypotheses is highlighted below. 
 
1) Perspective-taking ability (DT) will be associated with lower levels of 
emotion dysregulation and suppression use. Perspective-taking ability 
will be positively associated with reappraisal use. 
 
2) Mental state attribution accuracy (RMET) will show no relationship 
with trait emotion dysregulation or reappraisal/suppression use.  
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3) SFM magnitude will be positively related to emotion dysregulation and 




An a priori sample size estimation was conducted using G*Power 3.1. (Faul 
et al., 2007). Based on the expectation that these task measures of empathy 
would show stronger relationships with trait emotion regulation than the 
trait empathy measures used in chapter 2, the sample size estimation 
suggested that a sample of 44 would be required to detect correlations of a 
moderate to large effect size at an alpha level of p = .05, with power of .80. 
Forty-eight right-handed participants (31 females) were recruited from the 
UOR campus via the online research panel and poster advertisements.  
 
All participants completed the DT and SFM tasks; a subsample of N = 40 
participants also completed the RMET. The mean age of the sample was 
21.29 yrs (SD = 4.03). One participant, for whom the necessary 
questionnaire data was incomplete, was removed prior to analysis. 
Following data quality checks, five participants were removed from the SFM 
task and eight participants were removed from the DT (see Facial EMG 
recording and processing, and Eye-tracking recording and processing 
sections for details). Reimbursement was in the form of either course credit 
or cash payment of £7 per hour. Questionnaires were completed online and 
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the tasks as part of a lab session, which also included the emotion 
regulation task reported in chapter 6. The order of task completion was 
counterbalanced across the sample. Ethical approval was obtained from the 
UOR research ethics committee.  
 
3.2.2. Materials & Procedure 
Emotion dysregulation. Trait emotion dysregulation was measured using 
the DERS-SF (Kaufman et al., 2016). The DERS-Total score demonstrated 
high internal consistency within this sample, 𝛼DERS-Total = .89.  
 
Reappraisal and suppression use. The habitual use of reappraisal and 
suppression was measured using the ERQ (Gross and John, 2003). 
Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable for both subscales of the ERQ: 𝛼Reappraisal = 
.79, 𝛼Suppression = .77.  
 
Director task. Stimuli consisted of computerised images of a 4x4 shelving 
unit containing various objects. There were six object sets, each comprising 
six different objects. Each object set was used on four control trials and 
four experimental trials, with a different instruction for each trial. While all 
objects were visible to the participant, two objects were always located on 
shelves where the backs were covered, meaning they were not visible to the 
director. The director was physically present in the room and sat opposite 
participants facing a monitor positioned back to back with the monitor on 
which participants completed the task. This approach was used in order to 
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increase the ecological validity over previous versions of the DT in which a 
“virtual” director is used. A photograph of the director facing the 
participant through the shelves was visible on the monitor.  
 
Participants were informed that the director would verbally instruct them 
to move a particular object to a particular location, and that they should 
take into account which objects are visible to the director (see appendix E 
for full instructions). The target object referred to in the director’s 
instruction was always one of three similar objects. For instance, where the 
instruction referred to a cup, a small, medium, and large cup were all 
present. Instructions on experimental trials referred to a target object that 
was visible only to the participant. For example, the instruction to move the 
“big cup” could induce participants to consider the foil object (i.e. the 
largest cup visible to them) as the target. However, the correct target would 
be the largest cup visible to both the participant and director. To respond 
correctly participants must inhibit their egocentric perspective in order to 
select the object that matches the instruction from the director’s 
perspective. There were two types of conflict on experimental trials: spatial 
(e.g. “move the top/bottom cup”) and size (e.g. “move the big/small cup”). 
There was no conflict on control trials as the director’s instruction referred 
to a mutually visible object (e.g. the instruction to “move the small cup” 
referred to the smallest cup, which was visible to both director and 
participant) (fig. 3.1).  
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Each trial started with a central fixation cross which remained on screen as 
the scripted instruction was delivered verbally by the director. Immediately 
following the instruction, the director pressed the spacebar and the stimuli 
were presented on the monitor after a 400 ms delay. The cursor was not 
visible until the participant clicked the mouse button. Once the cursor 
appeared, participants then clicked on the target object then on the new 
location, at which point the display was updated to show the selected 
object in the new location. Participants were instructed that they should 
administer their first mouse click only once they have decided upon the 
target object and the new location. Response time (RT) was calculated as 
the interval between stimulus onset and the first mouse click. The task 
comprised 48 trials in total (24 experimental, 24 control) and lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. Trial order was pseudorandom, with no more 
than 3 trials of either condition in succession. Trial order was reversed for 
half of the sample. This DT differed from previous versions in that there 
was no trial time limit and participants completed six practice trials, three 




Fig. 3.1. Example of trial stimuli from the participant’s perspective in the Director 
task. Instructions on experimental trials referred to an object occluded from the 
director's perspective, e.g. “the big cup”. The comparable control trial instructions 
for the same stimuli referred to a mutually visible object, e.g. “the small cup”.  
 
Eye-tracking recording & processing 
Gaze data were recorded using a Tobii X2-60 eye-tracker recording at 
60Hz, positioned below the monitor on which the task was completed. 
Participants’ eye-gaze patterns were tracked during the initial “decision 
period” from stimulus onset until the first mouse click, thereby providing an 
indication of the objects being considered as potential targets. The display 
was separated into 16 regions corresponding to each shelf area. Analyses 
focused upon the key regions of interest, which were the shelves on which 
the target and foil objects were located. Any gaze points within the 
corresponding shelf regions were classified as a gaze to the target/foil.  
 97 
 
The key metric extracted from this task as a measure of perspective-taking 
ability was the duration of time spent looking at the target relative to the 
foil object on experimental trials. This metric was calculated by dividing 
target gaze time by foil gaze time, with larger values reflecting more 
efficient egocentric suppression (i.e. perspective-taking ability). In contrast 
to previous measures, such as the time it takes for the participant to look at 
the correct target object, this metric does not assume that the first look at 
the target object denotes the point at which egocentric bias has been 
successfully inhibited and can account for instances in which participants 
may look back and forth between the target and foil before making their 
decision. To isolate experimental trials that tapped into this ability there 
were two criteria for inclusion: (1) participants had to look at the foil object 
(to ensure egocentric bias was induced), and (2) a correct response had to 
follow (to ensure egocentric bias was successfully inhibited).  
 
A technical fault led to gaze data from one participant not being recorded. 
To maintain data quality, any participant for whom more than ⅓ of overall 
gaze points were not detected were removed (7 participants). Of the 
remaining N = 39 sample, any trials where more than ⅓ of gaze points were 
not detected (56 trials), and/or in which RT deviated from the overall mean 
by more than 3*SD (67 trials) were removed. Given the aforementioned 
inclusion criteria, any trials in which the foil object was not looked at were 
not included in our metric of egocentric suppression (94 trials). Following 
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these exclusions, all participants retained at least 10 experimental trials 
from which the perspective-taking ability metric was calculated (M ± SD = 
19.1 ± 3.75).   
 
Reading the mind in the eyes test. The RMET comprised 36 trials 
(preceded by one practice trial), in which participants were presented with 
a photograph depicting the eye region of different Caucasian actors (19 
male, 17 female) portraying complex mental/emotional states (e.g. 
despondent, playful, nervous). Stimuli were presented centrally on the 
monitor, surrounded by four numbered mental state descriptors (e.g. 1. 
jealous, 2. panicked, 3. arrogant, 4. hateful) (fig. 3.2). One of the descriptors 
described the depicted mental/emotional state; the other three descriptors 
were incorrect foils. Participants were instructed to select the descriptor 
that best described what the target was thinking/feeling (see appendix E 
for full instructions).  
 
There was no time limit on each trial and participants provided their 
response by pressing on the keyboard the number (1-4) corresponding to 
the relevant descriptor. A booklet containing definitions of each descriptor 
was provided to minimise the extent to which any variability in word 
comprehension might influence participants’ accuracy on the task. 
Participants were encouraged to consult the definition booklet if they were 
unsure of the meaning of any descriptors. The key metric extracted from 
this task was participants’ mean accuracy score. 
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Fig. 3.2. Example of trial stimuli from the RMET. 
 
Spontaneous facial mimicry task. A component of affective empathy was 
assessed using a spontaneous facial mimicry (SFM) task, in which fEMG was 
used to measure CS and ZM activity during the passive viewing of 
emotional facial expressions. Facial stimuli were taken from the 
MindreadingTM set (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004), and comprised 4000 ms clips 
of four different targets (2 males, 2 females) displaying happy and angry 
facial expressions. Dynamic video stimuli were used as they provide greater 
ecological validity and have been shown to elicit greater SFM than static 
stimuli (Rymarczyk et al., 2011; Sato and Yoshikawa, 2006; Weyers et al., 
2006). Stimuli were presented centrally on the monitor at a height of 16 cm, 
a width of 28 cm, and a frame rate of 30 fps. The task lasted approximately 
5 minutes. 
 
The task comprised 48 trials (24 happy, 24 angry), with each clip presented 
six times in a randomised order. Each trial consisted of the following 
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sequence of events: (1) central fixation cross for 1000ms, (2) angry or happy 
facial expression clip for 4000 ms, (3) blank screen for 1000 ms (fig. 3.3). 
Participants were instructed simply to pay attention to the faces for the 
entirety of the task (see appendix E for full instructions). In accordance 
with prior SFM studies (e.g. Sims et al., 2012), in order to reduce the 
likelihood that participants were focusing on their facial muscles they were 
informed that the EMG sensors were measuring sweat gland activity. 
  
Facial EMG recording and processing 
EMG activity was measured using sensors positioned over the ZM and CS in 
accordance with the guidelines proposed by Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). 
The skin was cleaned using 70% alcohol wipes, after which 4mm Ag/AgCl 
surface sensors (Discount Disposables, USA) filled with isotonic electrode 
gel (Mansfield R&D, UK) were attached bipolarly to the left side of the face 
using 5mm collars (Discount Disposables), at a distance of 10mm apart. A 
ground electrode was positioned over the left mastoid process.  
 
The EMG signal was recorded using an ML-870 Power Lab, amplified 10,000 
times by an ML-138 Octal Bioamp and recorded/processed using LabChart 
8 (AD Instruments). The raw EMG signal was sampled at a rate of 1kHz, 
digitized with 16-bit precision. Digital 500 Hz low-pass and 50 Hz high-pass 
filters were applied to the signal offline. Data from three participants were 
removed due to technical issues resulting in poor quality recordings 
and/or lost event markers. Data were visually inspected and any trials with 
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clear movement artefacts/noise or in which the mean CS or ZM activity 
deviated from the group mean by more than 3*SD were removed (92 trials). 
Following these removals, all participants had at least 12 trials per condition 
(M ± SD = 23.04 ± 2.38). The EMG data were rectified and logarithmically 
transformed to remove negative values and minimize the impact of any 
extreme values.  
 
To test for the emergence of SFM, the magnitude of EMG activity during 
the presentation of the facial expression clips relative to a 1 second baseline 
during the fixation screen period, was examined (de Wied et al., 2009). The 
key metric extracted from this task as a measure of SFM was the mean 
baseline-corrected ZM activity for happy faces and CS activity for angry 
faces during the 2-4 second epoch following stimulus onset (fig. 3.3). This 
epoch was selected because the dynamic facial expressions reached 
maximal intensity at approximately the 2000 ms mark (Sims et al., 2012).  
 
Fig. 3.3. Schematic of trial structure in the spontaneous facial mimicry task. The 
key metric of SFM extracted from this task was the mean baseline corrected CS 
(for angry faces) and ZM (for happy faces) activity within the 2-4 second epoch 
post stimulus onset. 
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3.2.3. Data reduction and analyses 
To test for egocentric bias in the DT, paired samples t-tests were used to 
compare mean RT and the proportion of trials in which the foil object was 
looked at across the experimental and control conditions. To test for the 
emergence of SFM, separate repeated measures ANOVAs with emotion 
(happy/angry) and epoch (baseline/stimulus period) as within-subjects 
factors were conducted for the two dependent variables ZM and CS 
activity. Where the assumption of sphericity was not satisfied, Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected values are reported.  
 
The key metrics extracted from each task for the correlation analysis were, 
(1) the relative proportion of gaze time on target versus foil objects on 
experimental trials in the DT, (2) mean accuracy on the RMET, and (3) mean 
baseline-corrected congruent muscle activity during the 2-4 second period 
in the SFM task. While not directly related to the study hypotheses, the 
relationship between these task measures of empathy and the QCAE were 
examined (see appendix E). Normality of each variable was assessed using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Accordingly, Spearman’s rho is reported for 
correlations where any of the variable distributions showed significant 
deviation from normality. All p-values are reported as 2-tailed, with a 
significance threshold of p < .05. To ensure that the observed results were 
not unduly influenced by a small number of outlier cases, the same analyses 
reported in the results section were conducted following the removal of 
univariate and bivariate outlier cases (see appendix E).  
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3.3. Results  
3.3.1. Director task 
Overall accuracy on the DT was high (M ± SD = 95.45% ± 4.01%). Mean RT 
was significantly longer on experimental (M ± SD = 3031.17 ms ± 748.13 ms) 
relative to control trials (M ± SD = 2948.63 ms ± 740.11 ms), t(46) = 2.36, p = 
.02 (fig 3.4). Analysis of the eye-gaze data showed that the foil object was 
looked at on a significantly greater proportion of experimental trials (mean 
± SD = 87.61% ± 14.33%) relative to control trials (mean ± SD = 57.21% ± 
16.35%), t(38) = -14.05, p < .001. Taken together, these results suggest that 
experimental trials successfully induced an egocentric bias, with 
participants’ gaze patterns suggesting that they considered the foil object 
as a potential target. 
 
 
Fig. 3.4. Mean response time (ms) for experimental and control trials in the 




























DT correlations with trait emotion dysregulation 
To examine the relationship between this task measure of perspective-
taking ability and trait emotion dysregulation, I focused upon the 
experimental condition as these were the only trials in which participants 
were required to suppress their egocentric bias in order to correctly 
identify the target object referred to by the director. A large negative 
correlation between the DT perspective-taking metric and DERS-Total was 
observed, r(37) = -.49, p = .002  (fig. 3.5). 
 
 
Fig. 3.5. Scatterplot showing the relationship between the director task 
perspective-taking metric (gaze time target/gaze time foil) and DERS-Total.  
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DT perspective-taking ability correlations with regulation strategy use 
The DT perspective-taking metric was not significantly related to 
reappraisal use, rho(37) = .21, p = .21, but showed a trend-level negative 




Fig. 3.6. Scatterplot showing the relationship between the director task 
perspective-taking metric and reappraisal/suppression use (ERQ).  
 
3.3.2. RMET 
Mean accuracy (± SD) on the RMET was 76.94% (±9.36%). As this task is a 
four-alternative forced-choice paradigm, an average score of 25% would be 
observed if participants were simply guessing. Accuracy equal to or greater 
than 50% indicates this is not the case and that participants were able to 
complete the task as instructed. Thus, the observed results suggest that 
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participants were able to accurately attribute the correct descriptors to the 
depicted emotions at a level greater than chance.    
 
RMET correlations with trait emotion dysregulation and strategy use 
Mean RMET accuracy showed no relationship with DERS-Total, r(38) = -.14, 
p = .40. Similarly, RMET accuracy was not significantly related to the use of 
reappraisal (rho(38) = .11, p = .51) or suppression (r(38) = -.16, p = .32).  
 
3.3.3. SFM task 
A repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated that for the dependent variable 
ZM activity, there was no main effect of emotion, F(1, 39) = .31, p = .58, 
partial 𝛈2 = .01, or epoch, F(1, 39) = 1.34, p = .25, partial 𝛈2 = .03. The 
expected epoch by emotion interaction was significant, F(1, 39) = 4.49, p = 
.04, partial 𝛈2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction 
demonstrated that ZM activity was higher in the stimulus period relative to 
baseline for happy (p = .04) but not for angry (p = .54) faces. For illustrative 
purposes the mean baseline corrected ZM activity for each one-second 




Fig. 3.7. Mean baseline-corrected ZM activity for happy and angry faces in each 1-
second epoch during the stimulus presentation period. Error bars depict ± 1 
within-subjects SEM. 
 
For the dependent variable CS activity, there was a main effect of emotion, 
F(1, 39) = 16.16, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .29, but no main effect of epoch, F(1, 39) 
= .71, p = .40, partial 𝛈2 = .02. There was a significant emotion by epoch 
interaction, F(1, 39) = 13.67, p = .001, partial 𝛈2 = .26. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed that CS activity was higher 
for angry relative to happy faces overall (p < .001). For angry faces, CS 
activity was significantly higher in the stimulus period relative to baseline (p 
= .001). For happy faces, CS activity was significantly lower in the stimulus 
period relative to baseline (p = .03). For illustrative purposes, the mean 
baseline corrected CS activity for each one-second epoch during stimulus 



































Fig. 3.8. Mean baseline-corrected corrugator activity for each 1-second epoch 
during stimulus presentation. Error bars depict ± 1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
 
SFM task correlations with trait emotion dysregulation 
Mean SFM (mean baseline corrected congruent muscle activity collapsed 
across happy and angry faces) showed a non-significant negative 
relationship with DERS-Total, rho(38) = -.26, p = .11. To better understand 
this unexpected result, the correlations between DERS-Total and mimicry 
of happy (ZM activation) and angry (CS activation) faces were examined 
individually. Happy face mimicry showed no relationship with DERS-Total, 
rho(38) = -.03, p = .84, however, mimicry of angry faces showed a large 
negative correlation with DERS-Total, rho(38) = -.47, p = .002. These two 




























Happy Face Angry Face
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Fig. 3.9. Scatterplots showing the relationship between z-transformed mimicry of 
angry (baseline-corrected CS activity) and happy faces (baseline-corrected ZM 
activity) and DERS-Total. DERS-Total was negatively correlated with angry-face 
mimicry (blue) but was not significantly related to happy-face mimicry (red).  
 
SFM correlations with regulation strategy use 
Mean SFM magnitude was not significantly related to the use of reappraisal 
(rho(38) = .29, p = .07) or suppression (rho(38) = -.13, p = .44). Given the 
above findings demonstrating a different relationship with emotion 
dysregulation for mimicry of happy and angry faces, the relationship 
between happy and angry mimicry with reappraisal/suppression use were 
examined separately.  
 
Happy face mimicry showed no relationship with reappraisal use (rho(38) = 
.04, p = .83), however, angry face mimicry was positively correlated with 
reappraisal use (rho(38) = .39, p = .01) (fig. 3.10). The difference between 
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these two correlations was approaching significance (Steiger’s Z = -1.78, p = 
.08). The use of suppression was not significantly related to mimicry of 
happy (rho(38) = -.07, p = .69) or angry (rho(38) = -.19, p = .24) faces. These 
correlations were not significantly different (Steiger’s Z = -0.61, p = .55).  
 
 
Fig. 3.10. Scatterplot showing the relationship between z-transformed mimicry of 
angry (baseline-corrected CS activity) and happy (baseline-corrected ZM activity) 
faces with reappraisal use (ERQ). Reappraisal use was positively correlated with 
angry mimicry (blue) but was not significantly related to happy mimicry (red).  
 
3.3.4. Summary of results 
Table 3.1. Correlations between empathy tasks and trait emotion regulation 
Variable DT RMET Angry SFM Happy SFM 
DERS-Total -.49 (p = .002) -.14 (p = .40) -.47 (p = .002) -.03 (p = .84) 
Reappraisal (ERQ) .21 (p = .21) .11 (p = .51) .39 (p = .01) .04 (p = .83) 
Suppression (ERQ) -.31 (p = .06) -.16 (p = .32) -.19 (p = .24) -.07 (p = .69) 
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3.4. Discussion 
3.4.1. Summary of findings 
This study examined the relationship between trait emotion regulation and 
task measures of different component processes related to empathy. 
Broadly speaking, the results support the hypothesis that different 
empathic processes share distinct relationships with emotion regulation.  
 
Consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work suggesting that higher 
levels of cognitive empathy may support adaptive emotion regulation (e.g. 
Okun et al., 2000; Schipper and Petermann, 2013), a task measure of 
perspective-taking ability was negatively associated with trait emotion 
dysregulation as measured by the DERS (Kaufman et al., 2016). Perspective-
taking ability was not significantly related to reappraisal use, as measured 
by the ERQ (Gross and John, 2003), however, the predicted negative 
relationship with suppression use was observed. Performance on a task 
assessing the ability to attribute complex mental/emotional states to 
targets based on images of the eye region showed no relationship with any 
measures of trait emotion regulation.  
 
Contrary to the hypothesis that affective empathy would be positively 
related to emotion dysregulation, the magnitude of fEMG-measured SFM 
showed a trend-level negative correlation with trait emotion dysregulation. 
Follow-up analyses demonstrated that while mimicry of happy faces 
(indexed by increased ZM activity) showed no relationship with emotion 
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dysregulation, mimicry of angry faces (indexed by increased CS activity) 
was negatively correlated with trait emotion dysregulation. Additionally, 
increased mimicry of angry, but not happy faces was associated with an 
increased tendency to use reappraisal but showed no relationship with self-
reported use of suppression.  
 
3.4.2. Cognitive empathy & emotion regulation 
Through the use of multiple task measures that assess separable 
components of cognitive empathy, this study gives greater specificity to the 
relationship between cognitive empathy and emotion regulation. 
Perspective-taking ability was negatively associated with trait emotion 
dysregulation, suggesting that those with a greater capacity to take 
another’s perspective experience fewer difficulties with emotion regulation. 
In contrast, the ability to infer a target’s mental/emotional state based on 
images of the eye region showed no relationship with any trait measures of 
emotion regulation.  
 
The different relationships that these two cognitive empathic abilities share 
with trait emotion regulation could be related to differences in the 
underlying processes by which they are mediated. A fundamental 
distinction between the processes recruited by these task measures is the 
extent to which they are reliant upon the ‘online’ control of self and other 
representations (Santiesteban et al., 2012). To perform well on the DT, 
participants must be able to represent the visual perspective of the 
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director, and on experimental trials, quickly inhibit their own visual 
perspective in order to correctly identify the target object to which the 
director was referring. This egocentric suppression is largely mediated by 
inhibitory control processes, which enable the observer to switch between 
the co-active self and other representations (Bailey and Henry, 2008; Ruby 
and Decety, 2004; Santiesteban et al., 2012).  
 
In contrast, the RMET is dependent upon one’s ability to interpret subtle 
facial cues in order to attribute to the target a complex emotional/mental 
state. This ability is thought to rely upon the relatively automatic process of 
matching the perceived expressions to archetypes of emotional expressions 
and associated language stored in semantic memory, and unlike 
perspective-taking, does not necessitate the online switching between self 
and other representations (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Vellante et al., 2013).  
 
Therefore, while both tasks assess abilities related to the cognitive 
component of empathy, the underlying mechanisms by which they are 
mediated differ in the extent to which they place demands on cognitive 
control processes (Bailey and Henry, 2008; Spengler et al., 2010). Given that 
many forms of adaptive emotion regulation are reliant upon similar 
cognitive control processes to those associated with perspective-taking 
(Buhle et al., 2014; Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis et al., 2009; Goldin et al., 
2008; Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; Saxe et al., 2004), it could be that 
individuals with a greater capacity for perspective-taking are able to engage 
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these processes more efficiently, which facilitates the ability to regulate 
one’s emotions. Such an interpretation could also explain why perspective-
taking ability was negatively related to the use of suppression, as the 
greater regulatory capacity of individuals with improved perspective-taking 
abilities makes them less reliant upon potentially maladaptive strategies. 
 
As the RMET does not recruit to the same extent the cognitive control 
processes that support emotion regulation, a greater ability to interpret 
others’ emotional/mental states based on facial cues may confer little 
benefit in terms of regulating one’s own emotions. It is important to note 
that the RMET assesses only the first stage of inferring another’s 
mental/emotional state, which involves attributing an appropriate state to 
the other (e.g. embarrassed) but does not necessarily involve the later stage 
of inferring the content of that state (i.e. the cause of the target’s 
embarrassment) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Therefore, based on the results 
of this study, one can conclude only that there is no evidence that this first 
stage of mental state attribution is related to one’s capacity for emotion 
regulation, and not that these inferential processes as a whole are 
unrelated to emotion regulation.  
 
3.4.3. Affective empathy & emotion regulation 
In contrast to cognitive empathic processes, the capacity to share others’ 
emotions is largely mediated by more implicit mechanisms. For example, 
the predisposition to spontaneously mimic others’ emotional displays, 
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which can elicit an isomorphic affective state in the observer without the 
need for explicit cognitive processes (de Waal and Preston, 2017; Hatfield et 
al., 1993; Preston and de Waal 2002). The task measure of affective empathy 
used in the present study utilised fEMG to measure the extent to which 
participants spontaneously mimicked targets’ emotional facial expressions, 
providing a proxy measure of their propensity to implicitly resonate with 
others’ emotions (Dimberg et al., 2011; Hatfield et al., 1993; Sonnby-
Borgstrom, 2002). 
  
Consistent with prior work, the results suggest that the perception of 
emotional facial expressions elicits spontaneous activation in congruent 
facial muscles (Bornemann et al., 2012; Dimberg, 1990; Dimberg and 
Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2000). Based upon evidence demonstrating 
the potentially deleterious effects of emotions on the efficiency of cognitive 
control processes (Hare et al., 2005, 2008; Tottenham et al., 2011) coupled 
with evidence that higher affective empathy is associated with heightened 
emotional reactivity (Rueckert et al., 2011; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002), it was 
predicted that SFM magnitude would be positively associated with levels of 
trait emotion dysregulation.  
 
In contrast to this hypothesis, the mean magnitude of SFM (averaged across 
angry and happy faces) was not significantly related to trait emotion 
dysregulation. Furthermore, follow-up analyses revealed that a heightened 
propensity to mimic others’ angry, but not happy, facial expressions was 
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associated with lower levels of trait emotion dysregulation and an increased 
tendency to use adaptive reappraisal strategies. While these results were in 
contrast to the initial hypothesis, extant work does provide some precedent 
for these findings.  
 
Prior work has shown that individuals who experience more negative 
emotions can exhibit deficits in spontaneous mimicry (Likowski et al. 2011). 
While negative affect was not explicitly measured in the present study, one 
could reasonably assume that individuals with greater levels of emotion 
dysregulation may be more prone to experiencing negative emotions than 
those with a greater capacity for regulation. Similarly, there is evidence that 
increased anxiety, often related to difficulties with emotion regulation (see 
Cisler et al., 2010 for review), is associated with reduced spontaneous 
mimicry (Vrijsen et al., 2010).  
 
A study of children with disruptive behavioural disorders (DBD), for whom 
impairments in emotion/self-regulation are prevalent (Schoorl et al., 2016), 
demonstrated that relative to typical controls, those with DBD exhibited 
reduced mimicry of angry, but not happy, faces (de Wied et al., 2006). 
Similar valence-specific differences in processing emotional stimuli have 
been observed in other individuals for whom difficulties with emotion/self-
regulation are common. For example, boys who display antisocial behaviour 
and conduct disorder show atypical processing of negative, but not 
positive, emotional stimuli (de Wied et al., 2009). The results of the present 
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study are to some extent consistent with such findings and suggest that 
emotion dysregulation may be associated with valence-specific deficits in 
the propensity to mimic others’ expressions of negative emotion.  
 
When exposed to a conspecific displaying an angry facial expression with 
direct eye contact, one’s initial response to the potential threat inherent in 
such stimuli (Kleinke, 1986) could be a defensive ‘freezing’ reaction (Ardizzi 
et al., 2013). Indeed, it has been proposed that fight, flight, and freeze 
systems are important mediators of one’s reaction to potentially 
aversive/threatening stimuli (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). A freeze 
response is thought to occur upon perception of a threatening stimulus and 
disrupts action in service of prioritising resources in order to deal with the 
potential threat (Algom et al., 2004; McKenna and Sharma, 2004).  
 
The reduced mimicry of angry facial expressions observed in individuals 
with higher levels of emotion dysregulation could be related to a 
heightened propensity to exhibit an automatic freezing response, which 
results in inhibited facial muscle activity for angry, but not happy faces. It is 
also possible that individuals with a greater capacity for emotion regulation 
are better able to implicitly regulate these early automatic responses and 
thus, exhibit greater mimicry of angry expressions than those with less 
well-regulated responses. Similarly, one could speculate that SFM of angry 
faces might include some degree of cognitive processing associated with 
determining whether the perceived other is a friend/foe or more/less 
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dominant (Wang and Hamilton, 2012). Given that such cognitive processes 
would be unlikely to occur in the instance of non-threatening happy facial 
expressions, such an interpretation could potentially explain the results 
observed in the present study. 
 
It is important to consider the possibility that the observed effects were not 
driven solely by deficits in mimicry/embodiment processes per se but 
could also be a reflection of variability in the way in which individuals with 
higher/lower levels of emotion dysregulation attended to the stimuli. While 
SFM reflects a relatively automatic and implicit response, it is sensitive to 
modulation by attentional processes. For example, the magnitude of SFM is 
increased when individuals have a greater motivation to attend to the 
emotional features of faces, such as when explicitly instructed to infer the 
emotional state of depicted targets (Murata et al., 2016). Additionally, 
activations in brain regions associated with mimicry/embodiment are 
greater when participants are induced to focus upon the eye region of the 
face (Hadjikhani et al., 2017). In line with these findings, it is possible that 
individuals with higher levels of emotion dysregulation were less 
willing/able to maintain direct contact with the threatening angry faces, 
which may have reduced the extent to which they exhibited SFM for these 
expressions.   
 
Finally, it was predicted that SFM magnitude would be negatively related to 
the use of suppression. However, this study found no evidence for a 
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significant relationship between any SFM metrics and the habitual use of 
suppression. It is possible that individuals who use suppression regularly 
are more likely to do so only in instances where their emotional response 
exceeds a certain threshold in intensity. Given that the face stimuli used in 
the current SFM task were unlikely to elicit emotion of a particularly high 
intensity, it could be that even those who frequently use suppression in 
their daily lives were no more likely than others to use this strategy during 
the task. This could explain why SFM showed no relationship with the 
habitual use of suppression. 
 
3.4.4. Summary, conclusions, and limitations  
The results of this study provide new evidence regarding the relationship 
between cognitive/affective empathy and emotion regulation. By utilising 
two task measures that assess different abilities relevant to the cognitive 
component of empathy, this study provides greater specificity regarding 
the relationship between this dimension of empathy and emotion 
regulation. Consistent with the results of the trait analysis reported in 
chapter 2, perspective-taking ability was positively related to adaptive 
emotion regulation. However, the ability to attribute complex 
emotional/mental states to targets based on subtle facial cues showed no 
relationship with measures of trait emotion regulation. Using a task 
measure of affective empathy (based on SFM), it was observed that mimicry 
of angry, but not happy, faces was associated with more adaptive emotion 
regulation. 
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While the studies reported thus far have utilised a combination of trait and 
task measures of empathy, emotion regulation has been assessed using only 
trait measures, which may not necessarily provide an accurate reflection of 
respondents’ regulatory abilities. Subsequent chapters seek to build upon 
these studies by using more objective task-based measures of different 
emotion regulation abilities. The next chapter examines the relationship 































































The studies reported in prior chapters broadly support the hypothesis that 
the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy are differentially related 
to emotion regulation. The trait analysis reported in chapter 2 highlights 
specific points of divergence between cognitive and affective empathy in 
terms of their relationship with subscales measuring difficulties with 
impulse control and maintaining focus on goal-directed behaviours in 
emotional situations. These abilities are largely dependent on implicit 
regulatory processes; consequently, the study reported in this chapter 
examines how these components of trait empathy are associated with 
performance on two behavioural tasks that assess implicit emotion 
regulation abilities.  
 
4.1.1. Implicit emotion regulation  
Implicit emotion regulation encompasses various regulatory processes that 
can occur automatically with little or no reliance upon conscious effortful 
control. Such processes may be enacted automatically in response to an 
emotional stimulus, running to completion without the need for any explicit 
regulation intentions or conscious monitoring (Gyurak et al., 2011; Mauss et 
al., 2007). Implicit emotion regulation can entail the spontaneous 
implementation of what are often deemed more explicit regulatory 
strategies, such as reappraisal, which may be enacted without conscious 
intent or awareness (Yuan et al., 2015). In this study, the focus is upon 
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implicit regulatory processes that occur at the earliest stages of exposure 
to an emotional stimulus.   
 
The capacity for emotional stimuli to capture attention in an automatic 
fashion is well documented (Buschman and Miller, 2007; Carretié, 2014; 
Öhman et al., 2001). This prioritised attentional orienting is likely mediated 
by automatic activations in subcortical regions associated with emotional 
processing, such as the amygdala, which show increased activity in 
response to emotional stimuli (Breiter et al., 1996; Gamer and Büchel, 2009; 
Garavan et al., 2001; Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2001; Monk et al., 2003; 
Whalen et al., 1998).  
 
Prioritised processing of emotional information is in many ways adaptive, 
particularly in the case of negatively valenced stimuli which could 
represent a potential threat that should be attended (Hansen and Hansen, 
1988; Öhman et al., 2001; Schimmack and Derryberry, 2005). However, there 
are many instances in which emotional stimuli are entirely irrelevant to 
one’s survival or current goals and represent little more than an unhelpful 
distraction. Attention reflects a limited capacity system (Kahneman, 1973), 
and irrelevant emotional distractors may consume the cognitive resources 
critical for the successful enactment of goal-oriented behaviours. Indeed, 
prior work highlights the potentially deleterious impact emotional stimuli 
can have on cognitive control processes (Hare et al., 2005; Jasinska et al., 
2012; Padmala et al., 2011; Reeck and Egner, 2011; Tottenham et al., 2011).  
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Given the fast and spontaneous onset of affective responses, coupled with 
the high frequency with which one may encounter emotion-inducing 
stimuli in daily life, the capacity to adaptively regulate the early influence of 
emotional stimuli/experiences on cognitive control processes is crucial for 
effective social/cognitive functioning (Blair et al., 2007; Campos et al., 2004; 
Etkin et al., 2006) and the completion of goal-oriented behaviours (Blair et 
al., 2007; Taylor and Fragopanagos, 2005).  
 
Evidence suggests that deficits in implicit emotion regulation, such as 
reduced efficiency in disengaging attention from distracting task-irrelevant 
emotional stimuli, are associated with increased risk for the development 
and maintenance of emotion dysregulation and various disorders of affect 
(Olafsson et al., 2011; Olatunji et al., 2011; Rive et al., 2013). Furthermore, as 
many explicit regulation processes are reliant upon the efficient action of 
cognitive control mechanisms (Buhle et al., 2014; Goldin et al., 2008; 
Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; Kalisch, 2009; McRae et al., 2012), deficits in 
early implicit regulatory processes could impact one’s capacity to utilise 
adaptive regulation strategies at a later stage in the emotion generation 
process (Koster et al., 2011; Morillas-Romero et al., 2015). Thus, it is possible 
that the different relationships that cognitive and affective empathy share 
with emotion dysregulation and habitual strategy use are to some extent a 




4.1.2. Task measures of implicit emotion regulation 
A common approach for assessing implicit emotion regulation abilities 
involves cognitive control tasks wherein performance is compared across 
conditions in which distracting stimuli are either emotional or non-
emotional. Such tasks provide a measure of the extent to which cognitive 
performance is disrupted by emotional information and are based on the 
assertion that individuals with greater implicit emotion regulation abilities 
exhibit reduced emotional interference effects (Etkin et al., 2010; Jackson et 
al., 2003; Koole and Rothermund, 2011; Zhang and Lu, 2012).  
 
While the term implicit is sometimes used only in reference to paradigms 
where the processing of emotional information is entirely irrelevant to task 
performance (Zhang and Lu, 2012), in alignment with Yiend et al. (2008), 
here the term is used more broadly to refer to tasks in which regulatory 
processes may be initiated without any explicit instruction or overt 
intention. In the following subsections, I discuss two paradigms commonly 
used to assess implicit emotion regulation: The emotional go/nogo 
(henceforth Emo-GNG) and the emotional Stroop (henceforth Emo-Stroop).  
 
4.1.3. Emo-GNG  
The go/nogo is a psychomotor task in which participants must respond 
rapidly to targets (go stimuli) while withholding responses to non-targets 
(nogo stimuli) (Rueda et al., 2005). Stimuli are presented in quick 
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succession, with the task structure weighted in favour of go trials (typically 
~75% of trials) in order to induce a prepotent tendency to respond, which 
must then be inhibited on nogo trials. The go/nogo is considered a reliable 
measure of response inhibition/behavioural impulsivity, which is indexed 
by false alarm rate (FAR; i.e. the proportion of nogo trials in which the 
participant failed to inhibit their response) (Rueda et al., 2005; Tottenham 
et al., 2011). The Emo-GNG task utilises the same structure but with the 
addition of emotional and neutral stimuli, which enables the assessment of 
the extent to which emotional information impacts inhibitory control 
processes (Albert et al., 2010; Blair et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2005; Tottenham 
et al., 2011). This task has previously been used to assess variability in 
implicit emotion regulation abilities in both clinical and typical populations 
(Hare et al., 2005, 2008; Tottenham et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2016).  
 
Prior studies have demonstrated that emotional nogo stimuli induce a 
higher FAR relative to neutral nogo stimuli (e.g. Hare et al., 2005; 
Tottenham et al., 2011). Additionally, some studies have shown that 
positively valenced nogo stimuli are associated with increased FAR relative 
to negatively valenced nogos (Hare et al., 2005; though see Tottenham et 
al., 2011), which is typically attributed to the different approach/avoid 
tendencies that these positively/negatively valenced stimuli elicit (Chen 
and Bargh 1999; Marsh et al. 2005; O’Doherty et al., 2003). In addition to 
FAR it is important to consider participants’ hit rate (HR), which reflects 
their accuracy in responding on go trials. D-prime provides a more holistic 
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measure of Emo-GNG performance as it enables the assessment of FAR 
accounting for HR (Tottenham et al., 2011).  
  
4.1.4. Emo-Stroop  
The standard version of the Stroop requires participants to respond to the 
perceptual features of a stimulus (e.g. the colour in which a word is written) 
while ignoring an irrelevant semantic dimension (e.g. the meaning of the 
word), which is either congruent or incongruent with the target dimension 
(Stroop, 1935). An increase in mean response times (RT) for incongruent 
relative to congruent trials has been consistently reported (see review by 
MacLeod, 1991).  
 
Numerous emotional variants of the Stroop have been used to assess biased 
attentional processing and the interaction between emotion and cognition. 
With reference to the current study, Emo-Stroop tasks have also proven 
useful in assessing implicit emotion regulation (see review by Buhle et al., 
2010). Some emotional variants of the Stroop involve testing performance 
on a standard Stroop task following exposure to emotional and neutral 
stimuli (e.g. Hart et al., 2010), others involve comparing speed and accuracy 
in responding to the colour of emotional and neutral words (Whalen et al., 
1998; Richards et al., 1992; Mackay et al., 2004). Many of these Emo-Stroop 
variants have demonstrated the potential for emotional stimuli to disrupt 
cognitive control processes relative to neutral stimuli (Etkin et al., 2006; 
Haas et al., 2006). However, other studies have found evidence of Emo-
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Stroop interference effects only in individuals with high trait anxiety (e.g. 
Kalanthroff et al., 2015; Richards et al., 1992; see also Buhle et al., 2010). Here 
I focus upon a particular version of the Emo-Stroop, commonly referred to 
as the word-face Stroop.   
 
The word-face Stroop stimuli consists of an emotional facial expression 
overlaid with a word, which is either congruent or incongruent with the 
face in terms of the categorical emotion (e.g. Egner et al., 2008; Etkin et al., 
2006; Strand et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2010) and/or valence (e.g. Basgoze, 
2015; Haas et al., 2006; Stenberg et al., 1998; Strand et al., 2013). The word-
face Stroop is a 2-AFC response task in which participants must categorise 
a target (e.g. as positive or negative) while ignoring an irrelevant distractor 
dimension. In some paradigms the target is the face (with the word as a 
distractor; Egner et al., 2008; Etkin et al., 2006; Hu et al., 2012; Strand et al., 
2013; Zhu et al., 2010), whereas in others, the word is the target (with the 
face as a distractor; Başgöze, 2015; Haas et al., 2006; Stenberg et al., 1998; 
Strand et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2010).  
 
Using various versions of the word-face Stroop, prior studies have 
demonstrated increased RT on incongruent relative to congruent trials 
(Etkin et al., 2006; Haas et al., 2006). Given evidence of the automatic 
processing of both words and faces, such findings are interpreted as 
demonstrating that an irrelevant emotional stimulus can spontaneously 
activate associated semantic representations, which interferes with the 
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processing of incongruent targets and/or facilitates processing of 
congruent targets (Stenberg et al., 1998).  
 
4.1.5. The current study 
It is possible that the different relationships that cognitive and affective 
empathy share with trait emotion regulation reported in previous chapters 
are a reflection of differences in implicit emotion regulation abilities. For 
example, the greater use of adaptive reappraisal strategies and reduced 
difficulties with impulse control observed in individuals with higher trait 
cognitive empathy, could be a reflection of a heightened capacity for 
implicit regulatory processes. One prior study provides some support for 
this assertion, by demonstrating that performance on a cognitive 
empathy/ToM task was associated with increased ability to ignore 
irrelevant distractors in an Emo-Stroop task (Bradford 2015). However, this 
study did not examine the relationship that affective empathy shared with 
this task.  
 
Higher affective empathy entails increased reactivity to others’ emotions 
(Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002), which could have a deleterious effect on critical 
cognitive control processes (Tottenham et al., 2011). A reduced capacity to 
implicitly regulate such emotional interference could explain the positive 
relationship between affective empathy and self-reported difficulties in 
managing emotions and maintaining a focus on goal-oriented behaviours 
reported in chapter 2. Indeed, prior work has shown that affective empathy 
 131 
is associated with a heightened sensitivity to emotional stimuli, such as in 
attentional blink tasks (Kanske et al., 2013). Conversely, in a study using an 
Emo-Stroop variant it was found that trait empathy, as measured by the 
QMEE (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972) and the IRI (Davis, 1983), showed no 
relationship with the magnitude of Stroop incongruency effects (Hofelich 
and Preston, 2012).  
 
However, the trait measures used in this prior study may lack sufficient 
precision to assess the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy 
without conflating them with related but dissociable constructs, such as 
sympathy (Reniers et al., 2011). A further limitation of many previous word-
face Stroop tasks is the lack of an appropriate control condition, which 
makes it difficult to determine the extent to which the RT difference 
between congruent and incongruent conditions is driven by interference 
(on incongruent trials) or facilitation (on congruent trials). Accordingly, the 
current study includes a neutral control condition to enable the separation 
of emotional interference and facilitation effects.   
 
To better understand the divergent relationships that cognitive and 
affective empathy share with measures of trait emotion regulation, this 
study examined how these dimensions of empathy are related to implicit 
emotion regulation abilities. To this end, an Emo-GNG and Emo-Stroop 
task were used to assess participants’ ability to maintain effective cognitive 
control in the presence of salient emotional distractors. Given evidence of 
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their ability to evoke affective responses in an automatic fashion, human 
facial expressions of emotion were used as stimuli (Breiter et al., 1996; 
Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2001; Morris et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998; 
Hare et al., 2005). As prior work has demonstrated the potential for both 
positively and negatively valenced stimuli to attract attention and disrupt 
cognitive processing (Hare et al., 2005; Pratto and John, 1991), both tasks 
included positive, negative, and neutral facial expressions in order to 
increase the generalisability of the results.   
 
It was predicted that emotional stimuli would disrupt inhibitory control 
processes, as indexed by (1) lower D-prime for emotional nogo relative to 
neutral nogo trials in the Emo-GNG, and (2) increased RT for incongruent 
relative to neutral control trials in the Emo-Stroop. Critically, it was 
predicted that trait cognitive and affective empathy would be differentially 
related to the magnitude of these emotion interference effects. Greater 
cognitive empathy would be associated with reduced emotional 
interference and greater affective empathy associated with increased 
emotional interference. A summary of the hypotheses is presented below. 
 
1) D-prime will be lower for the emo-nogo relative to the calm-nogo 
condition. It is predicted that this emotional interference effect will be 




2) Emo-Stroop RT will be shorter for congruent trials and longer for 
incongruent trials, relative to a neutral control condition. It is 
predicted that the emotion interference effect will be negatively related 
to cognitive empathy and positively related to affective empathy.  
 
 
4.2. Emo-GNG task 
4.2.1. Participants 
Based on a correlation of .29 between affective empathy and the DERS goals 
subscale reported in chapter 2, an a priori sample size estimation using 
G*Power 3.1. (Faul et al., 2007) suggested a minimum sample of 72 was 
required to detect small to moderate effects at an alpha level of p = .05, 
with power of .80. Ninety-two right handed participants (78 females) were 
recruited from the undergraduate psychology population at the UOR. All 
participants completed the Emo-GNG and Emo-Stroop tasks. Participants 
were recruited through the online research panel and received course 
credit for participation. The mean age (±SD) was 19.86 (±2.39). Following 
data quality checks, 13 participants were removed from the Emo-GNG task 
(see data reduction and analyses section for details), leaving a final sample of 
N = 79 (68 females; mean age ± SD = 19.93 ± 2.61), which was subject to 
analysis. The QCAE was completed by all participants (see section 2.2.1.2. for 
further details of this measure). Cronbach's alpha was high for both QCAE 
subscales (𝛼Affective Empathy = .79; 𝛼Cognitive Empathy = .88).   
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 4.2.2. Materials  
Face stimuli were taken from the Nimstim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et 
al., 2012; www.macbrain.org) and comprised photographs of six female 
(identity numbers: 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10) and six male actors (identity numbers: 21, 
22, 23, 24, 28, 34). Different male and female actors displaying facial 
expressions of fear were used for the practice block (identity numbers: 2, 7, 
14, 16, 20, 37, 38, 42). Each image was converted to grey-scale with 
dimensions of 256 x 329 pixels. The facial expressions included in the task 
were the closed mouth versions of happy, sad, disgusted, and calm (i.e. 
neutral). These emotions were selected in order to include stimuli depicting 
expressions of positive, neutral, and negative valence, which were likely to 
differ in terms of the approach/avoid tendencies they elicit. The same 
actors were used for each facial expression, and the frequency with which 
each stimulus was presented was balanced across conditions.  
 
4.2.3. Procedure 
Participants completed the Emo-GNG and Emo-Stroop within the same 
session; the order of task completion was counterbalanced across the 
sample. The Emo-GNG task lasted approximately 25 minutes. This included 
a practice block comprising 12 trials, followed by 6 experimental blocks 
each comprising 48 trials. An emotional target (go) or distractor (nogo) was 
always paired with a calm target/distractor, such that if an emotional face 
was the go stimulus, a calm face was the nogo stimulus, and vice versa. To 
induce a prepotent tendency to respond, 73% (N = 35) of the trials in each 
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block were go trials, and 27% (N = 13) were nogo trials. Trial frequencies 
within each block are presented in table 4.1 and a schematic of the trial 
structure is depicted in figure 4.1. The order in which the different 
experimental blocks were completed was randomised.  
 
Table 4.1. Block structure and number of trials in the Emo-GNG task 
Go Stimulus (trial N) No-Go Stimulus (trial N) 
Happy (35) Calm (13) 
Sad (35) Calm (13) 
Disgust (35) Calm (13) 
Calm (35) Happy (13) 
Calm (35) Sad (13) 
Calm (35) Disgust (13) 
 
At the start of each block, participants were told which emotion 
represented the go stimulus and were instructed to respond to these 
targets by pressing ‘0’ on the keypad with their right index finger. 
Participants were not told what the nogo expression would be but were 
instructed to respond only to the target expression and withhold 
responding for any other expression. The instructions were to respond as 
quickly as possible to go targets while maintaining accuracy (see appendix F 
for full instructions).  
 
Stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen for 500 ms at a size of 
7.2cm wide 9.2cm high. A white fixation cross positioned centrally atop a 
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black background was presented during each interstimulus interval (ISI), 
which was jittered, ranging from 2000 ms - 6000 ms (M±SD = 3708ms ± 
1211ms). Following the onset of a stimulus there was a 2000 ms window in 
which responses were recorded (go trials in which a response was not 
made within this time window were classed as misses). As in previous Emo-
GNG tasks (Durston et al., 2002; Hare et al., 2005), trial order was 
pseudorandom and parametrically balanced to control for the number of go 
stimuli preceding each nogo stimulus and to ensure that nogo trials 
occurred equally across the early, middle, and late stages of a block. Upon 
completion of a block a holding screen was presented until participants 
pressed a key to continue.  
 
Fig. 4.1. Schematic of the Emo-GNG task events. This example shows three trials in 
the calm-happy block; participants must respond as quickly as possible to frequent 
go (neutral) faces while withholding responses to infrequent nogo (happy) faces. 
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4.2.4. Data reduction and analyses 
Participants with a mean HR or FAR that deviated from the group mean by 
more than 3*SD were removed as outliers (12 participants). Visual 
inspection of these data confirmed that these participants had failed to 
properly follow task instructions in at least one block (e.g. they 
always/never responded on every trial and/or confused the go/nogo 
stimuli). Further, one participant was removed as the necessary 
questionnaire data was incomplete, leaving a final sample of N = 79, which 
was subject to analysis.  
 
The key index of task performance on the Emo-GNG was D-prime, which 
was calculated by subtracting the z-transformed FAR from the z-
transformed HR. As D-prime calculations cannot be performed for values of 
1 (i.e. 100% HR/FAR) or 0 (i.e. 0% HR/FAR), any such values were 
transformed using the formula: 1/(2N) for values of 0, and 1-1/(2N) for 
values of 1. D-prime data were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA 
with trial type (Emo-NoGo/Calm-NoGo) and emotion (happy, sad, disgust) 
as within-subjects factors. Greenhouse Geisser corrected values are 
reported where the assumption of sphericity was not satisfied.  
 
The key metric extracted from this task for the correlation analysis was the 
difference in mean D-prime between the calm-nogo and emo-nogo 
conditions (CalmNoGo D-prime - EmoNoGo D-prime). This metric was 
termed the ‘emotion interference effect’. As the different facial expression 
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pairings were balanced across these two conditions, this metric controls for 
variability in participants’ capacity to discriminate between the calm and 
emotional faces, providing a measure of the extent to which performance 
was affected by emotional nogo stimuli. 
 
Bivariate correlations were used to examine the relationship between trait 
cognitive/affective empathy and the emotion interference effect. Normality 
of each variable was assessed using Kolmogorov Smirnov tests. Spearman's 
rho is reported for correlations where any variable distribution showed 
significant deviation from normality. To ensure that the observed results 
were not unduly influenced by a small number of outlier cases, the same 
analyses reported in the results section were conducted following the 
removal of univariate and bivariate outlier cases (see appendix F). 
Furthermore, while not related to the primary aims of this study, the 
relationship between the Emo-GNG, Emo-Stroop, and ERQ were examined 
(see appendix F). 
 
4.2.5. Results 
A repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of 
target, F(1, 78) = 96.60, p < .001, partial 𝛈2  = .55, and emotion, F(1.83, 142.88) 
= 70.91, p < .001, partial 𝛈2  = .48. A significant target by emotion interaction 




Effects of target condition 
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment revealed that 
D-prime was significantly higher for calm (M ± SD = 2.76 ± 0.51) relative to 
emotional (M ± SD = 2.19 ± 0.07) nogo stimuli (p < .001) (fig. 4.2, left panel). 
Regardless of the emotion, D-prime was always higher for blocks where the 
nogo stimulus was a calm face: Disgust (calm-nogo M ± SD = 3.09 ± 0.57; 
emo-nogo M ± SD = 2.72 ± 0.72, p < .001), happy (calm-nogo M ± SD = 2.92 ±  
0.61; emo-nogo M ± SD = 1.83 ± 0.94, p < .001), sad (calm-nogo M ± SD = 2.27 
± 0.72; emo-nogo M ± SD = 2.01 ± 0.67 p = .003) (fig. 4.2, right panel).  
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Mean D-prime for Emo-NoGo and Calm-NoGo conditions on the left. 
Mean D-prime for Emo-NoGo and Calm-NoGo trials for each emotion condition 
on the right. Error bars depict ± 1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
Effects of emotion and interaction with target condition 
Regardless of whether the nogo stimulus was calm or emotional, D-prime 















































































± 0.63, p < .001) and sad (M ± SD = 2.14 ± 0.59, p < .001). D-prime for happy 
blocks was higher than for sad (p = .004). To better understand the target 
by emotion interaction and whether the specific emotion had an influence 
on task performance, the D-prime difference (calm-nogo minus emo-nogo 
conditions) was compared across emotions. This metric reflects differences 
in the degree of interference for emo-nogo stimuli while controlling for any 
variability in the discriminability between the emotional and the calm faces. 
Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that the difference 
between the calm-nogo and emo-nogo conditions was greater for happy 
faces (M ± SD = 1.09 ± 0.96) relative to disgust (M ± SD = 0.38 ± 0.56) (p < 
.001), and sad (M ± SD = 0.25 ± .75) (p < .001). There was no difference 
between the disgust and sad conditions (p = .66).  
 
Emo-GNG emotion interference effect correlations with trait empathy 
Trait affective empathy was positively correlated with the GNG emotion 
interference effect, r(77) = .34, p = .003. Cognitive empathy was not 
significantly related to the GNG emotion interference effect, rho(77) = .14, p 
= .22. The difference between these correlations did not reach significance, 
Steiger’s Z = -1.58, p = .11. (fig. 4.3).  
 141 
 
Fig. 4.3. Scatterplot showing the relationship between z-transformed 
cognitive/affective empathy and the GNG task emotion interference effect (calm-
nogo D-prime minus emo-nogo D-prime). Affective empathy (red) showed a 
significant positive correlation with the emotion interference effect; cognitive 
empathy (blue) was not significantly related to the emotion interference effect.  
 
Given that affective empathy has been found to be associated with 
improved emotion discrimination under conditions of brief stimulus 
exposure (Kang et al., 2017), it is possible that the correlation between 
affective empathy and the emotion interference effect could have been 
driven by a higher D-prime in the calm-nogo condition (i.e. improved HR 
when responding to emotional go targets).  
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To test whether the observed correlation between affective empathy and 
the emotion interference effect may have been driven by an increased 
performance in the calm-nogo (emo-go) condition, rather than increased 
interference in the emo-nogo condition, the relationship between 
affective/cognitive empathy and D-prime in the calm-nogo and emo-nogo 
conditions were examined individually.  
 
A negative correlation between affective empathy and D-prime in the emo-
nogo condition was on the threshold of significance, r(77) = -.22, p =.05. 
Affective empathy showed no relationship with D-prime in the calm-nogo 
condition, r(77) = .08, p = .50. These results suggest that the correlation 
between affective empathy and the emotion interference effect was driven 
by increased emotional interference in the emo-nogo condition, rather 
than improved performance in the calm-nogo condition. Cognitive empathy 
was not significantly related to D-prime in either the emo-nogo, rho(77) =   










4.3. Emo-Stroop task 
4.3.1. Participants 
The same 92 participants who completed the Emo-GNG task also 
completed the Emo-Stroop. Nine participants were removed following data 
quality checks (see data reduction and analyses section for details), leaving a 
final sample of N = 83 (69 female; mean age ± SD = 19.93 ± 2.50), which was 
subject to analysis. Cronbach’s alpha for both dimensions of the QCAE were 
high within this sample (𝛼Affective Empathy = .83; 𝛼Cognitive Empathy = .90).  
 
4.3.2. Materials 
Face stimuli were taken from the Nimstim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et 
al., 2012; www.macbrain.org) and comprised the same male and female 
actors used in the Emo-GNG (see section 4.2.2. for details). The facial 
expressions used in the Emo-Stroop were angry, happy, and calm (i.e. 
neutral). Each image was converted to grey-scale, with dimensions of 256 x 
329 pixels. Different actors (identities: 7, 14, 20, 38) and emotional facial 
expressions (fearful) were used for the practice trials. For each face the 
word ‘angry’ or ‘happy’ was superimposed over the bridge of the nose so as 
not to obscure any features, in capitalized arial font at a size of 30 with 10% 
transparency. The stimuli were presented centrally on the monitor at a size 






The Emo-Stroop task took approximately 15 minutes to complete. This 
comprised 16 practice trials, followed by three experimental blocks each 
comprising 48 trials. The blocks were emotion specific (i.e. angry face, 
happy face, calm face), and contained an equal number of trials in which the 
word was ‘happy’ or ‘angry’. Trial and block orders were randomized. The 
task was 2-AFC with participants instructed to respond by pressing the 1 or 
2 keys on the keyboard with the index and middle finger of their right hand 
depending upon whether the word was positive (i.e. ‘happy’) or negative (i.e. 
‘angry’) (button mappings were counterbalanced across the sample) (see 
appendix F for full instructions).  
 
Each stimulus was presented for 500 ms, followed by a fixation screen 
comprising a white cross presented centrally atop a black background. The 
duration of the fixation screen was jittered, ranging from 4500 ms - 6000 
ms (M ± SD = 5250 ms ± 565 ms). Responses were recorded within a 2500 
ms window, which incorporated the 500 ms stimulus presentation and 
2000 ms of the post-stimulus fixation screen. Any trials in which the 
participant failed to respond within this time window were classed as 
incorrect. Details of each condition are presented in table 4.2 and a 






Table 4.2.  
Block structure and trial numbers for the Emo-Stroop conditions 
Face (trial N) Word (trial N) Trial type 
Happy 
(48) 
Happy (24) Congruent 
Angry (24) Incongruent 
Angry 
(48) 
Happy (24) Incongruent 
Angry (24) Congruent 
Calm 
(48) 
Happy (24) Control 
Angry (24) Control 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Schematic of trial events in the Emo-Stroop. This figure depicts examples 
of a congruent and an incongruent trial in the angry face block. 
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4.3.4. Data reduction and analyses 
An unexpected error in the task programme resulted in data for a 
significant number of trials being lost for two participants; these cases were 
removed prior to analysis. Two participants who failed to complete the 
necessary questionnaire data were removed. To ensure data quality, overall 
mean accuracy was assessed in order to identify any participants who had 
failed to correctly follow the task instructions. Participants with an overall 
mean accuracy more than 3*SD below the group mean (< 55.35% accuracy) 
were removed (5 cases), leaving a final sample of N = 83, which was subject 
to analysis. Incorrect trials (mean number of trials removed per participant 
= 12.28, SD = 8.07) or trials in which the RT deviated from the group mean 
by more than 3*SD were removed (mean number of trials removed per 
participant = 8.08, SD = 10.65). The mean number of trials per block 
following all removals was 41.21 (SD = 4.76). 
  
The dependent variable in the Emo-Stroop was RT for correct trials. These 
data were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA, with face 
(angry/happy/calm) and word (angry/happy) as within-subjects factors. 
Greenhouse Geisser corrected values are reported where the assumption 
of sphericity was not satisfied. Given the inclusion of a neutral (calm face) 
control condition, this paradigm enabled the separate assessment of 
interference (resulting from incongruent task-irrelevant emotional faces) 
and facilitation (resulting from congruent task-irrelevant emotional faces) 
effects. These metrics were calculated by subtracting the mean RT for the 
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neutral control condition from the mean RT for the incongruent condition 
(emotion interference effect) and subtracting the mean congruent RT from 
the mean neutral control RT (emotion facilitation effect).  
 
Bivariate correlations were used to examine the relationship between trait 
empathy and the Emo-Stroop task metrics. Normality of each variable was 
assessed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Spearman’s rho was used in 
instances where any of the variable distributions deviated significantly from 
normality. All tests were two-tailed, with a significance threshold of p < .05. 
To ensure that the observed results were not unduly influenced by a small 
number of outlier cases, the same analyses reported in the results section 
were conducted following the removal of univariate and bivariate outlier 
cases (see appendix F).  
 
4.3.5. Results 
Mean accuracy was 91.47% (SD = 5.6), which confirms that participants 
were able to complete the task as instructed. A repeated measures ANOVA 
examining the effect of face (angry/happy/calm) and word (angry/happy) 
on the dependent variable RT, demonstrated a significant main effect of 
word, F(1, 82) = 19.05, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .19, but no main effect of face, F(2, 
164) = .13, p = .88, partial 𝛈2  = .002. The expected face by word interaction 





Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment revealed that 
RT was significantly lower for the word happy (M ± SD = 590.66 ms ± 94.98 
ms) compared with the word angry (M ± SD = 604.16 ms ± 94.38 ms) (p < 
.001). While the word by face interaction did not reach significance, the 
data were suggestive of some differences in the magnitude of the happy 
word RT advantage across the different face conditions. This was explored 
further using post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment.  
 
In the calm face condition, RT for the word happy (M ± SD = 593.44 ms ± 
101.22 ms) was significantly shorter than for the word angry (M ± SD = 
603.64 ms ± 100.28 ms) (p = .04). Similarly, in the happy face condition, RT 
for the word happy (M ± SD = 586.80 ms ± 102.06 ms) was significantly 
shorter than for the word angry (M ± SD = 608.65 ± 101.07 ms) (p < .001). 
However, in the angry face condition, the difference between RT for the 
word happy (M ± SD = 591.75 ms ± 98.13 ms) and the word angry (M ± SD = 
600.19 ms ± 98.64 ms) did not reach significance (p = .11) (fig. 4.5, left panel).  
 
In sum, while the predicted face by word interaction did not reach 
significance, there was some evidence of emotional interference effects, 
which reduced the positive word RT advantage in the angry face condition. 
To test more directly for interference and facilitation effects, paired 
samples t-tests were used to compare RT across the congruent, 
incongruent, and control conditions. No significant differences were 
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observed between the control condition and the congruent (t(82) = 1.15, p = 
.26) or incongruent (t(82) = .34, p = .73) conditions. The difference between 
the congruent and incongruent conditions was approaching significance, 
t(82) = 1.816, p = .07 (fig. 4.5, right panel).  
 
 
Fig. 4.5. Mean RT across each condition in the Emo-Stroop task (left panel). Mean 
RT for the incongruent, congruent, and control conditions (right panel). Error bars 
depict ± 1 within-subjects SEM.   
 
Emo-Stroop task correlations with trait empathy 
Trait cognitive empathy was negatively correlated with the Emo-Stroop 
emotion interference effect, rho(81) = -.24, p = .03. In contrast, affective 
empathy showed no relationship with the emotion interference effect, 
rho(81) = .003, p = .98. These correlations were significantly different, 















































































Fig. 4.6. Scatterplot showing the relationship between z-transformed 
cognitive/affective empathy and the Emo-Stroop emotion interference effect 
(incongruent RT minus control RT). The emotion interference effect showed a 
significant negative relationship with cognitive empathy (blue) but was not 
significantly related to affective empathy (red).  
 
 
To test whether the reduced emotional interference associated with higher 
cognitive empathy was driven by a ‘gross-level’ ignorance of the task-
irrelevant emotional faces, which would also reduce the potential for any 
facilitation effects on congruent trials, the relationship between trait 
empathy and the emotion facilitation effect was examined.  
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Cognitive empathy showed a trend-level positive relationship with the 
emotion facilitation effect, rho(81) = .17, p = .13. Affective empathy showed 
no relationship with the emotion facilitation effect, r(81) = -.03, p = .80. 




4.4.1. Summary of findings 
This study examined the relationship between trait empathy and implicit 
emotion regulation abilities, as indexed by the magnitude of emotional 
interference in an Emo-GNG and Emo-Stroop task. The results of both 
tasks provide some support for the hypothesis that the cognitive and 
affective dimensions of empathy are differentially related to implicit 
regulation abilities. Affective empathy was associated with increased 
emotional interference in the Emo-GNG; however, no relationship was 
observed for cognitive empathy. In the Emo-Stroop task, cognitive empathy 
was associated with reduced emotional interference, but no relationship 
was observed for affective empathy. Taken together, these results provide 
some support for the hypothesis that cognitive empathy is positively 
associated with implicit emotion regulation abilities, whereas affective 





4.4.2. Emo-GNG task 
The results of the Emo-GNG task are consistent with prior studies that 
have reported decreased performance for emotional relative to neutral 
nogo stimuli (Hare et al., 2005, 2008; Tottenham et al., 2011). Using a 
measure of D-prime, it was found that participants made significantly more 
errors (i.e. increased FAR and/or decreased HR) on trials where the nogo 
stimuli were emotional faces, relative to trials in which the nogo stimuli 
were calm (i.e. neutral) faces. Furthermore, a significant difference in the 
magnitude of this emotion interference effect was observed for happy facial 
expressions relative to expressions of disgust and sadness.  
 
While some prior studies found that differently valenced nogo stimuli 
disrupt task performance to a similar extent (Tottenham et al., 2011), the 
findings of the present study are aligned with those reported by Hare et al. 
(2005), who found evidence of increased emotional interference for positive 
compared to negative emotional facial expressions in an Emo-GNG task. 
Consistent with the assertion that positive stimuli are associated with an 
approach tendency and negative stimuli with an avoid tendency (Hare et al., 
2005), the present findings suggest that withholding impulsive responses to 
happy faces is more difficult than withholding responses to disgusted and 
sad faces. In sum, the results suggest that the Emo-GNG provides a useful 
measure of implicit emotion regulation ability, capturing processes 
associated with the capacity to maintain inhibitory control in the presence 
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of salient emotional distractors, and overcoming the implicit action 
tendencies evoked by positive and negative emotional stimuli.  
 
Critical to the hypotheses of the study, the magnitude of the Emo-GNG 
emotion interference effect was positively related to trait affective 
empathy. This is possibly a reflection of increased spontaneous facial 
mimicry (SFM) and arousal in response to emotional facial expressions 
experienced by individuals with higher affective empathy (Rueckert et al., 
2011; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002), which results in greater difficulty 
regulating impulsive behaviours in the presence of emotional distractors.  
 
Given evidence for a relationship between cognitive empathy and inhibitory 
control processes (Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis et al., 2009; Frith and Frith, 
2003; Goel et al., 1995; Saxe et al., 2004), it was predicted that higher 
cognitive empathy would be associated with reduced emotional 
interference in this task. However, the observed results did not support this 
hypothesis, as no relationship between trait cognitive empathy and the 
Emo-GNG emotion interference effect was observed. One possible 
explanation for the failure to support this hypothesis is that trait measures 
may assess this dimension of empathy quite broadly, measuring not just 
perspective-taking, but also other abilities, such as emotion recognition, 




4.4.3. Emo-Stroop task 
Consistent with previous studies that utilised face-word Emo-Stroop tasks, 
the present study found evidence for an effect of word valence on response 
times, with significantly longer RTs observed for the word “angry” relative 
to the word “happy” (e.g. Stenberg et al., 1998). While significant 
interference or facilitation effects were not observed in the present study, 
there was some trend-level evidence of these effects, with a slight RT 
increase for incongruent trials and a slight RT decrease for congruent trials 
relative to a neutral control condition.  
 
The failure of these effects to reach significance could be due to the 
relatively automatic level at which words are processed, which may have 
attenuated the magnitude of any potential interference/facilitation effects 
induced by the task-irrelevant faces (Lei et al., 2017). While some prior 
studies have found evidence to suggest that task-irrelevant faces can 
influence the processing of the target words (Sternberg et al., 1998), other 
studies suggest that words are subject to prioritised processing over faces 
(Ovaysikia et al., 2011), which could explain why the emotional faces did not 
have a significant impact on RT for classifying the target words.  
 
In relation to the main hypotheses of the study, the results of the Emo-
Stroop provide further support for the hypothesis that cognitive and 
affective empathy share different relationships with implicit emotion 
regulation. Trait cognitive empathy was negatively correlated with the 
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Emo-Stroop emotion interference effect, which suggests that individuals 
with higher levels of cognitive empathy were more efficient in regulating 
the potential interference caused by the task-irrelevant emotional faces. 
Furthermore, trait cognitive empathy showed a small positive trend-level 
relationship with the emotion facilitation effect. This suggests that the 
observed reduction in emotional interference was not achieved by a more 
“gross-level” ignorance toward the task-irrelevant faces, which would also 
have inhibited their potential to facilitate target word processing on 
congruent trials. The negative relationship between cognitive empathy and 
emotional interference in the Emo-Stroop is in contrast to the findings of 
the Emo-GNG, where no relationship with cognitive empathy was 
observed.  
 
Contrary to expectation, affective empathy showed no relationship with the 
emotion interference effect in the Emo-Stroop task. It was expected that 
the heightened reactivity to others’ emotions in individuals with greater 
affective empathy (Rueckert et al., 2011; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002) would 
have resulted in increased interference (on incongruent trials) and 
facilitation (on congruent trials) effects. However, neither of these 
relationships were observed in the present study. This is in contrast to the 
results of the Emo-GNG task, where a positive correlation between 
affective empathy and the emotion interference effect was observed.  
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The divergent relationships that cognitive and affective empathy show with 
the Emo-GNG and Emo-Stroop could suggest that these tasks are assessing 
slightly different processes related to implicit emotion regulation. Indeed, it 
has been asserted that GNG tasks assess response inhibition whereas the 
Stroop assesses conflict resolution, which reflect closely related but 
dissociable aspects of cognitive control (Nee et al., 2007; Swick et al., 2011). 
In the present study, the metrics of emotional interference from each of 
these tasks were not significantly related to one another (see appendix F), 
which is in alignment with prior work demonstrating low convergence and 
different developmental trajectories for Stroop and GNG/stop-signal tasks 
(Huizinga et al., 2006; Morooka et al., 2012).  
 
Additionally, a speculative explanation for the divergent findings observed 
in the present study relates to differences in the task-relevance of the 
emotional face stimuli in these tasks. Given that the faces in the Emo-
Stroop were always task-irrelevant, it could be that participants were able 
to focus their attention more fixedly on the target words. Such an approach 
would likely have attenuated the potential influence of the emotional faces, 
which could explain why participants’ levels of trait affective empathy did 
not modulate these task effects. As participants were required to actively 
attend to the faces in order to perform successfully on the Emo-GNG task, 
such an approach would not have been possible. This could explain why 
higher affective empathy was associated with increased emotional 
interference in this task but not in the Emo-Stroop.  
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4.4.4. Summary, conclusions, and limitations 
This study builds upon the findings of previous chapters by examining the 
relationship between cognitive/affective empathy and tasks that provide 
objective performance-based measures of implicit emotion regulation 
abilities. While some contrasting results were observed across the two 
tasks, taken together they provide evidence to suggest that higher trait 
cognitive empathy is associated with improved implicit emotion regulation, 
whereas higher affective empathy is associated with a diminished ability to 
regulate early emotional influences on cognitive control processes.  
 
It is important to highlight some potential limitations of the present study. 
Firstly, some of the components assessed by these task measures are 
arguably associated more with emotional reactivity rather than emotion 
regulation per se. Thus, one limitation of these tasks is that it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which differences in the magnitude of emotional 
interference were driven by variability in reactivity or regulation, which is a 
pervasive issue in the field of emotion regulation. Given that regulatory 
processes can act implicitly and exert an influence at the earliest stages of 
an affective response (Gross, 2015; Gyurak et al., 2011), it is often difficult to 
highlight the precise point at which reactivity ends and regulation begins 




In acknowledgment of the limitations of the current study, the following 
two chapters utilise task measures of emotion regulation that enable 
greater clarity regarding the delineation between emotional reactivity and 
emotion regulation. Building upon the findings of chapters 2 and 3, which 
found some evidence of a relationship between cognitive empathy and 
reappraisal use, the next chapter tests the relationship between trait 
empathy and two tasks that assess the ability to downregulate negative 












































































In chapter 2 it was observed that the cognitive and affective dimensions of 
trait empathy share different relationships with the habitual use of 
reappraisal. Reappraisal use was positively associated with cognitive 
empathy but showed no relationship with affective empathy. The trait 
measure used in that study assessed only respondents’ propensity to use 
reappraisal, meaning it is not possible on the basis of those results to 
determine whether higher cognitive empathy is associated with improved 
reappraisal ability per se. To my knowledge, no studies to date have 
examined the relationship between empathy and task measures of 
reappraisal. Across two studies this chapter examines the relationship 
between trait empathy and tasks that assess participants’ ability to 
downregulate negative emotions based on implicit (study 1) and explicit 
(study 2) reappraisal. 
 
5.1.1. Task measures of reappraisal  
 
Reappraisal refers to a change in the meaning adhered to an emotion-
eliciting stimulus or event in order to lessen (or increase) its emotional 
impact (Gross, 1998, 2002, 2015). The majority of task-based measures of 
reappraisal assess what is often referred to as explicit (or instructed) 
reappraisal. In such tasks, participants are specifically instructed to use 
reappraisal to modify their emotional experience (e.g. Ochsner et al., 
2004a). This approach and its variants have demonstrated a reliable 
influence of reappraisal on self-reported emotional experience, 
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psychophysiological responses, and neural activation in regions associated 
with emotional processing and self-regulation (Jackson et al., 2000; Kalisch, 
2009; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Ray et al., 2010).  
 
 
While such tasks may capture abilities relevant to real-world situations in 
which the individual exerts a conscious effort to implement reappraisal, 
day-to-day emotion regulation also involves more implicit and 
unintentional processes (Gyurak et al., 2011; Mauss et al., 2007). For 
example, extrinsic contextual information can influence one’s appraisals 
and emotional responses to a stimulus in a relatively implicit manner, 
without any conscious goal or intention to engage in reappraisal (Berkman 
and Lieberman, 2009; Mocaiber et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2017).  
 
 
Some studies have adopted paradigms that assess these more implicitly 
evoked forms of reappraisal. Such tasks typically involve pairing emotional 
stimuli with brief descriptions (or frames) that provide a context for 
interpreting what is happening (e.g. Foti and Hajcak, 2008; Wang et al., 
2017). In a seminal early study examining the effects of contextual framing 
on emotional responses, Lazarus and Alfert (1964) demonstrated how self-
report and physiological indices of stress can be modulated by concurrent 
auditory descriptions that influence the observer’s interpretation of stress-
inducing videos. More recent studies provide further evidence of the 
modulatory effect of contextual framing on emotional responding (Dennis 
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and Hajcak, 2009; Foti and Hajcak, 2008; Kim et al., 2004; MacNamara et al., 
2009; Mocaiber et al., 2010, 2011; Wang et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2012). In 
contrast to explicit reappraisal paradigms, participants are not given any 
overt instruction to regulate their emotions in framing tasks and are 
required to simply attend to the stimuli in each condition. Thus, framing 
tasks are distinct from explicit reappraisal tasks in that their influence on 
emotional experience is driven largely by extrinsic (i.e. arising outside the 
individual) rather than intrinsic (i.e. arising from within the individual) 
factors, and they are thought to capture reappraisal of a more implicit and 
unintentional nature (Foti and Hajcak, 2008; Mocaiber et al., 2011; Wang et 
al., 2017).  
 
5.1.2. The current studies 
In this chapter, I report two studies that examined the relationship between 
trait empathy and the magnitude of negative emotion downregulation in an 
implicit (study 1) and explicit (study 2) reappraisal task. I use the term 
“explicit” to refer to instances in which reappraisal was driven by a 
deliberate attempt to alter one’s emotional experience. I use the term 
“implicit” to refer to less deliberate forms of reappraisal, where one’s 
emotional response was influenced by extrinsic factors without the 
necessity for any conscious intent to engage in reappraisal (Berkman and 
Lieberman, 2009).  
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Based on the results of previous chapters and the extant theoretical and 
empirical work discussed in the introductory chapter, it was predicted that 
cognitive, but not affective, empathy would be positively related to the 
magnitude of emotion downregulation in an implicit and explicit 
reappraisal task. A summary of the study hypotheses is presented below. 
 
1) Cognitive empathy will show a positive relationship with metrics of 
regulation magnitude in an implicit and explicit reappraisal task. 
 
2) Affective empathy will show no relationship with metrics of regulation 
magnitude in an implicit and explicit reappraisal task. 
 
 
5.2. Study 1: Trait empathy and implicit reappraisal 
This first study examines how variability in trait empathy relates to the 
implicit reappraisal of negative images driven by preceding sentence frames 
that provide a context for interpreting what is happening in the depicted 
situation. Implicit reappraisal was operationalised as the difference in 
ratings of self-reported emotional experience (valence) between negative 
images paired with descriptive framing sentences (which simply described 
the image content, thereby providing a baseline measure of participants’ 
emotional response) and negative images paired with neutralising framing 
sentences (which aimed to reduce the unpleasantness of participants’ 
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appraisals of the images). It was predicted that the implicit reappraisal task 
metric would be positively related to trait cognitive empathy but show no 
relationship with affective empathy. 
 
5.2.1. Participants 
Given that implicit reappraisal is less reliant than explicit reappraisal upon 
cognitive control processes also associated with cognitive empathy, it was 
expected that the relationship between trait empathy and reappraisal 
ability would be of a similar magnitude to the effects reported for trait 
reappraisal use in chapter 2. An a priori sample size estimation using 
G*Power 3.1. (Faul et al., 2007) suggested that a minimum sample of 82 was 
required to detect effects of a small to moderate magnitude with power of 
.80, at an alpha level of p = .05. Ninety-two participants (73 females) were 
recruited from the undergraduate population at the UOR to take part in a 
one-hour study on “mood and cognitive performance”. All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal vision, and the mean age was 20.24 years 
(SD = 2.21; range = 18-35). Participants were recruited via the university 
online participant pool and were awarded course credit for participation. 
  
5.2.2. Materials  
Empathy. Trait empathy was measured using the QCAE (Reniers et al., 2011). 
Within this sample, both sub-scales of the QCAE demonstrated high 
internal consistency (𝛼Cognitive Empathy = .87; 𝛼Affective Empathy = .84). 
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Affective images. Forty images (20 negative. 20 neutral) were selected from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) database (Lang et al., 
2005). All images were of a social nature, which was defined broadly as 
including a sentient target (or targets), for which one could infer an 
emotional/cognitive state and/or experience an emotional reaction in 
response to observing the target’s situation. A range of IAPS image types 
were used, including: Mutilation/injury, assault/attack, soldier, firefighter, 
car accident, scared/sick child, drugs, burn victim (negative); neu-
man/woman/child, office, bakers, factory worker, harvest (neutral). 
 
Based on the normative ratings provided in the IAPS manual (Lang et al., 
2005), independent samples t-tests demonstrated that the negative images 
had a significantly lower mean valence (Mvalence = 2.35, SD = 0.41) and 
significantly higher mean arousal (Marousal = 5.67, SD = 0.91), compared to 
the neutral images (Mvalence = 5.25, SDvalence = 0.56; Marousal = 3.56, SDarousal = 
0.49), (valence, t(38) = 18.58, p < .001; arousal, t(38) = 9.14, p < .001). 
 
Reappraisal framing sentences. Forty framing sentences were used (20 
neutralising, 20 descriptive), which were taken from prior studies on 
reappraisal framing where possible. Seven sentences were taken from Foti 
and Hajcak (2008), two of which were edited slightly to make the context 
less ambiguous. Thirty-two sentences were taken from an unpublished 
study conducted by collaborators and one new sentence was created to fit 
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the current image set (see appendix G for all negative and neutral IAPS 
image numbers with accompanying framing sentences). An independent 
samples t-test confirmed that the different sentence types did not differ in 
terms of word count (Mdescriptive = 8.6, SDdescriptive = 1.79; Mneutralising = 8.7, 
SDneutralising = 1.84), t(38) = .26, p = .80.   
 
All participants saw the same 40 images in block 1 (freeview condition). Half 
of the neutral images from block 1 were shown again in block 2 with an 
accompanying descriptive framing sentence. The ten neutral images 
presented in block 2 were counterbalanced across the sample. Based on the 
normative IAPS ratings (Lang et al., 2005), an independent samples t-test 
demonstrated that the different neutral image sets shown in block 2 did not 
differ significantly in valence, t(18) = .94, p = .36, or arousal, t(18) = .67, p = 
.51. For block 2, two sets of 10 images were created from the 20 negative 
images shown in block 1. These negative image sets were matched based on 
the image category (e.g. injury, drugs etc.), complexity, and the age, race, 
and number of depicted individuals. Based on the normative ratings (Lang 
et al., 2005), independent samples t-tests showed that these two negative 
image sets did not differ significantly in terms of valence (Mset1 = 2.33, SDset1 
= 0.45; Mset2 = 2.37, SDset2 = 0.39) or arousal (Mset1 = 5.65, SDset1 = 0.62; Mset2 = 
5.70, SDset2 = 1.16); valence, t(18) = .20, p = .85; arousal, t(18) = .12, p = .91. In 
block 2, half of the negative images were paired with descriptive sentences 
and half with neutralising sentences; image-sentence pairings were 
counterbalanced across the sample. 
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5.2.3. Procedure 
Participants read the information sheet and provided written consent to 
participate. All testing was completed in isolation, in a distraction-free 
environment. Participants were sat at an approximate viewing distance of 
60cm from the monitor, which had a refresh rate of 60Hz and ran the task 
at a resolution of 600 x 800. The implicit reappraisal framing task was 
completed as part of a larger battery, which took approximately one hour in 
total. The task consisted of two blocks comprising 70 trials in total (Block 1: 
20 negative, 20 neutral images; Block 2: 20 negative, 10 neutral images), and 
lasted on average approximately 20 minutes. While of primary interest were 
the negative image ratings across the different framing conditions, neutral 
images were included as a manipulation check and as a means of slowing 
habituation to negative images. 
 
Participants were informed that they would view a series of images and 
were asked to report after each “how unpleasant/pleasant they felt in 
response to the image” (see appendix G for full instructions). Ratings were 
made using the keyboard and a 1-9 bipolar scale was used, where: 1 = 
extremely unpleasant, 5 = neutral, 9 = extremely pleasant. While no positive 
images were used in the task, a bipolar valence scale covering the range 
from unpleasant to pleasant was used to maintain consistency with ratings 
scales used in previous studies (Foti and Hajcak, 2008; MacNamara et al., 
2009) and to account for the possibility that the neutralising reappraisal 
frames could result in the images being appraised as more 
 169 
positive/pleasant than neutral. Participants were asked to provide honest 
ratings based on their “initial reaction” upon viewing each image. The 
images in each block were presented in a randomised order. Block 1 trials 
followed the same sequence as those in block 2 (depicted in fig. 5.1), except 
there was no framing sentence event between the initial fixation and image 
presentation. 
 
Prior to commencement of block 2, participants were allowed to take a 
short break. They were then presented with an instruction screen 
informing them that in the next block each image would be preceded by a 
“sentence that provides some context for what is happening in the image”. 
At no point prior to or during the testing session was there any reference to 
emotion regulation. Block 2 consisted of the same 20 negative images from 
block 1, with half preceded by a descriptive framing sentence and the other 
half preceded by a neutralising framing sentence. The 10 neutral images 
presented in block 2 were all preceded by a descriptive framing sentence. 
The term reappraisal implies a process of altering one’s interpretation of a 
situation after an initial appraisal has been formed. While the framing 
sentences preceded the images in block 2, participants had already viewed 
and formed an appraisal of the images during the freeview condition (block 
1). As any change in the intensity of negative experience elicited by the 
images would rely upon participants altering their original appraisals, this 
task is best defined as a measure of implicit reappraisal, rather than what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘pre-appraisal’ (Matarazzo et al., 2014).   
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Fig. 5.1. Schematic of trial events during block 2 of the implicit reappraisal task. 
Each trial consisted of the following events: 1) white screen with black central 
fixation cross; 2) neutralising or descriptive framing sentence; 3) IAPS image (neg 
or neu); 4) white screen with centrally presented rating scale (1-9); 5) white screen 
with black central fixation cross (1000ms). The image shown above was selected 
from the OASIS images set (Kurdi et al., 2017) as a representative example and was 
not one of those used in the task. 
 
5.2.4. Data reduction & analyses 
Two participants were removed prior to analysis for failing to correctly 
follow task instructions, leaving a final sample of N = 90. The key metric of 
implicit reappraisal was the extent to which participants reported a 
decreased negative emotional response to negative images paired with 
neutralising framing sentences (NegNEU condition) relative to negative 
images paired with descriptive framing sentences (NegDES condition). This 
metric was termed ‘implicit reappraisal’ and was calculated by subtracting 
the mean NegDES rating from the mean NegNEU rating. As such, higher 
implicit reappraisal scores reflect a greater reduction in unpleasant 
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experience as a result of the neutralising framing sentences. This metric 
provides a measure of the extent to which the extrinsic framing sentence 
type influenced participants’ emotional reaction to the negative images, 
while controlling for the intrinsic valence of the stimulus. 
 
Separate paired samples t-tests were used to examine the effects of image 
(negative, neutral) and sentence frame (neutralising, descriptive) on self-
reported valence ratings. Individual differences were examined using 
bivariate correlations testing the relationship between the implicit 
reappraisal metric and trait cognitive/affective empathy. Normality of each 
variable was assessed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Spearman’s Rho is 
reported for correlations where any of the variable distributions deviated 
significantly from normality. All correlations are reported as two-tailed with 
a significance threshold of p < .05. To ensure that the observed results were 
not unduly influenced by a small number of outlier cases, the same analyses 
reported in the results section were conducted following the removal of 
univariate and bivariate outlier cases (see appendix G).  
 
5.2.5. Results 
5.2.5.1. Implicit reappraisal task 
Block 1 valence ratings for negative images (M = 2.49, SD = .77) were 
significantly lower (i.e. more negative) than for neutral images (M = 5.58, SD 
= .60), t(89) = -27.94, p < .001. Valence ratings in the NegNEU condition (M = 
4.38, SD = .97) were significantly less negative than in the control NegDES 
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condition (M = 2.92, SD = .77), t(89) = 15.17, p < .001 (fig. 5.2), which suggests 
that the context-framing had the expected effect on self-reported 
emotional experience.  
 
 
Fig. 5.2. Mean valence ratings for each condition in the implicit reappraisal task (1 = 
extremely unpleasant, 5 = neutral, 9 = extremely pleasant). In block 1, negative 
images (Neg) were associated with more negative emotional experience relative to 
neutral images (Neu). In block 2, negative images paired with a neutralising 
framing sentence (NegNEU) showed reduced negative (more neutral) experience 
relative to the baseline condition in which negative images were paired with 
descriptive framing sentences (NegDes). Error bars depict ±1 within-subjects SEM.     
   
 
Relationship between trait empathy and implicit reappraisal 
Trait cognitive empathy showed no relationship with the implicit 
reappraisal metric, r(88) = -.06, p = .60. However, a significant positive 
correlation was observed between affective empathy and the implicit 
reappraisal metric, rho(88) = .33, p = .002. This suggests that higher 
affective empathy was associated with reduced negative/more neutral 
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These two correlations were significantly different, Steiger’s Z = -3.22, p = 





Fig. 5.3. Scatterplot showing the relationship between the implicit reappraisal task 
metric (NegDES - NegNEU condition valence ratings) and Z-transformed trait 
cognitive/affective empathy (QCAE). Affective empathy (red) was positively 
correlated with implicit reappraisal (i.e. enhanced reduction in self-reported 
negative experience for negative images paired with a neutralising framing 
sentence, relative to negative images paired with a descriptive framing sentence). 







5.2.6. Study 1 discussion 
The finding of a significant reduction in self-reported unpleasant 
experience for negative stimuli paired with neutralising framing sentences 
is consistent with prior work demonstrating an influence of context 
framing on emotional experience (Dennis and Hajcak, 2009; Foti and 
Hajcak, 2008; Kim et al., 2004; MacNamara et al., 2009; Mocaiber et al., 2011; 
Wang et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2012). Contrary to the study hypotheses, it was 
observed that affective, but not cognitive, empathy was positively related to 
implicit reappraisal (defined as the extent to which participants 
experienced a reduction in negative emotional experience for negative 
images preceded by neutralising frames, relative to descriptive frames).  
 
The framing task used in this study provides a measure of more implicit 
reappraisal; specifically, the downregulation of negative affect resulting 
from extrinsic contextual information, in the absence of a specific 
instruction or conscious intention to alter one’s emotional state. Such 
implicit reappraisal processes are likely to be less cognitively demanding 
than reappraisal use in many real-life situations as there is no need for 
explicit goal switching and/or self-generation of reappraisal narratives 
(Wang et al., 2017). Thus, it might be that high cognitive empathy supports 
only the more cognitively demanding forms of reappraisal and confers little 
advantage in terms of more implicit reappraisal processes.  
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The positive relationship between affective empathy and the implicit 
reappraisal task metric could be a reflection of the heightened emotional 
awareness associated with greater affective empathy (see chapter 2), which 
may support the updating of emotion-relevant appraisals (Gross, 2015). 
These results are discussed in further detail in the general discussion 
section of this chapter.  
 
5.3. Study 2: Trait empathy and explicit reappraisal 
Contrary to expectations, the results of study 1 demonstrated that affective, 
but not cognitive, empathy was positively associated with the magnitude of 
implicit reappraisal in a framing task. One potential reason for the failure to 
find a significant relationship between cognitive empathy and the framing 
task metric is that this paradigm assesses reappraisal of a more implicit 
nature (Foti and Hajcak, 2008). The use of reappraisal in daily life may often 
place greater reliance on cognitive control processes, which mediate more 
demanding processes such as the generation of potential reappraisals that 
may serve to alter one’s emotional response to a given situation/stimulus 
(Etkin et al., 2015; McCrae et al., 2010; Urry et al., 2009). Therefore, it could 
be that greater cognitive empathy supports only these more demanding 
forms of reappraisal and provides little advantage with regard to more 
implicit reappraisal processes.  
 
Building upon the findings of study 1, this next study examined the 
relationship between trait cognitive/affective empathy and a task-based 
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measure of explicit reappraisal ability. In order to provide a more objective 
and holistic measure of emotional experience, this study combined self-
report measures of valence and arousal with a novel methodology that 
utilises video-based automated facial coding of affective states. It was 
predicted that cognitive but not affective empathy would be positively 
associated with the magnitude of negative emotion downregulation in an 
explicit (i.e. instructed) reappraisal task.  
 
5.3.1. Automated facial coding  
It has long been suggested that facial expressions of emotion are “hard-
wired” and play an important role in human social communication (Darwin, 
1872). In alignment with Cacioppo et al.’s (1986) assertion that facial 
expressions of emotion are typically associated with congruent emotional 
experiences, there is theoretical and empirical work suggestive of a close 
relationship between facial expressions and the valence of an individual's 
emotional state (Buck, 1994; Mauss et al., 2005; Russell, 1994). Consequently, 
comparing facial expressions indicative of the valence/intensity of affective 
states across regulation conditions can provide a more objective and 
implicit measure of participants’ reappraisal ability.  
 
While manual coding of facial expressions has for many years been the 
predominant method of classifying affective facial expressions (see Cohn et 
al., 2007; Ekman and Friesen, 1978, for reviews), such procedures are often 
laborious and require extensive training (Ekman and Friesen, 1978; Ekman et 
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al., 2002). Recent advances have enabled the development of software that 
can reliably categorise emotion states based on images or videos of the face 
(Valstar et al., 2012). One such piece of software, Facereader (Noldus), has 
been available for research use since 2005 (den Uyl and van Kuilenberg, 
2005; van Kuilenberg et al., 2005) and has proven useful in a range of 
contexts, from social/affective psychology (Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai, 
2010) to consumer science (Chan et al., 2014). Facereader was trained to 
classify the basic universal emotions described by Ekman (1992) using 
validated image sets of facial expressions (Olszanowski et al., 2015; van der 
Schalk et al., 2011). In addition to achieving an average recognition score 
approaching 90% across the six basic emotions, Facereader has been found 
to correctly classify neutral facial expressions with an accuracy of 94% (den 
Uyl and van Kuilenberg, 2005; Lewinski et al., 2014; Lewinski, 2015).  
 
This study utilised self-report and automated facial coding (AFC) measures 
of emotional experience to examine the relationship between trait 
cognitive/affective empathy and the ability to downregulate negative 
emotions using reappraisal. AFC metrics of emotional expression were used 
to assess emotion regulation by examining differences in facial expressions 
indicative of the intensity of emotional experience across conditions in 
which participants were instructed to respond naturally or use reappraisal 
to downregulate any negative experience evoked by the affective stimuli. It 
was predicted that the explicit reappraisal task metric would be positively 
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associated with cognitive empathy but show a negative relationship with 
affective empathy.  
 
5.3.2. Participants 
As this task assesses reappraisal ability under more demanding conditions 
(i.e. where participants must self-generate reappraisal narratives), it was 
expected that this metric would be more strongly associated with cognitive 
empathy than the implicit task, as it is more heavily reliant upon cognitive 
control processes also associated with cognitive empathy. An a priori 
sample size estimation using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) suggested that 
to detect correlations of a moderate to large effect size at an alpha level of 
p = .05 and power of .80, a sample of 44 participants was required.  
 
Forty-four participants (35 female) were recruited from the UOR student 
population via the online participant pool. The mean age (±SD) of the 
sample was 19.64 (±1.56). Two participants, for whom the necessary 
questionnaire data was incomplete were removed prior to analysis. A 
further three participants were removed following data quality checks (see 
data reduction & analyses section for details), leaving a final sample of N = 






5.3.3. Materials  
Empathy. Trait empathy was assessed using the QCAE. Cronbach’s alpha 
was high for the cognitive empathy subscale, 𝛼Cognitive = .89, but somewhat 
lower for the affective empathy subscale (𝛼Affective = .67). While the typical 
threshold for acceptability is Cronbach's alpha >= .70, it has been asserted 
that for scales with fewer than 20 items, a Cronbach’s alpha greater than 
.50 should be considered satisfactory (Dall'Oglio et al., 2010).  
 
Affective images. Thirty-six images (24 negative, 12 neutral) were selected 
from the IAPS database (Lang et al., 2005) (see appendix G for IAPS image 
numbers). As in study 1, all images were of a social nature and included a 
range of IAPS image types. Two sets of negative images were created, one 
of which was used for the “rethink” (i.e. reappraisal) condition and the other 
for the “watch” (i.e. control) condition; these image set-condition pairings 
were counterbalanced across the sample.  
 
Based on the normative IAPS ratings (Lang et al., 2005), independent 
samples t-test demonstrated that the two negative image sets did not differ 
in terms of valence (Mset1 = 2.24, SDset1 = 0.31; Mset2 = 2.31, SDset2 = 0.44; t(22) = 
.42, p = .68) or arousal (Mset1 = 5.62, SDset1 = 0.82; Mset2 = 5.74, SDset2 = 0.56; 
t(22) = .40, p = .70). Normative valence ratings for negative images (M = 2.27, 
SD = 0.38) were significantly lower than for neutral images (M = 5.36, SD = 
0.57), t(34) = 19.46, p < .001, and normative arousal ratings were significantly 
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higher for negative (M = 5.69, SD = 0.69) compared with neutral images (M 
= 3.63, SD = 0.46), t(34) = 9.31, p < .001.  
 
Video recording. Videos of participants’ faces were recorded throughout 
the task using a Microsoft Lifecam positioned in front of participants below 
the monitor on which the task was completed. Videos were recorded at a 
frame rate of 30 fps and a resolution of 640 x 480. A professional 
photography spotlight positioned above the monitor was used to reduce 
any shadows on participants' faces and improve the quality of the video 
recordings for the Facereader analysis. For ethical reasons participants had 
to be informed about the video recording prior to the experiment; to 
reduce the potential that participants were overly conscious of their facial 
expressions during the task, they were informed that the webcam was 
being used to track their eye-gaze patterns. 
 
5.3.4. Procedure 
Participants provided written informed consent to participate. 
Questionnaires were completed online and the explicit reappraisal task as 
part of a lab-based session. The task lasted approximately 20 minutes on 
average, and all testing was completed in isolation in a distraction-free 
environment. Participants were sat at an approximate viewing distance of 
60 cm from the monitor, which displayed the task at a resolution of 600 x 
800, with a refresh rate of 60 Hz.  
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Prior to commencement of the task, participants read the instructions and 
were given the chance to ask any questions to ensure they understood 
what the task entailed. They were instructed that they would be shown 
various images and would then be asked to rate how each image made them 
feel. They were informed that prior to each image an instruction word 
would be presented, which would either be “WATCH” or “RETHINK”. 
Participants were instructed that in the watch condition, they should let 
any thoughts/feelings evoked by the image unfold naturally. For rethink 
trials, participants were instructed to try to think about what is happening 
in the image in a way that reduces any negative experience. They were 
advised that they should attend to all images and not try to regulate their 
emotions by simply thinking about something else. They were also 
informed that the images depicted real situations and that they should not 
simply try to tell themselves that the images are merely staged. This was 
done in order to increase the ecological validity of the task, as the use of 
such reappraisals would be unlikely in real life situations (see appendix G 
for full instructions). 
 
Participants then completed a training block comprising two watch trials 
and two rethink trials. To ensure participants understood the task 
instructions and were able to successfully self-generate potential 
reappraisals, following each practice rethink trial the experimenter asked 
participants if they managed to think about the image in a way that made 
them feel less negative, and what this reappraisal entailed. All participants 
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were able to demonstrate that they understood the task and could come up 
with appropriate reappraisals. 
 
The main task included 36 trials; twenty-four negative image trials (12 
watch, 12 rethink), and twelve neutral image trials (6 watch, 6 rethink), 
which were presented in a randomised order. Trials comprised the 
following sequence of events: 1) ITI Fixation (5000ms); 2) Instruction 
(4000ms) stating whether the trial is “WATCH” or “RETHINK”; 3) Pre-
stimulus fixation (2000ms), during which the baseline measure of AFC 
valence was taken; 4) stimulus (8000ms), either a negative or neutral IAPS 
image; 5) valence rating screen (1-9; until response); 6) arousal rating screen 
(1-9; until response). A schematic of trial events is shown in figure 5.4.  
 
Participants responded to each image by rating how unpleasant/pleasant it 
made them feel (valence rating), and how arousing they found the image. 
Both ratings were provided using a 9-point scale, where in the case of 
valence: 1 = extremely unpleasant, 5 = neither pleasant nor unpleasant, 9 = 
extremely pleasant, and in the case of arousal: 1 = extremely relaxing, 5 = 
neither relaxing nor arousing, 9 = extremely arousing. While arousal is 
typically rated on a unipolar scale ranging from low to high, a bipolar 
arousal scale was used in this instance to minimise the potential for 
mistakes in responding due to confusion caused by rating two 1-9 scales in 
quick succession, one of which is bipolar and the other unipolar.  
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While the main task analysis focused upon negative images only, as in study 
1, neutral images were included as a manipulation check, and to slow the 
rate of habituation to negative images.  
    
 
Fig. 5.4. Schematic of trial events in the explicit reappraisal task. Each trial 
consisted of the following events: 1) white screen with black central fixation cross 
(5000ms); 2) instruction: either “watch” or “rethink” (4000ms); 3) Pre image 
fixation baseline (2000ms); 4) negative or neutral IAPS image (8000ms); 5) valence 
rating prompt (until response); 6) arousal rating prompt (until response). The 
image shown above was selected from the OASIS images set (Kurdi, Lozano, and 
Banji, 2017) as a representative example and was not one of those used in the task. 
 
Facereader AFC data processing 
The video clips of participants’ faces were analysed offline using Facereader 
8.0 (Noldus, 2014). These data were used to provide a metric of reappraisal 
ability by comparing facial expressions indicative of negative affect across 
the watch and rethink conditions. FaceReader works in three steps. First, 
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the program detects the presence of a face using the Viola-Jones algorithm. 
Next, Active Appearance Modelling (AAM; Cootes et al., 2001) is used to 
create a realistic face model that closely resembles the original image and 
provides good generalisation across various lighting conditions and poses. 
From this model, 500+ landmarks of different regions of the face are 
created and superimposed on the image as a virtual mesh. In the final stage, 
Facereader computes a probability/intensity score for each emotion on a 
scale of 0 to 1, representing the likelihood that the emotion (or neutral) 
expression is present. The key Facereader analysis steps are depicted in 
figure 5.5. The algorithm was trained using a three-layer artificial neural 
network with more than 10,000 instances of validated facial expression 
stimuli that were manually annotated by experts. For a detailed description 
of Facreader algorithms, see van Kuilenburg et al. (2005).  
 
In addition to coding the probabilities/intensities of the six basic emotions, 
Facereader also provides a measure of valence, which is calculated as the 
intensity of happy expression minus the intensity of the negative 
expression with the greatest intensity score. Given that a range of IAPS 
images were used in the explicit reappraisal task, which could be expected 
to evoke a range of emotional responses from disgust and anger to sadness 
and fear, the key metric extracted from Facereader was valence. This 
valence metric provides a bipolar rating of the extent to which participants 




Fig. 5.5. Depiction of Facereader analysis steps. A face is detected using the Viola-
Jones algorithm (top-left image); Active Appearance Modelling (AAM) is then used 
to create a realistic face model (top-middle image); 500+ landmarks are then 
identified using the AAM (top-right image). The bottom chart depicts mean 
valence of the face over time.  
  
The “general” Facereader model was used, which the programme 
documentation states should work well under most conditions for most 
people. To account for biases in neutral expression, each participant was 
calibrated to their individual neutral baseline recorded prior to task onset. 
Any cells in which Facereader failed to find the face or fit the AAM were 
removed; any trials in which more than 50% of data points were lost were 
removed. To reduce the impact of any extreme data points, the raw valence 
values were log-transformed and any trials in which the magnitude of the 
valence score deviated from the mean by more than 3*SD were removed as 
outliers. Following these exclusions, three participants for whom a 




5.3.5. Data reduction & analyses 
Following exclusion based on missing data (see section 5.3.3), a final sample 
of N=39 was retained for analysis. Self-report data were analysed using 
separate repeated measures ANOVAs with image (negative/neutral) and 
instruction (watch/rethink) as within-subjects factors for the dependent 
variables valence and arousal ratings. The AFC valence data were baseline 
corrected to the one second epoch preceding stimulus presentation. Given 
that IAPS images can take some time to decode (van Reekum et al., 2011) 
and the implementation of reappraisal may also take time, the mean 
baseline corrected AFC valence data were examined in two key epochs: An 
“early epoch” covering the 0-4s period following stimulus onset and the 
“late epoch” covering the 4-8s period post stimulus onset. These data were 
analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with instruction 
(rethink/watch) and epoch (early/late) as within-subjects factors.  
 
For the correlation analysis, the following metrics were extracted from the 
explicit reappraisal task as measures of reappraisal ability (i.e. the extent to 
which participants experienced a reduction in negative emotion in the 
rethink compared to the baseline watch condition). For self-reported 
valence, the key metric was the difference between the watch and rethink 
conditions, which was calculated by subtracting the mean valence rating in 
the watch condition from the mean valence rating in the rethink condition. 
For arousal ratings, this metric was calculated by the inverse subtraction 
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(i.e. mean arousal watch - mean arousal rethink), as higher arousal scores 
would be expected in the watch relative to the rethink condition.  
For the AFC data, the mean baseline corrected valence score in the early 
and late epochs for the watch condition were subtracted from the mean 
baseline corrected valence score in the corresponding epochs of the 
rethink condition. For all of these metrics a larger value reflects a greater 
magnitude of reduction in negative emotion following reappraisal.  
 
Normality of each variable was assessed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
Spearman’s rho is reported for any correlations where at least one variable 
distribution showed significant deviation from normality. All tests were 2-
tailed with a significance threshold of p < .05. To ensure that the observed 
results were not unduly influenced by a small number of outlier cases, the 
same analyses reported in the results section were conducted following the 
removal of univariate and bivariate outlier cases (see appendix G). While not 
related to the main hypothesis of this study, the correlations between ERQ 
reappraisal use and the implicit and explicit reappraisal task metrics are 
reported in appendix G. 
 
5.3.6. Results 
Self-report ratings  
Valence ratings 
A repeated measures ANOVA with emotion (neg/neu) and instruction 
(rethink/watch) demonstrated a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 38) 
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= 274.80, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .88, and a significant main effect of 
instruction, F(1, 38) = 15.75, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .29. A significant emotion by 
instruction interaction was also observed, F(1, 38) = 13.37, p = .001, partial 𝛈2 
= .26.  
 
Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment demonstrated that 
mean valence ratings were lower (i.e. more negative) for negative relative to 
neutral images (p < .001), and for the watch relative to rethink condition (p < 
.001). For negative images, mean valence ratings were lower in the watch 
relative to the rethink condition (p < .001). There was no difference in 
valence ratings in the rethink compared to the watch condition for neutral 
images (p = .50) (fig. 5.6, left panel).  
 
Arousal ratings 
A repeated measures ANOVA with emotion (neg/neu) and instruction 
(rethink/watch) demonstrated a main effect of emotion, F(1, 38) = 201.14, p < 
.001, partial 𝛈2 = .84. The main effect of instruction was not significant, F(1, 
38) = .02, p = .88, partial 𝛈2 = .001, however, there was a significant emotion 
by instruction interaction, F(1, 38) = 19.58, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .34. 
 
Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment demonstrated that 
arousal ratings were higher for negative relative to neutral images (p < .001). 
For negative images, arousal ratings were lower in the rethink relative to 
the watch condition (p < .001), however, arousal ratings were higher in the 
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rethink compared to watch condition for neutral images (p = .01) (see fig. 
5.6, right panel). 
 
 
Fig. 5.6. Mean valence (left panel) and arousal (right panel) ratings for negative and 
neutral images across each condition in the explicit reappraisal task. Error bars 
depict ± 1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
 
Analysis of Facereader AFC valence data 
A paired samples t-test demonstrated that the mean baseline corrected 
valence of facial expressions was lower (i.e. more negative) for negative 
relative to neutral images, t(38) = 2.43, p = .02 (fig. 5.7). This provides 
support for the assertion that the Facereader valence metric is capturing 
















































Fig. 5.7. Mean baseline corrected AFC valence scores for negative and neutral 
images. Error bars depict ± 1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA with instruction (rethink/watch) and epoch 
(early/late) found that the main effect of instruction failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 38) = 1.85, p = .18, partial 𝛈2 = .05. While the main effect of 
epoch was approaching significance, F(1, 38) = 3.62, p = .07, partial 𝛈2 = .09, 
the instruction by epoch interaction was not significant F(1, 38) = 1.74, p = 
.20, partial 𝛈2 = .04.  
 
While the instruction by epoch interaction was not significant, the data 
showed patterns in the expected direction, which were further explored 
using post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction. While 
there was no difference between the watch and rethink conditions in the 
early epoch (p = .52), there was a trend-level difference between these 




























between the early and late epochs in the rethink condition (p = .21), valence 
was lower at trend-level in the late compared to early epoch for the watch 
condition (p = .06) (fig. 5.8). For illustrative purposes the mean baseline 
corrected AFC valence for each one second epoch of the image 





Fig. 5.8. Mean baseline corrected AFC valence scores in the early (0-4s) and late (4-
8s) epochs of the image presentation period for the watch (red) and rethink (blue) 







































Fig. 5.9. Mean baseline corrected AFC valence scores in each 1 second epoch of the 
image presentation period for the watch (red) and rethink (blue) conditions. Error 
bars depict ± 1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
 
Relationship between trait empathy and explicit reappraisal metrics 
Self-report metrics 
The valence rating reappraisal metric was not significantly related to trait 
cognitive (rho(37) = -.15, p = .35) or affective (rho(37) = .15, p = .36) empathy. 
These two correlations were not significantly different (Steiger’s Z = -.15, p 
= .14). The arousal rating reappraisal metric showed a trend-level negative 
relationship with trait cognitive empathy, rho(37) = -.29, p = .07. This 
arousal metric showed no relationship with trait affective empathy, rho(37) 
= .10, p = .57. The difference between these correlations was on the 

































Fig. 5.10. Scatterplot showing the relationship between explicit reappraisal task 
arousal rating difference (watch - rethink) and z-transformed cognitive and 
affective empathy. Affective empathy (red) was not significantly related to the 
arousal difference metric; cognitive empathy (blue) showed a negative correlation 
with the arousal difference metric that was approaching significance.  
 
Facereader AFC valence metrics  
Trait cognitive empathy showed a negative correlation with the AFC 
valence reappraisal metric in the early epoch, rho(37) = -.32, p = .047. Trait 
affective empathy was not significantly related to the AFC valence 
reappraisal metric in the early epoch (rho(37) = .17, p = .30). These 
correlations were significantly different, Z = -2.44, p = .01 (fig. 5.11). Both 
cognitive and affective empathy showed no significant relationship with 
this metric in the late epoch, rho(37) = -.01, p = .96. or late (rho(37) = .21, p = 
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.21). A Steiger’s test confirmed that these two correlations were not 
significantly different, Z = -1.08, p = .28).  
 
  
Fig. 5.11. Scatterplot showing the relationship between the explicit reappraisal task 
AFC valence score difference in the early epoch (baseline corrected rethink - 
watch condition) and z-transformed cognitive/affective empathy. The AFC 
valence metric was negatively correlated with cognitive empathy (blue) but was 







5.4. General discussion 
5.4.1. Summary of findings 
Across two studies it was observed that the cognitive and affective 
dimensions of trait empathy share different relationships with metrics 
assessing the magnitude of negative emotion downregulation in an implicit 
(study 1) and explicit (study 2) reappraisal task. Contrary to the study 
hypotheses, trait cognitive empathy was not related to improved 
reappraisal ability in either study. Cognitive empathy showed no 
relationship with an implicit reappraisal task metric, a trend-level negative 
relationship with self-reported arousal change, and a negative relationship 
with an AFC metric of regulation magnitude in an explicit reappraisal task. 
While no relationship was observed between trait affective empathy and 
the explicit reappraisal task metrics, higher affective empathy was 
associated with a greater magnitude of emotion downregulation in the 
implicit reappraisal task. I now discuss some potential interpretations of 
these results in relation to prior theoretical and empirical work.  
 
5.4.2. Cognitive empathy & reappraisal 
The prediction of a positive relationship between cognitive empathy and 
reappraisal ability was based on evidence that processes associated with 
the cognitive component of empathy show overlap with those recruited 
during reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014; Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis et al., 
2009; Goldin et al., 2008; Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; Messina et al., 
2015; Saxe et al., 2004; Webb et al., 2012a). Given this overlap, one might 
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infer that a greater capacity for one ability is similarly associated with a 
greater capacity for the other. Furthermore, component processes 
associated with cognitive empathy, such as perspective-taking/self-other 
control, may support reappraisal in more specific ways. Aside from the 
dominant usage of the term reappraisal as referring to a change in meaning 
attributed to an emotional stimulus, reappraisal can also entail cognitive 
change via self-distancing (or reappraisal via perspective-taking) (Kross and 
Ayduk, 2008; Messina et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2012a).  
 
Self-distancing (henceforth, distancing) involves taking a detached 
perspective from one’s immediate egocentric experience (Cocking and 
Renninger, 1993; Ochsner et al. 2004; Trope and Liberman, 2010), and has 
been shown to be effective in modulating emotion based on self-report and 
physiological/neural metrics (Ayduk and Kross, 2010; Davis et al., 2011; 
Kross et al., 2005, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2012). While a distinct form of 
reappraisal in its own right, distancing could also support semantic 
reappraisal, as the ability to distance oneself from the more concrete 
aspects of one’s current experience may be conducive to self-reflection 
(Davis et al., 2011; Gruber et al., 2009; Katzir and Eyal, 2013; Kross and 
Ayduk, 2011; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011), 
thereby facilitating the generation of reappraisals in the service of emotion 
regulation (Wallace-Hadrill and Kamboj, 2016). Indeed, there is evidence to 
suggest that distancing can facilitate the positive reconstrual of life 
stressors (Kross and Ayduk, 2008; Kross et al., 2012). 
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The concept of distancing is conceptually similar to perspective-taking in 
that both involve a shift in one’s perspective. Consequently, one could 
argue that the ability to shift between self and other perspectives (a 
component process of cognitive empathy) might facilitate the process of 
distancing oneself from the ongoing emotional experience in order to 
modulate one’s response using semantic reappraisal. Furthermore, as the 
emotional stimuli used in these studies were all of a social nature, 
distancing oneself from the emotional experience in order to generate new 
and/or subdominant meanings may necessitate being able to efficiently 
detach oneself from the perceived other’s perspective.  
 
With the above interpretation in mind, the unexpected finding that 
cognitive empathy was negatively related to metrics of reappraisal ability in 
the explicit task could be due to the way in which the empathy measure 
used in this study relates to this particular task. In the current studies, 
cognitive empathy was assessed only by trait measures, which capture an 
individual's perceived abilities and motivation/propensity to engage 
empathic processes (Gehlbach, 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2014). It is 
possible that a greater motivation or disposition to take others’ 
perspectives may impede the processes necessary to regulate one’s 
emotions via reappraisal in the case of social stimuli. Consequently, the 
finding that higher trait cognitive empathy was negatively associated with 
reappraisal ability in this task could suggest that it takes longer for 
individuals with a heightened propensity to engage cognitive empathic 
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processes to detach from the other’s perspective in order to reappraise the 
stimulus in a manner that elicits a reduced emotional response. This 
speculative interpretation highlights an important question as to whether 
one’s ability and propensity for empathy may be differentially related to 
their emotion regulation abilities.  
 
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that individuals with high trait 
empathy show an increased preference for social vs. non-social stimuli 
(Hedger et al., 2018), and pay more attention to social stimuli such as faces 
(Choi and Watanuki, 2014). Thus, it is possible that the negative relationship 
between cognitive empathy and metrics of regulation magnitude in the 
explicit reappraisal task were driven by a heightened tendency to attend to 
the affective stimuli, which could have reduced the availability of cognitive 
resources necessary to effectively implement reappraisal.  
 
5.4.3. Affective empathy & reappraisal 
Individuals with higher trait affective empathy showed an increased 
magnitude of emotion downregulation in an implicit reappraisal task, which 
suggests that affective empathy may support the ability to implicitly update 
one’s emotional appraisals based on extrinsic contextual information. 
Reappraisal frames are thought to exert their influence over emotional 
responses in a relatively implicit manner (Foti and Hajcak, 2008; Wang et 
al., 2017). Similarly, affective empathy is thought to involve largely implicit 
processing of emotional information (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009; 
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Niedenthal, 2007; Preston and de Waal, 2002). Hence, the association 
between implicit reappraisal and affective empathy is not entirely 
surprising given that both abilities relate to implicit emotional processes. 
The results of study 2 found no evidence for any relationship between trait 
affective empathy and regulation magnitude in an explicit reappraisal task.  
 
Taken together these findings suggest that affective empathy may support 
the ability to implicitly update one’s initial appraisals of a stimulus based on 
extrinsic contextual information; however, it does not facilitate the 
regulation of emotion via reappraisal in instances where one must self-
generate potential reappraisal narratives. While there is overlap in the brain 
regions associated with explicit and implicit reappraisal, explicit reappraisal 
represents a more cognitively demanding task (due in part to the 
recruitment of cognitive control and semantic processes required to 
construct potential reappraisal narratives) (Messina et al., 2012; Ochsner 
and Gross, 2005; Wang et al., 2017; Webb et al., 2012a). Thus, even though 
higher levels of affective empathy may support the implicit process of 
updating one’s initial emotional appraisals, it may not confer any advantage 
in instances where reappraisal is dependent upon more demanding 
cognitive control processes.  
 
Furthermore, it is possible that the heightened arousal that individuals with 
greater trait affective empathy experience in response to others’ emotions 
(Rueckert et al., 2011; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002) results in increased 
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emotional interference on cognitive control abilities (Hare et al., 2005; 
Tottenham et al., 2011), which may reduce the ability to effectively engage 
more demanding reappraisal processes. Consequently, any advantage that 
affective empathy may confer in terms of updating one’s emotional 
appraisals on an implicit level might be negated in more demanding 
situations by the deleterious effects of increased emotional reactivity on 
vital cognitive control processes. 
 
5.4.4. Summary, conclusions, and limitations 
The two studies reported in this chapter found some evidence to support 
the hypothesis that the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy 
share different relationships with reappraisal ability. However, the 
relationships that cognitive and affective empathy shared with reappraisal 
ability were contrary to the study hypotheses. There was no evidence to 
suggest that cognitive empathy was associated with improved reappraisal 
ability in either study. Furthermore, while affective empathy was unrelated 
to task metrics of explicit reappraisal, it showed a positive relationship with 
a task metric of implicit reappraisal.  
 
It is important to highlight certain limitations of the current studies, and 
how these will be addressed in the final empirical chapter. A caveat of study 
1, which is shared with many studies on emotion regulation, is that the 
metric of implicit reappraisal was based on self-report data. While it is 
possible that socially desirable responding and/or demand characteristics 
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could have played some role in the observed effects, a number of steps 
were taken to reduce the potential for such confounds. Firstly, participants 
were recruited for a study on “mood and cognitive performance“ and there 
was no mention of emotion regulation during the lab testing session. 
Additionally, the experimenter was not present in the room during task 
completion and participants were explicitly informed that their data would 
be analysed anonymously and were instructed to respond accurately and 
honestly. As such, there is no reason to infer that such confounds were 
likely to have influenced the observed results in any demonstrable way. 
 
Study 2 supplemented self-report metrics with a more objective measure of 
emotional experience based on Facereader AFC ratings of facial expression 
valence. The approach showed some promise as a tool for assessing 
emotional reactivity/regulation, demonstrating sufficient sensitivity to 
detect differences in facial expression valence between negative and 
neutral images. However, while the observed effects of regulation 
instructions showed a pattern in the expected direction, these were small 
in magnitude and failed to reach significance.  
 
Visual inspection of the video data revealed that to the human eye, 
participants for the most part showed relatively stable neutral expressions 
throughout the task. Thus, while Facereader was able to detect some 
differences between the regulation conditions it may lack the sensitivity 
required to detect such subtle differences in facial states. To maximise the 
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utility of AFC analyses in this context it may be useful to use more 
intense/graphic stimuli than those used in the current study. In the study 
reported in the next chapter, facial EMG measures of corrugator activity 
were used to enable greater sensitivity to detect subtle changes in muscle 
activity associated with emotional expression/experience.  
 
Both studies in this chapter used only trait measures of cognitive and 
affective empathy. Given prior work highlighting the importance of 
distinguishing between one’s ability and propensity to engage empathic 
processes (Cameron et al., 2019; Gehlbach, 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2014; 
Zaki, 2014), coupled with evidence of inconsistent patterns of convergence 
between trait and task measures of empathy (Melchers et al., 2015; Murphy 
and Lilienfeld, 2019), it would be worthwhile to examine these relationships 
using a range of empathy measures. In the next chapter, I examine the 
relationship between a task measure of emotion regulation and a 
combination of trait and task empathy measures. This approach should 
enable greater clarity regarding the relationship between emotion 
regulation ability and one’s propensity and ability for engaging different 
component processes of empathy. 
 
Finally, while reappraisal is typically considered an adaptive regulation 
strategy, its efficacy in modulating emotion may be dependent upon various 
contextual factors (Aldao, 2013; Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema 2012; Suri et al., 
2018). For example, regulating emotions via semantic reappraisal may be 
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easier and more effective in the context of the death of an elderly relative 
following a protracted illness compared to the tragic death of a young 
relative. Adaptive emotion regulation is dependent not only upon an 
individual’s ability to implement a given strategy, but also their ability to 
select a suitable strategy for a given context (Aldao, 2013, Bonanno and 
Burton, 2013; Gross, 2015; Sheppes and Levin, 2013; Urry and Gross, 2010). 
This selection component of emotion regulation (Gross, 2015) is not 
captured by paradigms such as those used in study 2, where participants 
are instructed to use only one particular strategy throughout. To provide 
greater consideration of strategy selection, the task reported in the next 
chapter used an instructed regulation paradigm in which participants were 
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In acknowledgement of the limitations of instructed emotion regulation 
tasks discussed in the previous chapter discussion, this chapter reports a 
study that used a more ecologically valid regulation paradigm that assessed 
the ability to select and implement an appropriate regulatory strategy 
(Gross, 2015). To enable greater clarity regarding the relationship between 
emotion regulation and one’s motivation and ability to engage different 
cognitive and affective empathic processes, empathy was assessed using a 
combination of trait and task measures. Furthermore, in addition to 
assessing instructed emotion regulation magnitude using self-report and 
facial electromyography (EMG), this task used corrugator EMG measures to 
assess participants’ spontaneous emotional recovery following exposure to 
negative stimuli.  
 
 
6.1.1. Regulation strategy selection 
The vast majority of instructed emotion regulation paradigms specify the 
particular strategy (or strategies) to be used across all regulation trials (e.g. 
Ochsner et al., 2004a). While useful for characterising the affective 
consequences and neutral substrates of different strategies, such 
paradigms may not provide a wholly accurate reflection of participants’ true 
regulatory abilities. For example, instructing the use of a given strategy, 
such as reappraisal, may artificially improve the regulatory performance of 
individuals, who left to their own devices might have selected a less 
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adaptive strategy such as suppression. Conversely, such paradigms could 
also artificially decrease the regulatory performance of strong regulators, 
who may otherwise have used a different strategy that might have been 
more effective than reappraisal in a particular context. Furthermore, such 
tasks do not allow participants to utilise multiple strategies simultaneously, 
or switch to a different strategy following initial failures to achieve the 
desired emotion state, which may be common occurrences in day-to-day 
regulation (Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Gross, 2015).  
 
In sum, by instructing and training participants to use a particular strategy, 
many regulation paradigms enable the assessment of only the 
implementation stage of the regulation process and do not capture other 
processes critical for adaptive regulation. One such process is the capacity 
to select an appropriate strategy suitable for a given context and/or 
emotional experience. While some prior studies have used tasks in which 
participants are able to choose how they regulate their emotional response, 
such studies typically restricted participants to choosing between a limited 
set of strategies, such as reappraisal and distraction (Scheibe et al., 2015; 
Sheppes et al., 2011).    
 
To obtain a more accurate and holistic measure of an individual's true 
regulatory abilities, research should utilise tasks in which participants are 
not given any detailed training in the use of a particular regulation strategy 
and where they are free to choose the means by which they regulate their 
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emotions in response to different stimuli (Baur et al., 2015). Given that the 
effectiveness of real-world emotion regulation is dependent upon the 
ability to flexibly adapt one’s regulatory actions to meet situational 
demands (Bonanno et al., 2004; Gross, 2015), a free choice regulation task 
may provide a more ecologically valid assessment of emotion regulation 
abilities (Baur et al., 2015; Optiz et al., 2015).  
 
6.1.2. Instructed versus spontaneous emotion regulation 
A further limitation of instructed regulation tasks is that they assess only 
the more explicit and intentional forms of emotion regulation. While 
conscious and intentional processes may be common in real-world emotion 
regulation (Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2008; Tice and Bratslavsky, 2000), 
more spontaneous and effortless regulatory processes are also likely to play 
an important role in managing emotions day-to-day (Gyurak et al., 2011; 
Mauss et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2007).  
 
Implicit or spontaneous emotion regulation (SER) is typically defined as the 
modulation of any aspect of emotion, such as subjective experience, 
emotional expression and/or physiology, in the absence of any conscious 
awareness or explicit intention to alter one’s emotional state (Mauss et al., 
2007; Mocaiber et al., 2011; Morillas-Romero et al., 2015; Williams et al., 
2007). There is evidence to suggest that difficulties in spontaneously 
downregulating negative emotions are associated with increased trait 
negative affect and anxiety (Egloff et al., 2006), diminished emotional 
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wellbeing (Hopp et al., 2011), and increased vulnerability for developing 
depression (Ehring et al., 2010).  
 
The importance of examining SER in addition to more explicit forms of 
regulation is further highlighted by studies which have found a lack of 
convergence between instructed regulation tasks and typical day-to-day 
experiences with emotion regulation. For example, one study found that 
while individuals with bipolar disorder experience significant difficulties 
with emotion regulation in daily life (Gruber et al., 2013), such difficulties 
are not always evident in instructed regulation tasks (Gruber et al., 2009). 
However, when assessing more spontaneous forms of emotion regulation in 
the laboratory environment the expected deficits may be observable 
(Depue et al., 1985). 
 
SER has been assessed by prior work in various ways, commonly by 
comparing self-report ratings and/or physiological metrics of affect before 
and after emotional induction (Aldao et al., 2013; Egloff et al., 2006; Ehring 
et al., 2010; Volokhov and Demaree, 2010), and/or examining how these 
metrics are modulated by individual differences in self-reported habitual 
strategy use. One issue with such approaches is that it may be difficult to 
determine the extent to which such changes reflect variability in SER 
versus emotional reactivity. In this study, fEMG measured corrugator 
activity is used to assess the efficiency of spontaneous emotional recovery 
(independent of emotional reactivity) following exposure to negative 
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emotional stimuli, as done in previous studies (Lapate et al., 2014; van 
Reekum et al., 2011).  
 
6.1.3. The current study 
While the hypothesised relationship between cognitive empathy and 
reappraisal ability was not observed in the previous chapter, this could in 
part be due to the aforementioned limitations of instructed regulation 
paradigms. While it could simply be that cognitive empathy is positively 
associated with the propensity but not the ability to use reappraisal, it is 
possible that cognitive empathy could support emotion regulation through 
the ability to select and monitor the influence of regulatory processes, 
rather than the ability to implement them per se. To examine this 
possibility the current study utilised an instructed regulation paradigm in 
which participants were free to regulate their emotions using any strategy 
of their choosing. Furthermore, this task also enabled the examination of 
the relationship between empathy and spontaneous emotional recovery, an 
aspect of emotion regulation that has been largely overlooked by prior work 
in favour of more explicit forms of regulation. 
 
Regulation magnitude was assessed using a combination of self-report 
ratings and fEMG-measured corrugator activity, which has been shown to 
provide a reliable indication of emotional reactivity/regulation (Jackson et 
al., 2000; Lapate et al., 2014; van Reekum et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). Given 
evidence of a link between day-to-day regulation habits (e.g. habitual 
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strategy use) and task-based metrics of SER (Drabant et al., 2009), it was 
predicted that cognitive empathy (which was found in chapters 2 and 3 to 
be associated with increased reappraisal use) would be associated with 
more efficient spontaneous emotional recovery following the offset of 
negative affective stimuli. It was also predicted that cognitive empathy 
would be positively related to metrics of instructed regulation magnitude. 
In the previous chapter, affective empathy was positively correlated with 
the magnitude of downregulation in an implicit, but not an explicit, 
reappraisal task. Consequently, it was predicted that affective empathy 
would be positively associated with spontaneous emotional recovery but 
show no relationship with metrics of instructed regulation.   
 
To enable greater clarity regarding the relationship between emotion 
regulation abilities and one’s motivation and ability to engage different 
empathic processes, empathy was assessed using a combination of trait and 
task measures. As in prior chapters, trait empathy was assessed using the 
QCAE, with more objective measures of these abilities assessed using the 




The same N = 48 participants who completed the empathy tasks reported in 
chapter 3, also completed the spontaneous and instructed regulation task 
(see section 3.2.1 for sample demographics). Data for two participants were 
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removed from the regulation task (see data reduction and analysis section 
for details), leaving a final sample of N = 46 on which all analyses were 
performed.   
 
6.2.2. Materials  
Trait empathy. Trait empathy was assessed using the QCAE (Reniers et al., 
2011). 
 
Task measures of empathy. Two task measures of empathy were used in 
the current study. A component process of cognitive empathy was assessed 
using the director task, with an eye-tracking metric reflecting the relative 
gaze time on the target vs. foil object used as a measure of perspective-
taking ability. A component of affective empathy was assessed EMG-
measured spontaneous facial mimicry (SFM), which provides a proxy 
measure of participants’ capacity to resonate others’ emotional states (see 
section 3.2.2 for further details of these tasks/metrics).  
 
Affective images. Sixty social images (45 negative, 15 neutral) were selected 
from the IAPS database (Lang et al., 2005) (see appendix H for IAPS image 
numbers). As in prior chapters, while the main analysis focused upon the 
negative images, neutral images were included in the first block as a 
manipulation check and as a means of slowing habituation to negative 
images. An independent samples t-test confirmed that the mean normative 
valence ratings for negative images (M = 2.36, SD = 0.57) were significantly 
 212 
lower than for neutral images (M = 5.20, SD = 0.62), t(58) = 16.42, p < .001. 
Negative images also had a significantly higher mean normative arousal 
rating (M = 5.69, SD = 0.80) compared to the neutral images (M = 3.59, SD = 
0.49), t(58) = 9.53, p < .001.  
 
Three sets of 15 negative images were created for counterbalancing 
purposes. Block 1 comprised one set of negative images alongside 15 neutral 
images; block 2 comprised the other two sets of negative images, each of 
which was paired with a different regulation instruction (“attend” or 
“regulate”). The condition in which each negative image set was used was 
counterbalanced across the sample. Image sets were matched based on 
mean normative valence and arousal ratings (Lang et al., 2005), image 
category, complexity, and social content. Independent samples t-tests 
demonstrated that there were no significant differences in mean normative 
valence/arousal ratings across each negative image set (all p >= .85).   
 
6.2.3. Procedure 
Questionnaires were completed online and the regulation task as part of a 
lab session, which also included the empathy tasks reported in chapter 3 
(order of task completion was counterbalanced across the sample). The 
regulation task lasted approximately 20 minutes and comprised two blocks: 
(1) a spontaneous reactivity/recovery block, and (2) an instructed regulation 
block. The spontaneous block was always completed first. Participants were 
told that they would be shown a series of images and would subsequently 
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be asked questions regarding how each image made them feel (see 
appendix H for full instructions). Block one comprised 30 trials (15 negative 
images, 15 neutral images). Participants responded to each image by rating 
how unpleasant/pleasant it made them feel (i.e. valence), and how arousing 
they found the image. Both ratings were provided using a 9-point scale, 
where in the case of valence: 1 = extremely unpleasant, 5 = neither pleasant 
nor unpleasant, 9 = extremely pleasant, and in the case of arousal: 1 = not at 
all arousing, 9 = extremely arousing. The rating scales were the same for 
block 1 and block 2, and on each trial the question and accompanying rating 
scale remained on screen until participants made their response using the 
1-9 keys on the keyboard.  
 
Participants were instructed that they should attend to the images for the 
entire time they are presented. As in chapter 5, participants were informed 
that all of the images depicted real people in real situations. Following 
completion of the first block, participants were able to take a short break if 
they wished and were then given instructions for the second task block. 
Participants were informed that prior to seeing each image, one of two 
possible instruction words would be presented on screen. Half of the 
images were preceded by the word “attend”, and the other half by the word 
“regulate”. Participants were instructed that when the word is “attend” they 
should let any thoughts/feelings unfold as they naturally would. For 
regulate trials, participants were instructed that they should try to 
downregulate any negative emotion the image evokes.  
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In contrast to prior studies where participants are typically instructed to 
use a particular strategy, in this task participants were free to regulate their 
emotions using any strategy of their choosing on each trial. The only 
restriction was that they should not close their eyes or look away from the 
image. Prior to commencement of the second block, participants 
completed three practice trials for the regulate condition. Following each 
practice trial, the experimenter checked that they were able to utilise a 
feasible regulation strategy. A schematic of trials events in the instructed 
block is depicted in figure 6.1 (spontaneous block trials comprised the same 
sequence of events, only excluding the instruction screen prior to image 
onset).  
 
Fig. 6.1. Schematic of trial events in the instructed regulation block. Trials 
consisted of the following sequence of events: 1) trial instruction (attend or 
regulate); pre-image fixation (during which the baseline corrugator activity was 
measured); 3) stimulus (negative or neutral IAPS image); 4) post-image fixation 
(recovery period); 5) valence rating screen; 6) arousal rating screen; 7) jittered ITI 
fixation screen. The trial events for the spontaneous block were exactly the same 
as above, however there was no instruction screen at the beginning of each trial. 
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Facial EMG recording and processing 
EMG activity was measured using sensors positioned over the corrugator 
supercilii in accordance with the guidelines proposed by Fridlund and 
Cacioppo (1986). The skin was cleaned using 70% alcohol wipes, after which 
4mm Ag/AgCl surface sensors (Discount Disposables, USA) filled with 
isotonic electrode gel (Mansfield R&D, UK) were attached bipolarly to the 
left side of the face using 5mm collars (Discount Disposables) at a distance 
of 10mm apart. A ground electrode was positioned over the left mastoid 
process. The EMG signal was recorded using an ML-870 Power Lab, 
amplified 10,000 times by an ML-138 Octal Bioamp and 
recorded/processed using LabChart 8 (AD Instruments). The raw EMG 
signal was sampled at a rate of 1kHz, digitized with 16-bit precision. Digital 
500 Hz low-pass and 50 Hz high-pass filters were applied offline.  
 
EMG data were visually inspected for any movement artefacts/noise, 
following which they were rectified and logarithmically transformed to 
remove negative values and minimize the impact of any extreme values. The 
magnitude of EMG activity during the image presentation epoch and 
recovery (post image-offset) epoch were baseline corrected by dividing the 
mean activity by the mean activity within a one second baseline fixation 





6.2.4. Data reduction and analyses 
One participant was removed due to poor quality EMG recording, and one 
participant with incomplete questionnaire data was also removed. This left 
a final sample of N = 46, which was subject to analysis. To reduce the 
influence of data outliers, any trials in which corrugator activity deviated 
from the mean by more than 3*SD were removed. Following all artefact and 
outlier trial removal the mean number of trials (± SD) from which the fEMG 
metrics were calculated was: negative image trials (M = 14.41 ± 1.20); neutral 
image trials (M = 14.93 ± 0.25). The mean baseline corrected corrugator 
activity was assessed in two epochs: (1) the “reactivity” epoch comprised the 
6 second period during which an affective image was present on screen; (2) 
the “recovery” epoch comprised the 6 second fixation screen period that 
immediately followed image offset. 
 
Self-report ratings of valence and arousal were examined using paired 
samples t-tests, which compared: (1) the negative and neutral image 
conditions in the spontaneous block, and (2) the regulate and attend 
conditions in the instructed block. Corrugator EMG data were analysed 
using a repeated measures ANOVA with emotion (negative/neutral) and 
epoch (baseline/reactivity/recovery) as within-subjects factors in the 
spontaneous block, and a repeated measures ANOVA with instruction 
(attend/regulate) and epoch (baseline/ reactivity/recovery) as within-
subjects factors in the instructed block.  
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The metric of spontaneous recovery following exposure to negative 
emotional images, was the baseline corrected corrugator activity within the 
recovery epoch (i.e. the 6 second fixation epoch following image offset). In 
alignment with prior studies (e.g. van Reekum et al., 2011), to render this 
recovery epoch independent from emotional reactivity, the baseline 
corrected corrugator activity within the recovery epoch was regressed 
against the baseline corrected corrugator activity within the reactivity 
epoch. The residuals were then saved as a new variable, which was used in 
the correlation analysis. As lower values for this residualised recovery 
metric actually reflected a greater magnitude of recovery, for the sake of 
clarity, these values were reversed such that higher values reflect a greater 
magnitude of recovery.  
 
Instructed regulation was assessed based on the difference in self-reported 
valence and arousal ratings for negative images in the regulate and attend 
conditions (block 2). So that a higher value on each metric reflects a greater 
magnitude of emotion downregulation, these metrics were calculated in the 
following way:  
 
Arousal regulation metric = mean attend rating - mean regulate rating 
Valence regulation metric = mean regulate rating -mean attend rating 
 
The corrugator metrics of instructed regulation magnitude were calculated 
by subtracting the mean baseline corrected corrugator activity within the 
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reactivity (0-6s following image onset) and recovery (0-6s following image 
offset) epochs of the regulate condition from the corresponding epochs in 
the attend condition. As with the other metrics, higher values reflect a 
greater magnitude of emotion downregulation (i.e. regulation ability).  
 
The relationship between emotion regulation ability and empathy was 
examined using bivariate correlations, which tested the relationship 
between measures of cognitive/affective empathy and the self-report and 
EMG metrics from the regulation task. In addition to trait empathy, the 
relationship between these emotion regulation metrics and key metrics 
from the director task and SFM task were examined (see section 3.2.2 for 
further details of these tasks/metrics).  
 
The normality of each variable was assessed using Kolmogorov Smirnov 
tests. Spearman’s rho is reported for any correlations where at least one 
variable distribution was significantly non-normal. All tests are reported as 
two-tailed with a significance threshold of p = .05. To ensure that the 
observed results were not unduly influenced by a small number of outlier 
cases, the same analyses reported in this results section were conducted 
following the removal of univariate and bivariate outlier cases (see appendix 
H). Furthermore, the relationship between the task metrics and a trait 





6.3.1. Block 1: Emotional reactivity and spontaneous recovery 
Self-report ratings 
A paired samples t-test demonstrated that arousal ratings were 
significantly higher for negative (M ± SD = 5.47 ± 1.46), relative to neutral (M 
± SD = 2.53 ± 1.29) images, t(45) = 17.30, p < .001 (fig. 6.2, left panel). Similarly, 
valence ratings were lower (i.e. more negative) for negative (M ± SD = 2.98 ± 
0.85) relative to neutral (M ± SD = 5.37 ± 0.55) images, t(45) = -14.94, p < .001 
(fig. 6.2, right panel).  
 
 
Fig. 6.2. Mean ratings of arousal (left panel) and valence (right panel) for negative 
and neutral images in block 1. Error bars depict ±1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
Corrugator activity 
A repeated measures ANOVA with valence (negative/neutral) and epoch 
(baseline/reactivity/ recovery) on the dependent variable corrugator 




















































< .001, partial 𝛈2 = .25, a significant main effect of epoch, F(1.33, 59.74) = 
15.52, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .26, and a significant valence by epoch 
interaction, F(1.32, 59.43) = 15.89, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .26.  
 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment revealed that mean 
corrugator activity was greater overall for negative compared to neutral 
images (p < .001). Overall corrugator activity was lower within the baseline 
fixation period relative to the reactivity and recovery epochs (both p < .001). 
There was no difference between corrugator activity for negative and 
neutral image trials in the baseline period (p = .90), however negative 
images were associated with significantly higher corrugator activity relative 
to neutral images in the reactivity and recovery epochs (both p < .001).  
 
For negative images, corrugator activity was higher in the reactivity and 
recovery epochs relative to the pre-stimulus baseline (all p < .001); 
corrugator activity for negative images was higher in the reactivity epoch 
relative to the recovery epoch (p = .01). For neutral images, there were no 
significant differences in corrugator activity across any epochs (all p >= .67). 
Baseline corrected corrugator activity for negative and neutral images 
across the reactivity and recovery epochs are presented in figure 6.3. For 
illustrative purposes the mean baseline corrected corrugator activity for 




Fig. 6.3. Baseline corrected corrugator activity for negative (red) and neutral (blue) 




Fig. 6.4. Baseline corrected corrugator activity for negative (red) and neutral (blue) 
images in each one second epoch of the reactivity and recovery periods. Error 
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Emotional reactivity/spontaneous recovery and empathy  
Self-report measures of emotional reactivity 
Trait cognitive empathy was not significantly related to arousal ratings for 
negative images, rho(44) = .19, p = .20. Affective empathy also showed no 
relationship with negative image arousal ratings, rho(44) = .10, p = .52. These 
correlations were not significantly different (Z = 0.67, p = .50). Trait 
cognitive and affective empathy both showed no relationship with valence 
ratings for negative images (r(44) = -.03, p = .87; r(44) = .03, p = .86, 
respectively). These correlations were not significantly different (Z = 0.44, p 
= .66).  
 
To enable greater clarity regarding the influence of one’s propensity and 
ability in relation to the different dimensions of empathy, the relationship 
between task-based measures of cognitive/affective empathy and the 
regulation task self-reported emotional reactivity metrics were examined 
(table 6.1) (see section 3.2.2 for further details of these tasks/metrics).  
 
Table 6.1. 
Correlation results for empathy tasks and self-reported arousal and valence 
Variable Mean arousal rating 
(neg images) 
Mean valence rating 
(neg images) 
Director Task .05 (p = .75) -.05 (p = .75) 
Angry SFM .26 (p = .11) .11 (p = .50) 
Happy SFM .16 (p = .33) -.11 (p = .50) 
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Corrugator EMG measures of spontaneous recovery  
To examine spontaneous recovery following exposure to negative images, 
the correlation between each empathy measure and corrugator activity 
within the recovery epoch (independent of emotional reactivity) was 
examined. Trait cognitive empathy showed no relationship with the 
corrugator recovery metric, r(44) = .14, p = .36. Trait affective empathy 
showed a non-significant positive trend with the corrugator recovery 
metric, r(44) = .23, p = .12. These correlations were not significantly 
different (Z = 0.62, p = .53). The correlations between the recovery metric 
and task measures of cognitive/affective empathy are shown in table 6.2.   
 
Table 6.2. 
Correlation results for empathy tasks and spontaneous recovery metric 
 
 
6.3.2. Block 2 - instructed emotion regulation 
Self-report ratings 
A paired samples t-test demonstrated that arousal ratings were 
significantly higher in the attend (M ± SD = 5.37 ± 1.46) relative to the 
regulate (M ± SD = 4.45 ± 1.50) condition, t(45) = 7.54, p < .001 (fig. 6.5, left 
panel). Similarly, valence ratings were significantly lower (i.e. more 
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negative) in the attend (M ± SD = 2.89 ± 0.68) relative to the regulate (M ± 
SD = 3.83 ± 0.73) condition, t(45) = -8.94, p < .001 (fig. 6.5, right panel).  
 
Fig. 6.5. Mean ratings of arousal (left panel) and valence (right panel) for the attend 
and regulate conditions. Error bars depict ±1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
Corrugator activity 
A repeated measures ANOVA with instruction (regulate/attend) and epoch 
(baseline/reactivity/recovery) on the dependent variable corrugator 
activity demonstrated a significant main effect of instruction, F(1, 45) = 7.92, 
p = .007, partial 𝛈2 = .15, a significant main effect of epoch, F(1.45, 65.33) = 
15.14, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .25, and a significant instruction by epoch 
interaction, F(1.66, 74.65) = 13.31, p < .001, partial 𝛈2 = .25.  
 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment revealed that mean 
corrugator activity was greater in the attend relative to the regulate 
condition overall (p = .007). Corrugator activity in the baseline epoch was 


















































epochs. There was no difference between the attend and regulate 
conditions in the baseline period (p = .65), however, corrugator activity was 
significantly higher in the attend relative to the regulate condition in the 
reactivity (p = .003) and recovery (p = .001) epochs.  
 
In the attend condition, mean corrugator activity was lower in the baseline 
epoch, relative to the reactivity and recovery epochs (both p < .001); mean 
corrugator activity was higher in the reactivity relative to the recovery 
epoch (p = .007). In the regulate condition, baseline corrugator activity was 
lower at trend-level than in the reactivity epoch (p = .05), but was not 
significantly different to the recovery epoch (p = 1.0); corrugator activity 
was higher in the reactivity epoch relative to the recovery epoch (p = .01).  
 
Baseline corrected corrugator activity for the attend and regulate 
conditions across the reactivity and recovery periods are presented in 
figure 6.6. For illustrative purposes the mean baseline corrected corrugator 
activity in the attend and regulate conditions for each one second epoch of 




Fig. 6.6. Baseline corrected corrugator activity for negative images in the attend 
(red) and regulate (blue) images in each reactivity and recovery epoch. Error bars 
depict ±1 within-subjects SEM. 
 
 
Fig. 6.7. Baseline corrected corrugator activity for negative images in the attend 
(red) and regulate (blue) in each one second epoch for the reactivity and recovery 
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Instructed regulation ability and empathy 
Self-report measures of regulation magnitude 
To assess instructed regulation ability, the relationship between each 
empathy measure and the self-reported valence (regulate - attend) and 
arousal (attend - regulate) regulation metrics were examined. Trait 
cognitive and affective empathy showed no relationship with the valence 
regulation metric (r(44) = .01, p = .96; r(44) = -.002, p = .99, respectively). 
These correlations were not significantly different, Z = 0.08, p = .93.  
 
Similarly, there was no evidence of any relationship between cognitive or 
affective empathy and the arousal rating regulation metric (rho(44) = -.03, p 
= .85;  rho(44) = .05, p = .73, respectively). These two correlations were not 
significantly different, Z = 0.55, p = .58. As highlighted in table 6.3, no 
relationships were observed between self-report metrics of regulation 
magnitude and task measures of cognitive/affective empathy.  
 
Table 6.3.  
Correlations between empathy tasks and self-report regulation metrics  
 
Variable Mean arousal diff  
(attend - regulate) 
Mean valence diff  
(regulate - attend) 
Director Task .03 (p = .87) .16 (p = .35) 
Angry SFM -.001 (p = .99) .17 (p = .30) 
Happy SFM -.01 (p = .93) .05 (p = .76) 
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Corrugator EMG measures of instructed regulation magnitude 
Trait cognitive and affective empathy were not significantly related to 
metrics of regulation magnitude in the reactivity epoch (rho(44) = .20, p = 
.18; rho(44) = .21, p = .17, respectively). These correlations were not 
significantly different (Z = 0.07, p = .94). There was no evidence of any 
relationship between trait cognitive and affective empathy and the metric 
of regulation magnitude in the recovery epoch (rho(44) = -.08, p = .58; 
rho(44) = .11, p = .48, respectively). These correlations were not significantly 
different (Z = 1.32, p = .19). There was also no evidence for any relationship 
between EMG measures of instructed regulation magnitude and task 
measures of empathy (table 6.4).  
 
Table 6.4.  
Correlations between empathy tasks and EMG regulation metrics  
 
Variable EMG regulation metric 
(reactivity period) 
EMG regulation metric  
(recovery period) 
Director Task -.08 (p = .63) -.11 (p = .50) 
Angry SFM .07 (p = .66) .01 (p = .98) 








6.4.1. Summary of findings 
This study examined the relationship that cognitive/affective empathy 
share with self-report and corrugator EMG metrics of (1) spontaneous 
emotional recovery and (2) instructed emotion regulation ability. In 
contrast to tasks that instruct participants to use a particular strategy (or 
strategies) across all regulate trials, this study utilised a paradigm in which 
participants were free to regulate their emotions using any strategy of their 
choosing. A benefit of this approach is that it enables a more holistic and 
ecologically-valid measure of regulation abilities (Baur et al., 2015), which 
incorporates aspects of strategy selection and implementation (Gross, 
2015). 
 
The results suggest that the task was effective in inducing negative affect 
and that participants were able to downregulate these experiences as 
instructed; this was evidenced by significant reductions in self-reported 
negative valence, arousal, and corrugator activity. These findings are 
aligned with those of various prior studies (Cacioppo et al., 1986, Dimberg, 
1990, Jackson et al., 2000; Larsen et al., 2003, Ray et al., 2010; Wu et al., 
2012), and one recent study in particular, which utilised a similar “free 
choice” regulation task (Baur et al., 2015). Additionally, it was observed that 
some of the self-report and corrugator change metrics from this task 
showed trend-level relationships with a trait measure of emotion 
dysregulation that were in the expected direction (see appendix H). Taken 
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together these results suggest that the task was effectively tapping into 
abilities relevant to emotion regulation.   
 
Across both the spontaneous and instructed blocks, the hypothesised 
relationship between cognitive empathy and emotion regulation ability was 
not observed; a trait and task measure of cognitive empathy showed no 
relationship with self-report and corrugator metrics of emotion regulation 
ability. While trait affective empathy showed a trend-level positive 
relationship with a corrugator EMG metric of spontaneous emotional 
recovery, no significant relationships with the regulation task metrics were 
observed for a trait and task measure of affective empathy. 
 
6.4.2. Cognitive empathy and emotion regulation 
Cognitive empathy showed no relationship with metrics of spontaneous 
recovery following exposure to negative emotional images. In an instructed 
regulation block, aside from a weak relationship with a corrugator metric of 
regulation magnitude that was in the expected direction, there was no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that cognitive empathy is positively 
associated with emotion regulation ability. 
 
These findings are in contrast to prior theoretical (Schipper and Peterman, 
2013) and empirical work (Lockwood et al., 2014; Powell, 2018; Tully et al., 
2016), which suggests that greater cognitive empathy may be associated 
with improved emotion regulation abilities. Furthermore, these results are 
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discordant with those reported in chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis, which 
found that cognitive empathy was positively associated with certain 
emotion regulation abilities. The handful of previous studies that have 
examined this relationship have typically done so using only trait measures; 
to my knowledge, this is the first study to examine this relationship using 
more objective measures of regulation ability that assess different implicit 
and explicit emotion regulation abilities. Therefore, while the current 
findings are in contrast to prior work, given the different methodologies 
used some divergence is not entirely surprising. Similarly, the previous 
studies in this thesis that reported a relationship between cognitive 
empathy and emotion regulation assessed different regulatory abilities 
using different approaches to the current study, which may not necessarily 
be directly related to one another.  
 
In sum, this study found no strong evidence to support the hypothesis that 
cognitive empathy is positively associated with emotion regulation ability. 
Some potential interpretations of these findings in relation to prior 
theoretical and empirical work are discussed further in section 6.4.4.   
 
6.4.3. Affective empathy and emotion regulation 
Given the findings of chapter 5, which suggested that affective empathy 
was associated with increased downregulation of negative emotion based 
on implicit but not explicit reappraisal, it was predicted that affective 
empathy would be positively related to a metric of spontaneous recovery 
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but would show no relationship with metrics of instructed regulation 
ability. In block 1, trait and task measures of affective empathy showed no 
relationship with self-report measures of emotional reactivity (i.e. valence 
and arousal), however a trend-level positive relationship with an EMG 
measure of spontaneous emotional recovery was observed for trait 
affective empathy. While not significant, this finding suggests that greater 
trait affective empathy was associated with a slightly faster recovery (i.e. 
corrugator return to baseline) following the offset of negative affective 
images. In block 2, trait affective empathy showed no relationship with self-
report or corrugator EMG metrics of instructed regulation ability.   
 
Across previous chapters, affective empathy has shown a mixed 
relationship with metrics of emotion regulation ability. For example, trait 
affective empathy was associated with fewer difficulties with emotional 
awareness and increased magnitude of negative emotion downregulation in 
an implicit reappraisal task; however, it was also associated with greater 
self-reported difficulty maintaining goal-focused behaviours and increased 
emotional interference in an implicit emotion regulation task.  
 
With these results in mind, it is possible that greater affective empathy 
confers advantages for more implicit and spontaneous regulatory processes 
but can hinder more explicit and effortful processes. A speculative 
interpretation might be that any potential benefit that a heightened 
awareness of one’s own emotions may confer on one’s emotion regulation 
 233 
abilities, is negated by concurrent heightened levels of emotional 
interference. This might explain why affective empathy shows some 
evidence of being associated with improved spontaneous emotional 
recovery but is largely negatively related or unrelated to metrics assessing 
more explicit and effortful aspects of emotion regulation.  
 
6.4.4. Summary, conclusions, and limitations 
The study reported in this chapter utilised a task measure of emotion 
regulation that enabled the assessment of different implicit and explicit 
abilities. In alignment with the extended process model of emotion 
regulation, performance on this task was reliant not only upon participants’ 
ability to effectively implement regulatory control, but also their ability to 
select a strategy most suitable for different negative images and the 
emotional state they evoked (Gross, 2015). Based on self-report (valence 
and arousal) and EMG (corrugator change) metrics of downregulation 
magnitude, this study found no strong evidence for any relationship 
between cognitive or affective empathy and emotion regulation ability.  
 
While the free-choice regulation task provides a more ecologically valid 
measure of regulation ability than other regulation paradigms, performance 
on this task may not necessarily provide an accurate reflection on 
participants' true emotion regulation abilities. While lab-based studies 
enable greater control over potential confounds, the environment is 
inherently somewhat artificial and may not accurately capture more 
 234 
naturalistic regulatory behaviours/abilities. One key aspect relevant to 
real-world emotion regulation that was not assessed by the current task, is 
the ability to generate appropriate regulatory goals. According to the 
extended process model of emotion regulation, one need not necessarily 
regulate all emotions all the time. Instead, the modulation of emotions 
should only occur when one’s current state interferes with the 
accomplishment of some explicit or implicit goal (Gross, 1998, 2015). A 
speculative interpretation of the null findings of this study is that any 
variability in emotion regulation ability may have been overshadowed by 
differences in the regulation goals of participants with different levels of 
cognitive/affective empathy.  
 
To explain this point further, I now draw upon some recent theoretical 
work highlighting the role of goals and motivation in relation to empathy. 
This work suggests that an individual's level of trait empathy may influence 
the extent to which they value engaging with the emotions of others. 
Individuals with higher trait empathy may place greater value upon 
engaging with another’s emotions, even in instances where this might entail 
experiencing negative emotions (Cameron et al., 2018; Tamir, 2016; Zaki, 
2014). In line with this assertion, it is possible that individuals with higher 
trait empathy were simply more willing to tolerate a higher level of 
negativity caused by another’s emotional state than those with lower trait 
empathy, which could have overshadowed any potential advantages that 
greater empathy might entail with regards to regulation ability.  
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Any such differences in the goal-states participants with different levels of 
empathy were trying to achieve through regulation might have manifested 
as differences in the strategies they chose to use during the task. There are 
various ways in which an individual could regulate the emotions they 
experience in response to perceiving the negative state of another. For 
example, one could try to reappraise the state of the other as less negative 
or simply distract oneself in order not to think about the other’s situation 
(Cameron et al., 2018; Tamir, 2016; Zaki, 2014).  
 
If individuals with greater empathy place more value on engaging with 
another’s emotions, it could be that they were less likely than those with 
lower levels of empathy to use a strategy that entailed avoiding the other’s 
emotions (e.g. distraction). Perhaps they were instead more likely to use a 
regulation strategy that entailed still engaging with the other’s experience 
(e.g. reappraisal). Given evidence that distraction is typically more effective 
than reappraisal in modulating more intense emotional responses in the 
short-term (McRae, 2016; Sheppes and Levin, 2013; Smoski et al., 2014), this 
speculative interpretation could explain why the predicted relationship 
between cognitive empathy and regulation ability was not observed.  
 
While this interpretation may sufficiently explain the observed relationship 
between trait empathy and regulation ability, it is somewhat less convincing 
in relation to the results observed for the task measure of cognitive 
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empathy. While trait empathy largely reflects one’s dispositional motivation 
to engage empathic processes, the director task provides a more objective 
measure of perspective-taking ability (Gehlbach, 2004; Guzman et al., 2016; 
Santiesteban et al., 2012). Thus, while the relationship (or lack thereof) 
between trait cognitive empathy and regulation ability may in part be a 
reflection of different regulation goal-states and patterns of strategy 
selection, this interpretation is less able to account for the failure to find 
any significant relationship between emotion regulation metrics and the 
task measure of perspective-taking ability.  
 
In the context of the speculative interpretation discussed above, one 
limitation of the current study is that all of the negative images were of a 
social nature. Given that one would expect greater cognitive and affective 
empathy to be associated with increased emotional reactivity to others’ 
negative emotions (e.g. Sato et al., 2013; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002), it could 
be that individuals with greater empathy experience greater difficulty in 
regulating their emotional state in such instances. Thus, it could be that 
using only social images negated any potential advantage that greater 
empathy could endow in terms of regulating one’s emotions day-to-day, 
which would often not be triggered by the perception of another 
individual’s emotional state. It would be beneficial for future work to test 
this speculative interpretation by examining the relationship between 
measures of empathy and regulation tasks that include both social and non-












































7.1. Summary  
Despite increasing theoretical work suggestive of a close relationship 
between empathy and emotion regulation, there has been relatively little 
empirical study of how different cognitive and affective component 
processes associated with empathy relate to different emotion regulation 
abilities. Building upon a handful of prior studies that have found evidence 
for a relationship between empathy and emotion regulation using trait 
measures (Contardi et al., 2016; Lockwood et al., 2014), this thesis utilised a 
range of methodological approaches to examine the relationship between 
distinct component processes of empathy and emotion regulation. Based 
on a series of studies, which used a combination of self-report, behavioural, 
eye-tracking, and psychophysiology metrics, this thesis found evidence that 
variability in empathy is associated with individual differences in emotion 
regulation abilities and behaviours.  
 
In the majority of studies there was some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy share 
different relationships emotion regulation abilities. While there was some 
evidence to support the prediction that emotion regulation ability would be 
positively associated with cognitive empathy and negatively associated with 
affective empathy, some conflicting findings were observed. The results 
suggest that the nature of the relationship between these constructs varies 
as a function of: (1) the precise component of emotion regulation and 
empathy being tested, and (2) the nature of the methods used to assess 
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them. The hypotheses and findings for each study are presented in table 7.1. 
These findings and their relation to the extant literature are considered in 
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7.2. Cognitive empathy and emotion regulation 
Based on the literature reviewed in chapter 1, it was predicted that 
cognitive empathy would be positively associated with emotion regulation 
ability. Broadly speaking, the results of the studies reported in this thesis 
provide support for this hypothesis. However, the nature of the relationship 
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between cognitive empathy and emotion regulation varied depending upon 
the way in which each construct was measured.  
 
7.2.1. Trait and task measures of cognitive empathy and their relationship 
with trait emotion regulation 
 
In chapter 2, it was observed that higher trait cognitive empathy was 
associated with more adaptive self-reported strategy use, indexed by a 
greater propensity to use reappraisal and a reduced propensity to use 
suppression. Trait cognitive empathy was also negatively related to self-
reported emotion dysregulation, which was driven primarily by negative 
relationships with subscales assessing difficulties with emotional awareness 
and controlling emotional impulses.  
 
In relative alignment with these results, in chapter 3 it was observed that a 
task measure of perspective-taking ability (director task; henceforth DT) 
was negatively associated with trait emotion dysregulation. While this 
perspective-taking metric showed a negative correlation with suppression 
use, it was not significantly associated with reappraisal use. In contrast to 
perspective-taking ability, a task assessing participants' ability to recognise 
complex mental/emotional states based on images of the eye region (the 
RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997, 2001) was unrelated to any trait measures 
of emotion regulation.  
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These findings provide support for the hypothesis that cognitive empathy is 
positively associated with emotion regulation ability, and build upon prior 
work in this area by: (1) showing evidence of this relationship using both 
trait and task measures of cognitive empathy, and (2) providing greater 
specificity regarding how different abilities associated with cognitive 
empathy (i.e. perspective-taking and mental state attribution) are related to 
trait emotion regulation measures.  
 
While the DT and RMET both assess abilities related to the cognitive 
component of empathy, these tasks may differ in the extent to which they 
place demands on effortful cognitive processes (Santiesteban et al., 2012). 
While there is evidence to suggest that various abilities associated with 
cognitive empathy are related to the efficiency of domain-general cognitive 
control processes (Bull et al., 2008; Carlson et al., 2004; Dennis et al., 2009; 
Goel et al., 1995; Gokcen et al., 2017; Hansen, 2011; Saxe et al., 2004), there 
may be some variability in the extent to which they each place demands on 
different sub-processes, such as working memory and inhibition (Bailey and 
Henry, 2008; Guzman et al., 2015; Spengler et al., 2010).  
 
Santiesteban et al. (2012) assert that a key difference between perspective-
taking and mental state attribution/emotion recognition tasks is the extent 
to which they necessitate the online control of self and other 
representations. To perform well in the DT, participants must be able to 
simultaneously hold in mind their own and the director’s perspective, and 
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switch between these coactive self and other related representations. 
These processes are likely to place demands on working memory and 
inhibitory control, which have also been implicated in various emotion 
regulation processes (Guzman et al., 2016; Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; 
McRae et al. 2010; Messina et al., 2015).  
 
Similar to perspective-taking, reappraisal may require one to 
simultaneously hold different appraisals in mind and inhibit dominant 
appraisals in order to generate new and/or sub-dominant appraisals that 
might serve to modify one’s emotional response (Messina et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, perspective-taking processes are closely related to the 
emotion regulation strategy sometimes referred to as cognitive distancing 
(or reappraisal via perspective-taking) (Davis et al., 2011; Kross and Ayduk, 
2008; Messina et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2012a). Both of these processes are 
associated with a shift in perspective and are likely mediated by similar 
inhibitory control processes, subserved largely by the PFC and 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Davis et al., 2011; Guzman et al., 2015; 
Santiesteban et al., 2012).  
 
Given that many forms of emotion regulation are reliant upon similar 
underlying processes to those associated with perspective-taking 
(Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; Kalisch, 2009; McRae et al., 2010; Salas et 
al., 2014; Saxe et al., 2004; Urry et al., 2009), it could be that individuals with 
improved perspective-taking abilities are able to engage these processes 
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more efficiently, which facilitates emotion regulation. In contrast, as 
performance on the RMET is thought to rely upon more automatic 
processes associated with matching the target expression to expression 
archetypes and terminology stored in memory (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
Vellante et al., 2013), a greater capacity for this component of cognitive 
empathy may confer little advantage in terms of the efficiency of the 
processes that support emotion regulation.  
 
7.2.2. Trait cognitive empathy and task measures of emotion regulation 
In later chapters of this thesis (chapters 4, 5, and 6), I examined the 
relationship between trait empathy and task measures of different emotion 
regulation abilities. Reported in chapter 4 were two tasks that assessed 
implicit emotion regulation abilities associated with controlling impulsive 
responses in the presence of salient emotional distractors (Emo-GNG and 
Emo-Stroop). While cognitive empathy showed no relationship with the 
Emo-GNG task metrics, it was negatively associated with emotional 
interference effects in an Emo-Stroop task.  
 
Broadly speaking, these results suggest that individuals with greater 
cognitive empathy were more effective in minimising the interference 
caused by emotional distractors. These results are consistent with those 
reported chapter 2, where trait cognitive empathy was negatively 
associated with self-reported difficulties with impulse control. These 
findings may also to some extent explain the relationship observed between 
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cognitive empathy and habitual regulation strategy use. Many adaptive 
forms of emotion regulation, such as reappraisal, are dependent upon 
cognitive control processes such as working memory and inhibition (Buhle 
et al., 2014; Hendricks and Buchanan, 2016; Salas et al., 2014). A greater 
capacity to maintain efficiency of these processes in emotional situations 
may support the ability to form appropriate regulatory goals and to select 
and implement more adaptive strategies (Koster et al., 2011; Morillas-
Romero et al., 2015; Servaas et al., 2013;). This could explain in part why 
cognitive empathy was positively associated with the habitual use of 
reappraisal and negatively associated with the habitual use of suppression.   
 
To test whether the increased use of reappraisal reported by individuals 
with greater cognitive empathy was also associated with improved 
reappraisal abilities, chapter 5 examined the relationship between trait 
empathy and two task measures of reappraisal. No evidence was found to 
support the hypothesis that cognitive empathy would be positively 
associated with reappraisal ability. Trait cognitive empathy showed no 
relationship with the magnitude of emotion downregulation in an implicit 
reappraisal task. Furthermore, trait cognitive empathy was negatively 
related to self-report and automated facial coding (AFC) metrics of 
regulation magnitude in an explicit reappraisal task.  
 
Trait cognitive empathy measures largely reflect one’s motivational 
disposition toward taking others’ perspectives (Gehlbach, 2004; Keysers 
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and Gazzola, 2014; Reniers et al., 2011). Accordingly, the results of the 
explicit reappraisal task could suggest that participants with a greater 
dispositional propensity to take the perspectives of others were less 
effective in downregulating negative emotional experiences using 
reappraisal. Given the social stimuli used in this task, it is possible that an 
increased disposition to take others’ perspectives made it more difficult to 
adopt a distanced perspective that might facilitate the generation of 
effective reappraisal narratives. While further work would be required to 
test this speculative interpretation, it highlights a potentially important 
divergence between one’s ability and propensity for cognitive empathy, and 
how they relate to emotion regulation. 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that while cognitive empathy is 
positively associated with the propensity to use reappraisal, it is not 
necessarily associated with a heightened ability to downregulate negative 
emotions using reappraisal. In terms of the extended process model of 
emotion regulation (Gross, 2015), this could imply that cognitive empathy 
facilitates the selection, but not the implementation, stage of the regulatory 
process.  
 
The study reported in chapter 6 utilised a task in which participants were 
free to choose the means by which they attempted to regulate their 
emotions. In addition to enabling the assessment of abilities associated with 
the selection and implementation of emotion regulation strategies, this 
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study also examined the relationship that trait and task measures of 
empathy shared with a measure of spontaneous emotional recovery. Based 
on a combination of self-report and corrugator EMG metrics, this study 
found no evidence for any relationship between trait cognitive empathy and 
emotion regulation ability. A task measure of perspective-taking ability also 
showed no relationship with any of the regulation task metrics.  
 
These findings are in contrast to prior chapters, where greater cognitive 
empathy was associated with more adaptive emotion regulation abilities 
and behaviours (chapters 2, 3, and 4). Possible explanations for the different 
relationships that cognitive empathy shows with trait and task measures of 
emotion regulation are discussed further in subsection 7.4 of this chapter. 
Here I focus upon the divergent relationships that trait cognitive empathy 
shows with different emotion regulation tasks. 
  
The finding that trait cognitive empathy was positively associated with 
implicit emotion regulation abilities (chapter 4) but did not show a similar 
positive relationship with regulation ability in chapters 5 and 6, could be 
due to differences in the regulatory processes that these tasks assess. The 
tasks in chapters 5 and 6 assessed the ability to downregulate negative 
emotional responses to social IAPS images, whereas the Emo-Stroop 
assessed more implicit regulatory process that occur at an early stage of 
stimulus processing. Thus, some divergence between these different task 
measures should be expected. However, the regulation tasks reported in 
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chapters 5 and 6 were similar in many respects; yet, trait cognitive empathy 
still showed different relationships with these measures.  
 
These inconsistent findings could be due to variability in the strategies that 
participants used to regulate their emotions in these tasks. In the explicit 
reappraisal task (chapter 5), participants were specifically instructed to use 
only reappraisal, whereas in the chapter 6 regulation task they were free to 
regulate their emotions using any strategy of their choosing.  
 
In the context of interpreting these results, a pertinent distinction between 
different regulatory strategies is regarding their relative position along an 
“approach/avoid” continuum. For example, reappraisal entails a relatively 
“approach” focused strategy, in which the observer still engages with the 
emotional stimulus (i.e. the other’s situation/emotion in the context of 
social images), but simply tries to change their appraisals of it. In contrast, 
attentional deployment and distraction strategies can be considered more 
“avoidant”, in the sense that the individual may attempt to reduce the 
extent to which they attend the emotional stimulus (Augustine and 
Hemenover, 2009; Gross, 2015; Rieffe et al., 2014).  
 
People tend to favour more avoidant strategies such as distraction over 
reappraisal for regulating emotional responses to more intense stimuli 
(Sheppes et al., 2011; Sheppes and Levin, 2013). There is also evidence to 
suggest that avoidant strategies like distraction are less cognitively 
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demanding and more effective in inducing short-term emotional 
modulation than reappraisal (Kanske et al., 2011; Smoski et al., 2014; Strauss 
et al., 2016). In light of this evidence, it is possible that differences in the 
strategies that participants used in each of these tasks could to some extent 
explain the different relationships these measures share with cognitive 
empathy.   
 
One’s capacity to share another’s emotion is not driven solely by 
spontaneous mimicry/embodiment in response to concrete emotion cues. 
Placing oneself in ‘another’s shoes’ and making inferences about their 
emotional experience can in itself be sufficient to induce some degree of 
affective resonance with their imagined state (Bird and Viding, 2014; 
Goldman, 2011). Given that higher trait cognitive empathy reflects in part a 
heightened disposition to recognise others’ emotions and place oneself in 
their perspective (Gehlbach, 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2014; Reniers et al., 
2011), it is reasonable to infer that it might also be associated with increased 
resonance with others’ emotions.  
 
Consequently, the fact that the explicit reappraisal task required 
participants to maintain engagement with the negative social stimuli may 
have made regulation more difficult for those with higher trait cognitive 
empathy. This could perhaps have been due to difficulties in adopting a 
more detached perspective that might facilitate the generation of 
alternative reappraisals of the stimuli. In contrast, when participants were 
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free to use any strategy of their choosing, a heightened propensity to take 
the depicted target’s perspective and resonate with their experience may 
have exerted less of a negative influence, as regulation could be achieved 
simply by disengaging one’s attention from the more evocative aspects of 
the stimulus (e.g. the other’s suffering).  
 
In sum, the findings of these studies provide some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that greater cognitive empathy is associated with more adaptive 
emotion regulation. However, the relationship that cognitive empathy 
showed with emotion regulation abilities demonstrated significant patterns 
of divergence across these studies. 
 
7.3. Affective empathy and emotion regulation 
Based on evidence to suggest that greater affective empathy is associated 
increased reactivity to social emotional stimuli (Rueckert et al., 2011; Sato et 
al., 2013; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002) it was expected that higher levels of 
affective empathy would be associated with a heightened sensitivity to the 
potential emotional interference on cognitive control processes (Hare et al., 
2005, 2008; Tottenham et al., 2011). Given the crucial role these processes 
play in various aspects of emotion regulation (Buhle et al., 2014; Messina et 
al., 2015), it was predicted that affective empathy would show a negative 
relationship with metrics of emotion regulation ability. While there was 
some evidence to support this hypothesis, as was the case with cognitive 
empathy, the relationship between affective empathy and emotion 
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regulation was different depending upon the way in which each construct 
was measured.  
 
7.3.1. Trait and task measures of affective empathy and their relationship 
with trait emotion regulation 
 
Trait affective empathy was not significantly associated with overall levels 
of self-reported emotion dysregulation, however, it showed significant 
positive relationships with subscales measuring difficulties (1) managing 
one’s emotions and (2) maintaining goal-focused behaviours in emotional 
situations. In contrast, trait affective empathy was negatively associated 
with difficulties with emotional awareness, suggesting that higher affective 
empathy may facilitate the capacity to reflect upon one’s own emotions. 
Taken together these findings suggest that greater affective empathy may 
support some aspects of emotion regulation while hindering others.  
 
While affective empathy showed no relationship with the habitual use of 
reappraisal, it was negatively associated with the propensity to use 
suppression. This suggests that while greater affective empathy is 
associated with less frequent use of maladaptive strategies, it is not 
associated with more frequent use of adaptive reappraisal strategies.  
 
Contrary to the results observed for trait affective empathy, a task measure 
of SFM (a key component process associated with affective empathy) 
showed relationships with trait measures of emotion regulation that were 
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broadly indicative of more adaptive emotion regulation abilities. Increased 
spontaneous mimicry of angry faces was negatively associated with trait 
emotion dysregulation and showed a positive relationship with the habitual 
use of reappraisal. Interestingly, no relationship with these emotion 
regulation measures was observed for mimicry of happy faces (chapter 3).   
 
These results could suggest that emotion dysregulation is associated with 
valence-specific disruption in spontaneous mimicry mechanisms. It could 
be that individuals with increased levels of emotion dysregulation exhibit an 
increased freezing response when exposed to threatening stimuli (e.g. 
angry faces). It is also possible that these effects were associated with 
differences in the way in which individuals with high/low trait emotion 
dysregulation attended to the angry faces. For example, those with greater 
emotion dysregulation may have been less willing/able to maintain direct 
eye contact with the threatening angry faces, which could explain their 
attenuated mimicry response (Hadjikhani et al., 2017).  
 
These findings demonstrate a divergence between trait and task measures 
of affective empathy in terms of their relationship with emotion regulation. 
Furthermore, they highlight important considerations regarding the 
assessment of empathy. Prior work has failed to find evidence of strong 
convergence between trait and task measures of empathy (Melchers et al., 
2015; Murphy and Lilienfeld, 2019), which suggests that these different 
approaches may not necessarily assess the same underlying constructs. The 
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current findings are broadly consistent with such work and demonstrate 
that trait and task measures of affective empathy are differentially related 
to emotion regulation abilities.  
 
7.3.2. Trait affective empathy and task measures of emotion regulation 
While trait affective empathy showed no relationship with the self-reported 
habitual use of reappraisal, it was associated with increased downregulation 
of negative emotion in an implicit reappraisal task. This suggests that while 
those with greater affective empathy do not use reappraisal more 
frequently in their daily lives, they show a heightened capacity for implicit 
reappraisal through extrinsic contextual information. In contrast, trait 
affective empathy showed no relationship with reappraisal ability in an 
explicit reappraisal task and was not significantly related to metrics of 
spontaneous recovery or regulation ability in an instructed emotion 
regulation task. In chapter 4, it was observed that trait affective empathy 
was positively associated with the magnitude of emotional interference 
effects in an Emo-GNG task.  
 
In attempting to synthesise the findings of these various studies one could 
speculate that while higher affective empathy is associated with improved 
trait emotional awareness (chapter 2), which should support emotion 
regulation, it is also associated with a heightened sensitivity to emotional 
interference on inhibitory control processes (chapters 2 and 4). This may 
negate any potential benefit of improved emotional awareness in instances 
 255 
where regulation is more reliant upon effortful cognitive control processes 
(chapter 5, study 2 and chapter 6, instructed block). However, in instances 
where emotion regulation is less reliant upon conscious implementation 
and cognitive control, greater affective empathy may support certain 
regulation processes (chapter 5, study 1 and chapter 6, spontaneous block).  
 
 
7.4. Divergent patterns for trait and task measures of emotion 
regulation in terms of their relationship with cognitive and 
affective empathy 
 
As noted in the preceding sections, the relationships that cognitive and 
affective empathy shared with emotion regulation were different depending 
upon the way in which these constructs were measured. While some of the 
findings across these studies may at first seem somewhat discordant, there 
are a number of potential explanations for these divergent results.  
 
At the most basic level, it is important to note that different components of 
emotion regulation were examined across each of these studies. Therefore, 
the fact that empathy measures were related to some regulation metrics 
but not others could simply reflect the fact that cognitive and affective 
empathy share different relationships with distinct components of emotion 
regulation. Some studies did assess aspects of emotion regulation that one 
would expect to be at least moderately related; yet, different relationships 
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with these measures and empathy were still observed. I now highlight some 
important distinctions between the trait and task measures of emotion 
regulation used in this thesis and reflect upon their relevance for 
interpreting the relationships that these measures were found to share with 
empathy. 
 
7.4.1. Propensity versus ability  
While trait cognitive empathy was positively correlated with the habitual 
use of reappraisal, it showed a negative relationship with the magnitude of 
emotion downregulation in an explicit reappraisal task. A discrepancy 
between these reappraisal measures is in many ways not surprising given 
that one measure indexes an individual’s propensity to use reappraisal, 
whereas the other directly assesses their ability to regulate their emotions 
using this strategy in a laboratory environment.  
 
While one might assume that more frequent use of a given strategy entails a 
greater ability to use that strategy, and vice versa, this evidently is not 
necessarily always the case (Ford et al., 2017). While various prior studies 
have found evidence of a relationship between the habitual use of 
reappraisal and task metrics of regulation ability (Brudner et al., 2018; 
Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Kanske et al., 2012; McRae et al., 2013), in the present 
studies there was little evidence of convergence between self-reported 
strategy use and task measures of emotion regulation ability.  
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Unlike task paradigms, trait measures assess respondents’ self-perceptions 
of their regulatory abilities/experiences, which may not necessarily provide 
an accurate reflection of their true abilities. For example, many regulatory 
processes can take place on an implicit level; as such, one may not have the 
ability to accurately reflect upon certain regulatory abilities (Gyurak et al., 
2011; Koole et al., 2015; Mauss et al., 2007). Additionally, individuals may 
overestimate their own abilities and/or positive traits (John and Robins, 
1994), which can leave self-report measures susceptible to certain response 
biases. This is less true of task measures, particularly those that utilise more 
objective metrics of emotion, such as fEMG. 
 
7.4.2. Social versus non-social emotional triggers 
A further distinction between the trait and task measures used in this thesis 
is the extent to which they assess regulation of emotional states induced by 
empathic processes. The trait measures that were used measured 
participants’ typical experiences associated with emotion regulation, which 
would most likely cover a range of contexts, emotion triggers and states. In 
contrast, the task measures of emotion regulation in these studies all used 
social stimuli as a means of inducing emotion.  
 
While one might expect an individual’s emotion regulation abilities to show 
a relatively consistent pattern regardless of how emotion was induced, 
regulation is a highly contextual phenomenon (English et al., 2017; Gross, 
2015; Rottweiler et al., 2018; Suri et al., 2018) and it could be that there are 
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differences in one’s ability to regulate emotions as a function of whether 
they were elicited by social or non-social stimuli.  
 
Consequently, the different relationships that cognitive empathy was found 
to share with these trait and task measures of emotion regulation could 
suggest that any potential advantage greater cognitive empathy confers for 
regulating one’s emotions might not apply in instances of negative 
emotions induced by empathic processes. This could be because a 
heightened propensity to attend social stimuli and engage empathic 
processes diminishes the efficiency/efficacy of emotion regulation 
processes (Hedger et al., 2018; Zaki, 2014). An alternative interpretation is 
that those with higher trait cognitive empathy place greater relative 
importance on long-term goals, such as the implicit desire to maintain a 
positive self-concept of oneself as a compassionate individual, than on 
short-term goals, such as the desire to reduce one’s immediate negative 
emotional state (Cameron et al., 2018; Zaki, 2014).  
 
7.4.3. Long-term versus short-term emotion regulation processes 
Emotion regulation is not simply about one’s ability to control emotions in 
the immediate context, but also how emotions are managed over time 
(Davidson, 2015; Kuppens et al., 2010). Consider two individuals who 
experience the same distressing situation. While they may both exhibit 
similar emotional responses and regulatory efficacy while the situation is 
occurring, one may subsequently recover from this experience within a few 
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minutes or hours while the other may be plagued by worry and rumination 
for weeks.  
 
An important distinction between the trait and task measures used in the 
current set of studies relates to their relative focus upon short-term versus 
long-term aspects of emotion regulation. While task paradigms assess the 
relatively immediate consequences of one’s regulatory abilities, trait 
measures assess more stable dispositional emotion regulation experiences 
and behaviours (Gross and John, 2003). With these considerations in mind, 
one could infer that the divergent patterns that cognitive empathy showed 
with trait and task measures of emotion regulation suggest that while 
greater cognitive empathy does not confer any significant advantage for 
regulatory abilities based on short-term measures, it may support 
regulatory process that unfold over a longer time course.  
 
For example, perspective-taking abilities could support the capacity to 
adopt a distanced self-perspective when reflecting upon past emotional 
triggers/experiences, which could facilitate self-reflection and positive 
reappraisals. Indeed, Kross and colleagues (2005, 2008) have shown how 
recalling past emotional experiences from a distanced perspective vs a 
more immersed perspective can aid reappraisal and facilitate insight and 
closure. Thus, it may be that cognitive empathic abilities such as 
perspective-taking relate to emotion regulation processes that evolve over 
a longer time course than those examined in lab-based tasks. This might 
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explain why cognitive empathy was consistently associated with more 
adaptive emotion regulation when assessed by trait measures (which may 
tap into more long-term aspects of emotion regulation) but showed an 
inconsistent relationship with more short-term task metrics of emotion 
regulation ability.   
 
A further mechanism through which cognitive empathy could support 
adaptive emotion regulation in the long-, but not the short-term, is through 
implementation intentions. Implementation intention refers to an ‘if-then’ 
plan that seeks to build an association between a given cue (e.g. an 
emotional trigger or state) and a specific regulatory response (Gallo et al., 
2009). There is evidence to suggest that the formation of implementation 
intentions can improve the efficacy of regulation efforts in situ, presumably 
because the primed association between a given situation and a regulatory 
action improves the efficiency with which that regulatory response is 
implemented (Azbel-Jackson et al., 2015; Hallam et al., 2015; Webb et al., 
2012b). Consequently, one who is better able to anticipate and predict 
different emotional situations and the potential outcomes of different 
regulatory strategies may be more effective in regulating their emotions 
if/when that situation is encountered.  
 
While to my knowledge there is no direct evidence to suggest that cognitive 
empathy may support the formation and application of implementation 
intentions, there is strong evidence from which one might reasonably infer 
 261 
a relationship. In addition to supporting the ability to place oneself in 
another’s perspective, cognitive empathic processes may mediate the 
ability to shift from one’s immediate experience to different 
temporal/mental locations, such as the perspective of a future or past self 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009; Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2007). Functional MRI studies have demonstrated reductions in vmPFC 
activity when placing oneself in the perspective of another (Ochsner et al., 
2004b), with similar reductions also associated with taking the perspective 
of a future self (Mitchell et al., 2011, see also O’Connell et al., 2015).  
 
In light of such considerations, it is possible that the relationship between 
cognitive empathy and emotion regulation is underpinned not by 
improvements in the implementation of regulatory processes per se, but by 
a greater ability/propensity to project oneself into potential emotional 
situations. This form of mental self-projection could trigger the formation 
of implementation intentions, thereby facilitating the selection and 
implementation of an appropriate regulation strategy if/when the situation 
is encountered. Such an interpretation could explain why greater cognitive 
empathy was consistently associated with more adaptive trait emotion 
regulation, but the same relationships were not observed for task measures 





7.5. Implications, limitations, and further work 
Despite evidence to suggest a close relationship between empathy and 
emotion regulation, to date very few studies have directly examined this 
relationship. Furthermore, those that have typically used only trait 
measures of both constructs (e.g. Lockwood et al., 2014; Powell, 2018; Tully 
et al., 2016). To my knowledge, this thesis reflects the first research to 
examine the relationship between empathy and emotion regulation using 
task-based measures of cognitive and affective empathy, implicit emotion 
regulation, reappraisal ability, spontaneous emotional recovery, and 
instructed regulation. Through a systematic examination of the relationship 
that cognitive and affective empathy share with different abilities related to 
emotion regulation, the findings of this thesis give greater specificity to the 
relationship between these constructs.  
 
The current findings provide support for the proposed delineation between 
the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy (e.g. Decety, 2010; 
Goldman, 2011; Shamy-Tsoory, 2009) by demonstrating that they share 
different relationships with various aspects of emotion regulation. Broadly 
speaking, they suggest that cognitive empathy is positively associated with 
some emotion regulation abilities but not with others. The results regarding 
affective empathy were also mixed, showing a negative relationship with 
some measures, but a positive relationship with others. The findings 
demonstrate relationships between various different components of 
empathy and emotion regulation. Furthermore, they highlight some 
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interesting patterns of divergence in this relationship, which seemed to 
depend upon the way in which each construct was measured.  
 
These findings make a significant contribution to our understanding of the 
relationship between these constructs in normative populations and may 
provide useful insight for better understanding the shared deficits in 
empathy and emotion regulation observed in certain psychopathologies, 
such as ASC and borderline personality disorder.  
 
It is important to note that the findings of these studies should be 
interpreted with certain limitations in mind. Firstly, given the correlational 
design of each study it is not possible to make any causal claims regarding 
the observed relationships. The aim of this thesis was to provide a broad 
examination of some of the processes that comprise empathy and emotion 
regulation in order to highlight the potential relationships most worthy of 
further examination by future work. As such, the correlational design of 
these studies is not an issue per se, but simply a factor that should be 
considered in assessing the strengths and limitations of this thesis.  
 
A range of empathy and emotion regulation measures were used 
throughout this thesis. However, given the complex multidimensional 
nature of these constructs and the myriad processes they each comprise, it 
would be useful for future work to further examine this relationship using 
measures that tap into different abilities to the ones used in this thesis. 
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Additionally, while various metrics were used to assess empathy and 
emotion regulation, including self-report, behavioural, eye-gaze tracking, 
and psychophysiology, it would be useful for future work to utilise 
additional measures. For example, fMRI may be useful to examine whether 
individual differences in empathy are associated with variability in patterns 
of brain activation during emotion regulation.  
 
A further limitation is that the sample in most of these studies consisted 
largely of female university students aged between 18-30. While this is 
common in psychological research, it does to some extent limit the 
generalisability of the current set of results. Power analyses for these 
studies suggested that each sample demonstrated at the least sufficient 
power to detect effects of a moderate to large magnitude; however, it is 
possible that some studies may have lacked the power to detect significant 
relationships of a smaller magnitude. In these instances, however, the data 
were largely not suggestive of any relationship. As such, it is unlikely that 
the failure to find significant relationships between empathy and emotion 
regulation in these studies was due to a lack of statistical power.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be beneficial for future work to examine these 
relationships in larger and more heterogeneous samples in order to test the 
generalisability of these results. It may be particularly useful to study the 
relationship between empathy and emotion regulation in individuals with 
ASC and borderline personality disorder, where difficulties with both 
 265 
constructs are common (Daros et al., 2018; Frith and Happe, 2005; Roepke 
et al., 2013; Samson et al., 2012).  
 
It should be highlighted that the emotion regulation measures used in this 
thesis focus almost exclusively upon the downregulation of negative 
emotions. While negative states are arguably the most likely to be subject to 
regulation (Gross, 2015; Tice and Bratslavsky 2000), there are many real-
world instances in which one might need to downregulate positive 
emotions (e.g. attempting to hide one’s amusement in a situation where its 
expression would be inappropriate). Additionally, the ability to maintain or 
upregulate both positive and negative states is an important aspect of 
emotion regulation (Carstensen et al., 2000; Gross, 2015; Gross et al., 2006; 
Larsen, 2000).  
 
All of the tasks reported in this thesis used social stimuli to induce emotion; 
thus, one should bear in mind that these findings relate only to emotion 
regulation abilities in the context of emotion induced through empathic 
processes. While one might reasonably assume that an individual's emotion 
regulation abilities would be relatively consistent across emotions induced 
by social and non-social stimuli, emotion regulation has been shown to be 
highly context-dependent (Aldao, 2013; Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema 2012; 
Suri et al., 2018). It would be beneficial for future work to examine how 
empathy is associated with emotion regulation abilities using a combination 
of social and non-social stimuli. 
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Effort was made to make each task as relevant to real-world emotion 
regulation as possible, however, the inherently artificial setting and 
procedure of lab-based tasks mean they may not provide a wholly accurate 
reflection of participants’ real-world emotion regulation abilities (Opitz et 
al., 2015). It would be beneficial for future work to build upon the present 
findings by examining how empathy relates to more ecologically valid 
measures of emotion regulation. In light of the speculative interpretation 
regarding potential differences in the relationship that components of 
empathy share with short- and long-term measures of emotion regulation, 
longitudinal studies and the use of ecological momentary assessment may 
prove especially informative (Kuppens et al. 2010; Moberly and Watkins 
2010).  
 
Even in light of the above limitations, given the paucity of empirical work on 
this topic, these studies make a significant contribution to current 
knowledge and represent an important step toward elucidating the nature 
of the relationship between empathy and emotion regulation. The findings 
also highlight important considerations regarding the relationship between 
different methods used to assess empathy and emotion regulation and 
prompt a number of actionable research questions that future work should 
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APPENDIX A: QCAE (Reniers et al., 2011) 
 
1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of 
view. 
2. I am usually objective when I watch a film or play, and I don’t often get 
completely caught up in it. 
3. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision. 
4. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective. 
5. When I am upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for 
a while. 
6. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I was in 
their place. 
7. I often get emotionally involved with my friends’ problems. 
8. I am inclined to get nervous when others around me seem to be nervous. 
9. People I am with have a strong influence on my mood. 
10. It affects me very much when one of my friends seems upset. 
11. I often get deeply involved with the feelings of a character in a film, play, 
or novel. 
12. I get very upset when I see someone cry. 
13. I am happy when I am with a cheerful group and sad when the others are 
glum. 
14. It worries me when others are worrying and panicky. 
15. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation. 
16. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another. 
17. It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much. 
18. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes. 
19. I am good at predicting how someone will feel. 
20. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or 
uncomfortable. 
21. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling 
and what they are thinking. 
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22. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am 
saying. 
23. Friends talk to me about their problems as they say that I am very 
understanding. 
24. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person does not tell me. 
25. I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about. 
26. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion. 
27. I am good at predicting what someone will do. 
28. I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I do not 
agree with it. 
29. I usually stay emotionally detached when watching a film. 
30. I always try to consider the other fellow’s feelings before I do 
something. 
31. Before I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to it. 
 
 
Subscales and scoring  
Cognitive empathy: 
Perspective taking: 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 
Online simulation: 1 (r), 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 28, 30, 31 
 
Affective empathy: 
Emotion contagion: 8, 9, 13, 14 
Proximal responsivity: 7, 10, 12, 23 
Peripheral responsivity: 2 (r), 11, 17 (r), 29 (r) 
 
 
Each item is responded to using a 4-point Likert scale, where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 4 = strongly agree. The two cognitive subscales are summed to 
produce the score on the cognitive empathy scale and the three affective 
subscales are summed to produce the affective empathy score. Reverse 







APPENDIX B: ERQ (Gross and John, 2003) 
 
1. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or 
amusement), I change what I’m thinking about. 
 
2. I keep my emotions to myself. 
 
3. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), 
I change what I’m thinking about. 
 
4. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express 
them. 
 
5. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it 
in a way that helps me stay calm. 
 
6. I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
 
7. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m 
thinking about the situation. 
 
8. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the 
situation I’m in. 
 
9. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express 
them. 
  
10. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m 
thinking about the situation. 
 
Subscales and scoring  
Reappraisal: sum of items 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10 
Suppression: sum of items 2, 4, 6, 9 
 
 
Each item is rated using a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 = Strongly disagree 






APPENDIX C: DERS-SF (Kaufman et al., 2016) 
 
1. I pay attention to how I feel. 
2. I have no idea how I am feeling. 
3. I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings. 
4. I care about what I am feeling. 
5. I am confused about how I feel. 
6. When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions. 
7. When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way. 
8. When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done. 
9. When I’m upset, I become out of control.  
10. When I’m upset, I believe that I’ll end up feeling very depressed.  
11. When I’m upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things.  
12. When I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way.  
13. When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating.  
14. When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviours.  
15. When I’m upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make 
myself feel better.  
16. When I’m upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way.  
17. When I’m upset, I lose control over my behaviours.  
18. When I’m upset, it takes me a long time to feel better. 
 
Subscales and scoring 
Awareness: 1 (r), 4 (r), 6 (r) 
Clarity: 2, 3, 5 
Impulse: 9, 14, 17 
Goals: 8, 11, 13 
Non-Acceptance: 7, 12, 16 
Strategies: 10, 15, 18 
Each item is rated using a 5-point response scale ranging from almost 
never (0-10%) to almost always (91-100%). Items on each subscale are 




APPENDIX D: Chapter 2 supplementary material 
D.1. Correlation analysis following outlier removal 
Reported here are the results from the chapter 2 trait analysis following 
outlier removal. Univariate and bivariate outliers were identified using a 
criterion of 3*IQR and Cook’s distance > 4/N (Bollen & Jackson, 1990), 
respectively (number of outlier cases removed <= 16). Normality was 
assessed using Kolmogorov Smirnov tests; Spearman’s rho is reported for 
correlations where any of the variable distributions showed significant 











APPENDIX E: Chapter 3 supplementary material 
E.1. Director task instructions  
In this task you will be shown a shelving unit with different objects 
positioned on some of the shelves. I will be viewing the same shelving unit 
from the opposite side and will give you verbal instructions to move a 
particular object to a new location. You will notice that some of the shelves 
have open backs whereas others are covered at the back, meaning that the 
objects on those shelves can not be seen from my side. When interpreting 
my instructions, you should consider which objects I can and can’t see from 
my perspective.  
 
Each trial will start with a fixation cross; please focus on this cross 
whenever it is present on screen. I will see the shelves just before you and 
will deliver my instruction, at which point you will see the shelving unit. 
You should first of all decide which object I am asking you to move and to 
which shelf location. As soon as you have identified the object and the new 
location, please click the left mouse button once. The cursor will then 
appear on the screen and you should click on the object you want to move, 
this will then be highlighted, and then click on the location you want to 
move this object to. You will then see the object move and the display will 
progress to the next fixation screen.  
 
While accuracy is most important for this task, you should still try to 
perform the task quickly; i.e. click the mouse button as soon as you are 









E.2. Director task trial-level instructions 
Practice 1 (self-perspective):   Move the big camera one shelf up 
Practice 2 (self-perspective):   Move the big ball one shelf up 
Practice 3 (self-perspective):   Move the ball over the top camera 
Practice 4 (director-perspective):  Move the big camera one shelf up 
Practice 5 (director-perspective):  Move the big ball one shelf up 
Practice 6 (director-perspective):  Move the ball over the top camera  
 
1. Move the bottom camera over the mouse 
2.  Move the big heart one shelf down 
3.  Move the leaf over the small cup 
4.  Move the big camera over the tape 
5.  Move the ice cream next to the top battery 
6.  Move the top cup under the yogurt 
7.  Move the small heart one shelf down 
8.  Move the perfume next to the bottom ball 
9.  Move the bottom camera two shelves up 
10.  Move the big heart one shelf up 
11.  Move the perfume next to the top ball 
12.  Move the big camera next to the ice 
13.  Move the bottom heart over the camera 
14.  Move the small triangle to the top corner 
15.  Move the top battery over the ice cream 
16.  Move the top camera one shelf down 
17.  Move the top triangle over the cup 
18.  Move the yogurt under the small cup 
19.  Move the small camera over the tape 
20.  Move the perfume next to the bottom triangle 
21.  Move the bottom ball under the perfume 
22.  Move the leaf over the big cup 
23.  Move the ice cream next to the bottom battery 






25.  Move the bottom cup to the top 
26.  Move the bottom ball two shelves up 
27.  Move the small camera next to the ice 
28.  Move the big triangle to the bottom corner 
29.  Move the top camera over the mouse 
30.  Move the small triangle two shelves up 
31.  Move the top heart over the camera 
32.  Move the yogurt under the big cup 
33.  Move the big battery under the ball 
34.  Move the small heart one shelf up 
35.  Move the perfume over the top triangle 
36.  Move the small battery under the ball 
37.  Move the bee over the big ball 
38.  Move the bottom cup under the yogurt 
39.  Move the big triangle one shelf down 
40.  Move the big battery one shelf up 
41.  Move the top ball under the perfume 
42.  Move the big heart next to the ball 
43.  Move the bottom triangle over the cup 
44.  Move the bottom battery over the ice cream 
45.  Move the top cup to the bottom 
46. Move the small battery one shelf up 
47. Move the top ball one shelf down 
48.  Move the small heart next to the ball 
 








E.3. RMET instructions 
On each trial you will see an image of some eyes. For each set of eyes, 
choose which word best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling by pressing the corresponding number on the 
keyboard. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but 
please choose just one word, the word which you consider to be most 
suitable. 
 
You should try to do the task as accurately as possible. Before making your 
choice, please make sure that you have read all 4 words. If you really don’t 
know what a word means you can look it up in the definition handout. 
 
 
E.4. SFM task instructions 
In this task you will be shown brief videos of people making different facial 
expressions. It will last around 4 minutes and you do not need to respond in 
any way. However, it is important that you look at and pay attention to the 













E.5. Correlation analysis following outlier removal 
Reported here are the results from the chapter 3 correlation analysis 
examining the relationship between task measures of cognitive/affective 
empathy and trait emotion regulation (DERS & ERQ). Univariate and 
bivariate outliers were identified using a criterion of 3*IQR and Cook’s 
distance > 4/N, respectively (number of outlier cases removed <= 9). 
Normality was assessed using Kolmogorov Smirnov tests; Spearman’s rho is 
reported for correlations where any of the variable distributions showed 
significant deviation from normality. 
 












E.6. Relationship between trait and task measures of empathy 
To better understand the different relationships with trait emotion 
regulation observed for these tasks and those observed for the trait 
empathy measure in chapter 2, the convergence between these different 
empathy measures were examined (table 3.3.2). The results highlight some 
interesting points of divergence between trait and task measures of 
cognitive/affective empathy, which could have implications for 
understanding the different relationships with emotion regulation observed 
across trait and task measures of empathy. 
 













APPENDIX F: Chapter 4 supplementary material 
F.1. Emo-GNG task instructions 
On each trial a face displaying an emotional expression will be presented on 
screen. You must press the ‘0’ key with the index finger of your right hand 
as fast as you can whenever you see a face displaying a particular emotional 
expression. Do NOT press the button when you see any other expression. 
At the start of each block you will be told which expression you should 
respond to.  
 
Example of block instructions: 
Press the ‘0’ key as fast as you can whenever you see a HAPPY face. Do NOT 
press for any other faces; only the HAPPY faces. 
 
 
F.2. Emo-Stroop task instructions 
On each trial a WORD and a FACE will be presented on screen. You must 
press a button on the keyboard to state whether the WORD is positively or 
negatively valenced. Try to ignore the face and respond as quickly as 
possible to the word. 
 
Press ‘1’ if the WORD is POSITIVE 
Press ‘2’ if the WORD is NEGATIVE 
 
Please press the appropriate key using either the index or middle finger of 
your right hand. Remember to respond to the word as fast as you can 







F.3. Correlation analysis following outlier removal 
Reported here are the results from the chapter 4 correlation analysis 
examining the relationship between trait empathy and task measures of 
implicit emotion regulation (Emo-GNG & Emo-Stroop), with outlier cases 
removed. Univariate and bivariate outliers were identified using a criterion 
of 3*IQR and Cook’s distance > 4/N, respectively (number of outlier cases 
removed <= 5). Normality was assessed using Kolmogorov Smirnov tests; 
Spearman’s rho is reported for correlations where any of the variable 
distributions showed significant deviation from normality. 
 












F.4. Relationship between trait and task measures of emotion regulation 
Reported here are the correlations between the Emo-GNG and Emo-Stroop 
task metrics and a trait emotion regulation measure (ERQ).  
 
ERQ-Emo GNG/Emo-Stroop correlations 
 
 














APPENDIX G: Chapter 5 supplementary material 
G.1. Implicit reappraisal task instructions 
BLOCK 1 (freeview): 
You will be shown a series of images. After each image you will be asked to 
rate how pleasant/unpleasant the image made you feel. Please provide 
accurate and honest ratings based upon your initial reaction to the image.  
 
BLOCK 2 (framed): 
In this block, before each image you will see a sentence that provides some 
context for what is happening in the image. As in the previous block you 
will be asked to rate how pleasant/unpleasant each image made you feel. 
Please provide accurate and honest ratings based upon your initial reaction 
to the image. 
 
G.2. Implicit reappraisal task stimuli  
Neutral IAPS image numbers and frame sentences from the implicit 






Negative IAPS image numbers and frame sentences from the implicit 











G.3. Explicit reappraisal task instructions 
You will be shown a series of images. After each image you will be asked to 
rate: (1) how pleasant/unpleasant you felt in response to the image; (2) how 
much arousal you felt in response to the image. Please be entirely honest in 
your ratings.  
 
Prior to each image you will be shown a written instruction to either: (1) 
WATCH, or (2) RETHINK. When the instruction is “WATCH”, attend to the 
image and allow any thoughts and feelings to arise as they naturally would. 
Do not try to change the feelings that arise, and keep your eyes on the 
picture the entire time it is on screen.  
 
When the instruction is “RETHINK”, try to think about what is happening in 
the depicted situation in a way that helps you feel less negative. For 
example, you could try to think that whatever is happening is not as bad as 
it looks or will soon be resolved. You could also think about the steps that 
could be taken to change the situation. 
 
Please keep your eyes on the image the entire time it is on the screen and 
do not think about unrelated things. None of the images you will see are 
staged and it is important that you treat the depicted situations as real and 
do not simply think that the images are fake. Try to start thinking 
differently about the depicted situation as soon as the picture appears on 
the screen; continue to think differently until it disappears.  
 
Some pictures may not make you feel particularly negative. Nevertheless, 
we ask that you try to find ways to think differently about the picture so 







G.4. Explicit reappraisal task stimuli 
Negative IAPS image numbers from the explicit reappraisal task 

































Neutral IAPS image numbers from the explicit reappraisal task 





























G.5. Correlation analysis following outlier removal 
Reported here are the results from the chapter 5 correlation analysis 
examining the relationship between trait empathy and task measures of 
implicit and explicit reappraisal. Univariate and bivariate outliers were 
identified using a criterion of 3*IQR and Cook’s distance > 4/N, 
respectively. Univariate and bivariate outliers were identified using a 
criterion of 3*IQR and Cook’s distance > 4/N, respectively (number of 
outlier cases removed <= 7). Normality was assessed using Kolmogorov 
Smirnov tests; Spearman’s rho is reported for correlations where any of the 
variable distributions showed significant deviation from normality. 
 
Implicit reappraisal task-QCAE correlations 
 
 






G.6. Relationship between trait and task measures of reappraisal 
Reported here are the relationships between the ERQ measure of habitual 
reappraisal use and key metrics of reappraisal magnitude from the implicit 
and explicit reappraisal tasks.  
 

















APPENDIX H: Chapter 6 supplementary material 
H.1. Spontaneous and instructed regulation task instructions 
 
BLOCK 1 instructions: 
You will be shown a series of images. Please attend to each image and allow 
any thoughts and feelings to arise as they naturally would. After each image 
you will be asked to rate: (1) how pleasant/unpleasant you felt in response 
to the image; (2) how much arousal you felt in response to the image. Please 
be entirely honest in your ratings.  
 
 
BLOCK 2 instructions: 
In this next block, each image will be preceded by an instruction to either: 
(1) ATTEND, or (2) REGULATE. When the instruction is “ATTEND”, simply 
attend to the image as in the previous block and allow any thoughts and 
feelings to arise as they naturally would.  
 
When the instruction is “REGULATE”, try to reduce any emotional response 
that the image evokes, so that you feel less negative about it. You can do 
whatever you wish to try to feel less negative, we just ask that you don’t 
close your eyes or look away from the image. Please keep your eyes on the 
image the entire time it is on the screen. 
 
None of the images you will see are staged and it is important that you treat 
the depicted situations as real. Some pictures may not make you feel 
particularly negative. Nevertheless, we ask that you try to find ways to 









H.2. Spontaneous and instructed regulation task stimuli 
Negative IAPS image numbers from the regulation task 















































Neutral IAPS image numbers from the regulation task 
 






























H.3. Correlation analysis following outlier removal 
Reported here are the results from the chapter 6 correlation analysis 
testing the relationship between trait/task measures of empathy and task 
measures of spontaneous recovery and instructed regulation magnitude. 
Univariate and bivariate outliers were identified using a criterion of 3*IQR 
and Cook’s distance > 4/N, respectively (number of outlier cases removed 
<= 8). Normality was assessed using Kolmogorov Smirnov tests; Spearman’s 
rho is reported for correlations where any of the variable distributions 
showed significant deviation from normality. 
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H.4. Relationship between trait and task measures of emotion regulation 
To assess the convergent validity of the block 1 regulation task metrics of 
reactivity and spontaneous recovery, the relationship between these 
metrics and the DERS were examined. Reported here are the relationships 
between the DERS measure of self-reported difficulties in emotion 
regulation and self-report and corrugator EMG task metrics of emotional 
reactivity, spontaneous recovery, and instructed regulation magnitude. 
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